State v. Fabritz

• Decision Date: 03 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 29,29
• Citation: 276 Md. 416,348 A.2d 275
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Virginia Lynnette FABRITZ.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 416

276 Md. 416

348 A.2d 275

STATE of Maryland v. Virginia Lynnette FABRITZ.

No. 29.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 3, 1975.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Warren F. Sengstack, State's Atty. for Calvert County, Prince Frederick, on the brief), for appellant.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, and Richard J. Clark, Dist. Public Defender, LaPlata, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Maryland Code (1971 Repl.Vol., 1975 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 35A(a) provides that any parent or other person having custody of a child under eighteen years of age 'who causes abuse to such minor child' shall be guilty of a felony. The statute defines the term 'abuse' in subsection (b) 7 to mean:

'any physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of malicious act or acts . . ..'

Virginia Lynnette Febritz (Virginia) was charged with violating this statute by abusing her three-and-one-half-year-old daughter Windy. Evidence adduced at the trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Calvert County showed that Windy was brought to the Calvert County Hospital at 10:35 p.m. on October 3, 1973 in a badly beaten condition with approximately seventy bruises or contusions covering her body, ranging in size from one inch to five inches. She was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, her death being attributed to peritonitis resulting from a perforated or ruptured duodenum. The evidence showed that Windy's injuries were the result of 'blunt trama' caused by an instrument, or a fist, or some kind of blow inflicted within eighteen to twenty-four hours prior to her death.

Virginia had left Windy in the custody of Thomas Crockett and his wife Ann, with whom she resided, on October 1. Virginia did not see Windy again until 1 p.m. on October 3, at which time she noticed that Windy was very listless. Crockett told her that Windy had driven with him on his motorcycle and had gotten sick as a result of a bumpy ride. At 2:30 p.m. Windy complained of cramps and was running a slight fever; Virginia attributed this to the flu. She then bathed Windy and, after observing her badly beaten body, put her to bed and spent the remainder of the afternoon watching Crockett work on his motorcycle. At 5 p.m. Virginia observed that Windy appeared to be in a semiconscious state, but she did not take her to the hospital because she 'was too ashamed of the bruises on her daughter's body.' There was evidence that Windy thereafter sat up and appeared normal for a brief period, but at 6 p.m. she vomited and again complained that she did not feel well. At 7 p.m. Virginia put Windy back to bed and called a friend, Connie Schaeffer, and asked that she look at Windy. Miss Schaeffer arrived at 9 p.m. Windy was lying on the floor of the den, covered by a wet diaper. She was limp and appeared unconscious. When Miss Schaeffer questioned Virginia about the bruises on Windy's body, Virginia responded, 'Tommy (Crockett) hits hard.' Windy's condition worsened and at 9:45 p.m. Ann Crockett contacted the hospital. She was advised to bring Windy to the hospital immediately. After Mrs. Crockett left for the hospital with Windy, Virginia told Miss Schaeffer, 'It is my fault. I killed her.' Shortly thereafter, Virginia went to the hospital and learned that Windy was dead.

Expert medical evidence was adduced to show that a child with peritonitis would vigorously complain once she sustained the injury and would continue to complain until the onset of a coma; that at the time the injuries were sustained, there would have been immediate pain and the child would have begun to feel poorly; that the pain would have gradually increased, followed by fever, vomiting, and lack of appetite; that within six hours prior to death, the child would have become stuporous and comatose; that Windy would have lived had an operation been performed within at least twelve hours prior to death; and that she would have had a chance to survive if surgery had been performed up to an hour before death. A pathologist testified that it was his medical opinion, based upon the degree of injury, the multiplicity of wounds and his examination of Windy's body, that the injuries did not happen accidentally. There was no evidence indicating that Virginia struck the blows which caused the initial injuries to her child, nor was there any evidence to show that Virginia had knowledge that the person in whose custody she left Windy would abuse her.

The trial court instructed the jury that a parent is under an affirmative duty to provide reasonable medical necessities to his child and would be guilty of child abuse under the statute if the treatment afforded to the child was 'cruel or inhumane and it results in physical injury'; that the 'physical injury may be death itself'; and that 'the unattended worsening of obvious serious medical condition if cruel or inhumane and if more serious consequences result, is in itself . . . a physical injury within the meaning of the terms as they are used in the Statute.' The jury found Virginia guilty of the offense and she was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that 'to be guilty under the statute, the accused must be shown to have caused the injury, not simply aggravated it by failure to seek assistance.' Fabritz v. State, 24 Md.App. 708 at 714, 332 A.2d 324 at 327 (1975). In so concluding, the court said that there was nothing in the statute indicating that it was the legislative intent to encompass within its provisions parents who withhold the necessities of life, including medical care, from their children. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals properly interpreted the child abuse statute.

The State contends that Virginia's failure to provide medical care to Windy in the circumstances of this case amounted to child abuse within the meaning of the statute. More specifically, the State urges that the evidence showed that Windy was the victim of a medical condition known as the 'battered child syndrome'; that the beating Windy suffered caused peritonitis which resulted 'in a gradual and continuous general deterioration of the child's health and well-being culminating in her death'; that although there was no evidence that Virginia was the individual who beat Windy, she was 'fully aware of her child's beaten condition . . . (but) failed for a period of several hours to seek medical attention for her child and . . . her inaction amounted to child abuse'; and that while there was no evidence that Windy's injuries resulted from any 'malicious act' perpetrated by Virginia, her failure to obtain medical attention for her daughter constituted, within the sense contemplated by the statute, 'cruel or inhumane treatment' and was a contributing cause of the 'physical injury' which the child sustained.

On Virginia's behalf it is argued that to be guilty of child abuse under § 35A, a person must have 'caused' the child to suffer physical injury as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment. Virginia claims that § 35A 'concerns injuries as a result of the treatment or acts of the accused' and that because Windy was injured and died as a consequence of blows inflicted by someone other than herself, her failure to obtain medical aid for Windy was not the cause of the child's injuries or death. Virginia maintains that the gist of the statutory offense of child abuse is not cruel or inhumane treatment but rather the infliction of physical injuries upon a child as a result of such treatment.

The cardinal rule in the construction of statutes is to effectuate the real and actual intention of the Legislature. Purifoy v. Merc.-Safe Dep. & Trust, 273 Md. 58, 327 A.2d 483 (1974); Scoville Serv. Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 306 A.2d 534 (1973); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961). Equally well settled is the principle that statutes are to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished, Walker v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 98, 223 A.2d 181 (1966), and in light of the evils or mischief sought to be remedied, Mitchell v. State, 115 Md. 360, 80 A.2d 1020 (1911); in other words, every statutory enactment must be 'considered in its entirety, and in the context of the purpose underlying (its) enactment,' Giant of Md. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501 at 509, 298 A.2d 427, at 432 (1973). Of course, a statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of its language, since it is the language of the statute which constitutes the primary source for determining the legislative intent. Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assess., 271 Md. 232, 315 A.2d 758 (1974); Height v. State, supra. Where there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. Purifoy v. Merc.-Safe Deposit & Trust, supra. Thus, where statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, courts are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning. Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609, 224 A.2d 677 (1966). On the other hand, as stated in Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949), '(a)dherence to the meaning of words does not require or permit isolation of words from their context. '* * * (since) the meaning of the plainest words in a statute may be controlled by the context. . . . " In construing statutes, therefore, results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible...