State v. Fairchild

Decision Date29 September 2016
Docket NumberNo. 20131118–CA,20131118–CA
Citation385 P.3d 696,2016 UT App 205
Parties STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Steven Michael FAIRCHILD, Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Thomas S. Bowman, Aaron K. Bergman, Logan and Wayne K. Caldwell, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee.

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen and Kate A. Toomey concurred.

Opinion

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Steven Michael Fairchild appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial and its imposition of consecutive sentences. The issues on appeal relate to the fairness of the trial and sentence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 On November 16, 2011, Defendant and his girlfriend (Girlfriend) agreed to rob a bank. The couple left Logan, Utah, where Defendant resided, and drove to West Valley City, Utah, where friends paid them $100 to deliver psychedelic mushrooms the following day. Next, Defendant and Girlfriend drove to a pawnshop in Evanston, Wyoming, in the middle of the night. Girlfriend parked the car and waited for Defendant, who went inside, remained for less than two minutes, and returned with five guns.

¶3 The next day, the couple drove back to Logan, where they decided to rob a gas station instead of a bank. The couple entered the targeted gas station, Girlfriend wearing a red bandana and baggy clothing and Defendant dressed in a black ski mask, a black jacket, jeans, and white shoes. Each had a gun. Girlfriend remained by the gas station door as Defendant walked into the store toward the cash register. Defendant waved a gun in an employee's face and ordered her to open the cash drawer. Defendant stole the money from the register and a pack of Camel brand cigarettes and then fled. During the course of the robbery, a second employee came out of the storeroom, saw Defendant, and heard him order the first employee to "[o]pen the registers." She also saw Girlfriend.

¶4 That night, the couple bought and delivered the psychedelic mushrooms they had promised their friends. Meanwhile, police had been investigating the robbery at the gas station. As a part of the investigation, a third gas station employee (Employee) viewed surveillance video of the robbery, which included a recording of the robber's voice. Based on his voice, Employee recognized the gunman as Defendant. She was familiar with Defendant's voice because of extensive interaction with him: he was a regular customer at the gas station; she had previously hired him to build her porch; and she had recommended him for a job at her other place of employment, where he was hired and where they occasionally crossed paths. Employee also identified him in a video from his November 13 visit to the gas station when she said that he bought Camel cigarettes from her.2

¶5 Police also showed photographs of the robbery to Defendant's parole officer (Parole Officer). Parole Officer observed that the male suspect's clothing matched the clothes Defendant wore during a parole visit the day before the robbery. Police arrested Defendant and Girlfriend on November 20. During the arrest, police searched Defendant's truck and found Girlfriend's bandana and wallet in the glove compartment, a pack of Camel brand cigarettes by the ashtray, a cooler that contained a large quantity of psychedelic mushrooms, and four guns.3

¶6 The State charged Defendant with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony; four counts of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony; one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; and four counts of receiving stolen property, a second degree felony. The State also sought to enhance Defendant's sentence by having him designated as a habitual violent offender. The parties agreed that the judge would determine whether Defendant was a habitual violent offender and that the remaining issues would be tried to a jury.

¶7 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence, under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that Defendant was convicted of robbing two Logan banks in December 1998 and January 1999. The State argued that this evidence would show motive, plan, intent, and identity and that it was not attempting to impugn Defendant's character or establish his criminal propensity. The court denied the State's motion and ordered that it not put on evidence of Defendant's prior crimes at trial. One day before trial, Defendant moved to sever the "restricted person" requirement from the rest of the restricted-person-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge. Instead, the parties stipulated that the "restricted person" requirement was satisfied. The court agreed, ordering that it would instruct the jury as to Defendant's restricted status but "would not allow any evidence regarding [Defendant's] previous convictions or the reasons why he is a restricted person."

¶8 Despite the 404(b) pretrial order and the stipulation, there were multiple references to Defendant's status as a parolee during trial. First, during the State's opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Parole Officer "was a supervisor over [Defendant's parole]," and Defendant's trial counsel did not object. Indeed, trial counsel characterized Parole Officer in much the same way during his own opening statement. Later, Parole Officer testified that he knew Defendant in his capacity as a parole officer, stating that "in June of 2011, [Defendant] paroled from prison to my caseload." But he did not say why Defendant previously had been imprisoned, and the prosecutor asked no follow-up questions. Defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial motion.

¶9 During closing arguments, Defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor each referred to Defendant's status as a parolee. First, trial counsel said, "in the late fall of 2011, [Defendant] and [Girlfriend] went to the office of [Parole Officer]. They asked ... permission to live together, to further their relationship. [He] granted their request." And the prosecutor repeated Parole Officer's name and title before stating, "He supervised the defendant."

¶10 When the court was preparing to instruct the jury that Defendant was a restricted person, the prosecutor suggested that the instruction include that Defendant was on parole at the time of the gas station robbery. The court refused, stating, "Well, I don't want to bring any more attention to that fact, frankly. I shouldn't have—well, parole, we're okay with that." The court ultimately issued a limiting instruction, informing the jury that Parole Officer only mentioned Defendant's parole to show that he

knows the defendant and is familiar with him. Do not use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that the defendant is guilty of the crimes for which he is now on trial.... You may not convict a person simply because you believe he may have committed some other acts at another time.

¶11 The jury also heard testimony from Girlfriend, the two employees who were at the gas station during the robbery, and Employee. One of the employees testified that the robber had blue eyes, but Defendant has brown eyes. The State also presented the gas station's surveillance video, which showed the male suspect wore a dark hooded jacket, jeans, and white shoes. And it presented evidence of the items police found in Defendant's truck—the bandana, wallet, Camel cigarettes, psychedelic mushrooms, and guns.

¶12 The jury returned a guilty verdict on each of the ten counts against Defendant. The court then initiated a bench trial on the issue of whether Defendant was a habitual violent offender. It determined that he was. At sentencing, the trial court imposed indeterminate sentences of five years to life for aggravated robbery and each of the four weapons possession charges, one to fifteen years for the drug possession charge, and one to fifteen years for each theft by receiving stolen property charge. The court ordered that these sentences run consecutively to each other and to the sentence Defendant was already serving.4

¶13 Defendant then filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the statements during trial that he was on parole violated the pretrial order and unfairly prejudiced him. The court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that Parole Officer's testimony did not violate the pretrial order and that, even if it did, the error was harmless both because the totality of the evidence supported conviction and because the curative instruction ameliorated any potential harm.

¶14 Finally, Defendant filed a motion challenging the legality of his sentence. Citing Utah Code section 76–3–401, he asserted that consecutive sentences can never exceed thirty years. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that Defendant received five sentences with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and the thirty-year limitation does not apply to offenses with the possible maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76–3–401(1)(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial and his sentence.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because, as he contends, the multiple references to his status as a parolee violated the trial court's pretrial order and his rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, and a fair trial. "We will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Maestas , 2012 UT 46, ¶ 103, 299 P.3d 892. A trial court abuses its discretion where "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Gerrard , 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). "[W]e review the legal standards applied by the trial court in denying such a motion for correctness ... [and] the trial court's factual findings for...

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