State v. Eyre

Decision Date12 August 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20190977,20190977
Citation500 P.3d 776
Parties The STATE of Utah, Respondent, v. Matthew Gordon EYRE, Petitioner.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Andrea J. Garland, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Lindsey Wheeler, Asst. Solic. Gen., for respondent

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 "No problem of criminal law is of more fundamental importance or has proved more baffling through the centuries than the determination of the precise mental element or mens rea necessary for crime." Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea , 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (footnote omitted). Today, we address whether a jury instruction detailing the mens rea1 required to convict under an accomplice-liability theory was erroneous and, if so, whether a convicted defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to it.

¶2 Accurately conveying the required mental element of a crime in jury instructions is right up there in "fundamental importance" alongside accurately determining the mental element. This importance is on display today as we conclude the defendant, Matthew Eyre, has been convicted and incarcerated based on an erroneous mens rea jury instruction—an instruction to which trial counsel should have objected. And this failure to object prejudiced Eyre as competing factual scenarios created the possibility that he was convicted without meeting the requisite mens rea . Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals on the jury instruction issue, vacate Eyre's conviction, and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On the morning of August 28, 2016, Daniel Simon and Natanni Xoumphonphackdy were parked in Simon's Dodge Challenger near 300 South 600 West. Nearby, Matthew Gordon Eyre, Jesse Ray Rakes, and Michael Sean Polk were sitting in a PT Cruiser. When Rakes noticed the Challenger, he allegedly told Eyre and Polk that he wanted to steal it and said he was going to ask for a jump start.

¶4 Rakes approached the Challenger and asked Simon for help jump-starting the Cruiser. Simon agreed to help and moved his vehicle so that it was "nose to nose" in a "V" shape to the Cruiser.

¶5 Simon then got out of his Challenger, lifted up the hood, and stood near his passenger window between the two vehicles. Rakes also propped up the hood of his car and joined Simon between the vehicles, and the two engaged in small talk. By this point, Eyre and Polk had also exited the Cruiser and began to look for jumper cables in the back of the Cruiser. Feeling like it was taking too long, Simon asked Rakes if they had cables. Rakes then lifted his shirt, flashing a pistol in his waistband, and said something to the effect of: "You know what this is. We are taking everything." Notably, it is unclear if Rakes used the singular first-person pronoun "I" or the plural "we." Rakes also threatened to "pistol whip" Xoumphonphackdy if she did not exit the Challenger.

¶6 At this point, Xoumphonphackdy discretely handed Simon a pistol through the car window. As Simon attempted to back away from Rakes, Rakes pursued, "drawing his gun in [Simon's] direction." Simon then fatally shot Rakes. Eyre fled the scene. A collision occurred between the Challenger and Cruiser, which resulted in the Cruiser flipping over.

¶7 Eyre was arrested shortly after the incident and subsequently interviewed. No gun was found on him. In his interview, Eyre gave three accounts of the incident. Initially, Eyre denied being present, said he "did not shoot anybody," and said he did not "see anybody get shot." He said he only "heard the sirens" and "heard a shot." But then Eyre admitted to being in the car with Rakes and Polk when Rakes had asked Simon for a jump start. He also admitted to getting out of the car to look for cables upon Rakes's command. After finding no cables, Eyre said he walked around the car where he saw Rakes give chase to Simon before Simon shot Rakes.

¶8 After learning Rakes had died, Eyre alleged that it was Rakes's idea to steal Simon's car. He said that when Rakes initially saw the Challenger, Rakes told Eyre and Polk that he was going to take it. Eyre claimed that he told Rakes to leave them alone, that it was a "dumb ass idea," that he did not want to drive a stolen vehicle, and said, "I won't do it." Eyre said his refusal angered Rakes, who quickly dismissed Eyre's protest, stated he was going to ask for a jump start, and got out of the Cruiser. At this point, Eyre claimed that Rakes was "running the show" and that he and Polk got out to look for cables in the back of the Cruiser. Eyre claimed that, immediately prior to the shooting, he walked up to Rakes and Simon and indistinctly heard Rakes say "something" to Simon. He then saw Rakes give chase to Simon before Simon shot Rakes. When later asked about the "plan," Eyre stated that they had no plan.

¶9 In addition to Eyre's claims that he did not want to commit the robbery, there is conflicting testimony as to Eyre's actions during the robbery. Some testimony indicates that Eyre had approached Rakes and Simon between the cars and had also brandished a gun. But both Eyre and, notably, Xoumphonphackdy testified that Eyre did not engage in conversation with Simon or Rakes and did not possess or flash a gun. Xoumphonphackdy also testified that Eyre did not "do anything to further [the] crime." In addition to telling the police he was not armed during the robbery, Eyre claimed that he was unaware whether Rakes was armed.

¶10 Eyre was charged as an accomplice to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under a theory of accomplice liability. The State argued that Eyre acted as an accomplice by allegedly pretending to look for jumper cables and by allegedly threatening Simon with a gun.

¶11 A jury trial was held in October 2017. At trial, the jury was given three instructions on accomplice liability. Defense counsel stipulated to the inclusion of these instructions.

¶12 The jury found Eyre guilty, and he was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years to life. He timely appealed on multiple grounds. Relevant to our determination today, Eyre argued that jury Instruction No. 40 was erroneous and trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to it. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding "that the instructions as a whole adequately instructed the jury on accomplice liability for aggravated robbery" and that trial counsel's performance was thus not deficient. State v. Eyre , 2019 UT App 162, ¶ 21, 452 P.3d 1197. Eyre petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this court granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 "On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same standard of review used by the court of appeals. We review the court of appeals’ decision for correctness." Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo , 2012 UT 94, ¶ 10, 296 P.3d 709 (citation omitted). Further, "[c]laims of erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that we review for correctness." State v. Jeffs , 2010 UT 49, ¶ 16, 243 P.3d 1250.

¶14 When we review a jury verdict, we typically "examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Heaps , 2000 UT 5, ¶ 2, 999 P.2d 565. This standard of review, however, is not helpful for us today, as we are not aware of which version of events the jurors accepted in reaching a guilty verdict, and all conflicting versions of the event could have led a reasonable juror to convict under an instruction that erroneously allows for a lesser mens rea . As such, we examine the evidence of all factual scenarios presented to the jury upon which the jury could have convicted under the erroneous instruction.

ANALYSIS

¶15 Though Eyre argues for reversal based on three distinct legal theories, we conclude that we need only address one in order to dispose of this case: whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to object to jury Instruction No. 40.2 In short, we agree with Eyre's argument. We begin our analysis with an explanation of the mens rea requirements under a theory of accomplice liability. We then turn our analysis to Eyre's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding that no reasonable attorney would have agreed to the instruction and that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Eyre.

I. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND MENS REA

¶16 As anyone who has sat through the first day of an introductory course on criminal law knows, mens rea (or mental state) is typically a requisite of criminality. See, e.g., State v. Bird , 2015 UT 7, ¶ 14, 345 P.3d 1141 ("A mens rea element is an essential element of [an] offense." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Barela , 2015 UT 22, ¶ 26, 349 P.3d 676 ("[O]ur criminal code requires proof of mens rea for each element of a non-strict liability crime."); UTAH CODE § 76-2-102 ("Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state ...."). But while most offenses require a showing of only one culpable mental state, accomplice liability requires at least two.

¶17 This branched mens rea requirement is codified in the Utah accomplice liability statute. The statute provides: "Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct." UTAH CODE § 76-2-202. The first mens rea element—"[e]very person, acting with the mental state required for the...

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