State v. Falandes
| Decision Date | 04 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | K3-2015-0304A |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
| Parties | STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. ANDREW N. FALANDES |
DECISION
Before the Court is Andrew Falandes's (Defendant) "Motion to Suppress Breath Test Results." Defendant avers that his consent to a breath test administered by the East Greenwich Police Department (the Department) was invalid because he was not adequately warned of all penalties and consequences that could be imposed upon him if he refused to take the breath test. The State maintains that Defendant's consent was valid because the "Rights for Use at Station" form (Rights Form) that was read, acknowledged, and signed by Defendant was adequate. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion to suppress.
On April 18, 2015, Defendant was arrested by officers of the East Greenwich Police (the Police) on suspicion of driving under the influence. He was taken into custody and transported to the Department, where he was read a Rights Form. Defendant consented to a breath test, which revealed his blood alcohol content (BAC) to be .15 percent, almost twice the legal limit of .08 percent. The State brought charges against Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed the instant motion to suppress, and an evidentiary hearing (the Hearing) was scheduled and heard on October 15, 2015. At the Hearing, the arresting officer, Patrolman Matthew Larson (Officer Larson), testified for the State.
Officer Larson has worked for the Department since graduating from the Municipal Police Academy (the Academy) in 2012. He received training in identifying suspects driving under the influence at the Academy and continues to receive DUI training annually at the Department.
Officer Larson was on duty the night of April 18, 2015, patrolling "District Two," which encompasses the area in East Greenwich between Post Road and Route 4. Around 6:00 p.m., Officer Larson was observing traffic on Main Street from an abandoned Sunoco gas station when he received a broadcast from the Department's Dispatch Officer (Dispatch). Dispatch advised Officer Larson that there was an "erratic operator" driving northbound in a red sports car with Massachusetts registration plates. A few minutes later, Officer Larson observed a red Mitsubishi Eclipse—with a Massachusetts registration—traveling northbound at a high rate of speed. The car proceeded to "cut off" another automobile and commit several other motor vehicle violations. Officer Larson activated his overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop.
As Officer Larson approached the vehicle, he noticed Defendant in the driver's seat and an unidentified female passenger. He also detected an odor of alcohol emanating from the car. Officer Larson asked Defendant if he had been drinking; Defendant answered in the negative. In addition to smelling alcohol, Officer Larson observed Defendant's eyes to be bloodshot and watery, and his speech was slurred. Officer Larson again asked Defendant if he had consumed alcohol, and Defendant responded that he had consumed "a few" drinks at the beach. Subsequently, Officer Larson ordered Defendant out of the car and conducted several field sobriety tests, such as the "horizontal gaze" and "one leg balance" tests, among others. Based on Defendant's poor performance of these tests, he was placed under arrest and transported to the Department.
At the Department, Defendant read, acknowledged, and signed a Rights Form, agreeing to submit to a breath test. The Rights Form, in relevant part, states the following:
Officer Larson "did not tell him about anything not on [the Rights] Form," and further "told him it was his choice" whether to refuse or take the breath test. Defendant submitted to two chemical tests, which revealed his BAC to be .15 percent, almost twice the legal limit. Defendant was released from the Department around 8:25 p.m.
On cross-examination, Officer Larson conceded that the Rights Form had been changed twice since Defendant's arrest, and the Rights Form currently used (the New Rights Form) was submitted into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit A. See Def.'s Ex. A. In comparing the two rights forms, the New Rights Form differs from the Rights Form read to Defendant inasmuch as it advises, "[y]ou may also qualify for a conditional hardship license to get to and from employment, which can only be granted in conjunction with the installation of an interlock system." Additionally, Officer Larson affirmed that there was no discussion regarding an ignition interlock device or conditional hardship license.
On April 18, 2015, the State filed a criminal complaint (the Complaint) in District Court charging Defendant with driving under the influence of liquor, first offense, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2(d)(1). The Complaint alleges that Defendant "[d]id operate a vehicle in this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs in violation of § 31-27-2 greater than .15+ BAC." Subsequently, on May 1, 2015, the Complaint was filed with the Superior Court. Defendant filed a "Motion to Suppress Breath Test Results" with this Court, arguing that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the chemical test because he was not informed of potential penalties that could be imposed upon him. Additionally, Defendant maintains that his consent was coerced because the Police overstated the penalties that could be imposed upon him. The State filed an objection.
The Rhode Island General Assembly amended § 31-27-2, entitled "Driving under [the] influence of liquor or drugs" (the DUI Statute), with an effective date of January 1, 2015. The relevant part of the DUI Statute provides as follows:
Accompanying the DUI Statute is § 31-27-2.1(b)(1), entitled "Refusal to submit to chemical test" (the Refusal Statute). The Refusal Statute provides that, upon a suspect's first refusal of a breath test, the following sanctions shall be imposed:
Sec. 31-27-2.1(b)(1).
Notably, the Refusal Statute and DUI Statute are two separate statutes and thus can be enforced independently. See State v. DiStefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1162 (R.I. 2000) ().
Both the Refusal and DUI Statutes reference § 31-27-2.8, which is entitled "Ignition interlock system imposed as part of sentence—Requirements" (the Interlock Statute). The Interlock Statute was also amended by the General Assembly and took effect on January 1, 2015. The Interlock Statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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