State v. Falls Down
| Decision Date | 03 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-279.,02-279. |
| Citation | 2003 MT 300,318 Mont. 219,79 P.3d 797 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Myron FALLS DOWN, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: William Hooks, Helena, Montana.
For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana.
¶ 1 Myron Falls Down (Falls Down) appeals the judgment entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, on a jury verdict finding him guilty of deliberate homicide, attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnaping, two counts of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of sexual intercourse without consent by accountability.
¶ 2 We affirm the District Court.
¶ 3 We address and restate the following issues on appeal:
¶ 4 1. Did the District Court err in denying four of Falls Down's challenges for cause?
¶ 5 2. Did the District Court err in denying Falls Down's objection to the State's peremptory challenge?
¶ 6 3. Did the District Court err in denying Falls Down's motion for a mistrial or for additional individual voir dire when the State asked the jury about their knowledge regarding post traumatic stress disorder?
¶ 7 Falls Down was convicted by a jury of deliberate homicide, attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnaping, two counts of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of sexual intercourse without consent by accountability.
¶ 8 Before his jury trial, individual voir dire was conducted. During individual voir dire, the potential jurors were asked to complete a questionnaire. The District Court, the State of Montana (State), and Falls Down then questioned the potential jurors who either had personal knowledge of the case, had heard about the case, or had answered affirmatively to any of the questions on the questionnaire.
¶ 9 During this questioning, Falls Down challenged for cause four potential jurors. These four jurors included: A.C., J.B., D.R., and M.S. Additional facts regarding their statements will be discussed as they become applicable in the following analysis.
¶ 10 The District Court denied three of Falls Down's challenges for cause without explanation. As to the fourth challenge for cause, the District Court denied the challenge, stating generally that the law simply requires that an attorney obtain a commitment from a potential juror that the juror can set aside any personal biases.
¶ 11 After conducting individual voir dire, the State and Falls Down then conducted general voir dire on the 48 potential jurors chosen from the individual voir dire process.
¶ 12 During this general voir dire, both the State and Falls Down exercised their first six peremptory challenges on the first 24 potential jurors questioned. In so doing, the State removed R.M., the only juror of a different ethnic background. Falls Down removed the four jurors, whom he was unsuccessful in challenging for cause, thereby using four of his six peremptory challenges.
¶ 13 Falls Down objected to the State's peremptory challenge, citing "Battin" in support of his argument that such a challenge needed an explanation. The State countered by explaining it removed R.M. because it felt she would not be fair and impartial given that her son had been charged with an assault case and her husband had been involved in an assault case. The District Court then denied Falls Down's objection, without finding that purposeful discrimination had not occurred in removing R.M. from the jury.
¶ 14 Also during general voir dire, the State asked the jurors if any of them knew about or had experience with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In response to this question, two jurors stated that they had first-hand knowledge regarding the behavioral manifestations of PTSD. The State then asked these jurors to explain what behavioral manifestations they had observed. This line of questioning then concluded with the State asking whether the jurors would hold these behavioral manifestations against a witness. The jurors agreed that they would not and that they would use their common sense and experience in evaluating the testimony.
¶ 15 Falls Down did not object to the State's questioning until he began his general voir dire. At that time, Falls Down moved for a mistrial, arguing that the questioning, in effect, bolstered and vouched for the State's main witness. The District Court denied Falls Down's motion for a mistrial, finding that because the State did not mention the witness's name, no witness bolstering occurred.
¶ 16 Falls Down now appeals the District Court's judgment.
¶ 17 We review whether a court, in granting or denying a challenge for cause, has abused its discretion. State v. Good, 2002 MT 59, ¶ 41, 309 Mont. 113, ¶ 41, 43 P.3d 948, ¶ 41. If a court has abused its discretion in granting or denying a challenge for cause, we then determine whether a conviction should be set aside as a result of that error. Good, ¶ 41.
¶ 18 Did the District Court err in denying four of Falls Down's challenges for cause?
¶ 19 Falls Down argues that because the District Court erroneously denied his four challenges for cause, he had to use four of his six peremptory challenges to remove the jurors. In effect, Falls Down argues that the District Court denied him his statutorily entitled peremptory challenges. Further, Falls Down argues that even though the potential jurors indicated that they could be fair and impartial, that did not cure their biases. Thus, Falls Down argues that the error committed by the District Court in denying his challenges for cause was structural, requiring automatic reversal of Falls Down's convictions.
¶ 20 The State argues that the potential jurors' initial responses proved that they could be fair and impartial. The State also argues that only after further manipulation of the potential jurors' initial responses did their responses become unclear and seemingly biased.
¶ 21 We agree with the State.
¶ 22 According to § 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA, a potential juror can be challenged for cause if that potential juror "[has] a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party."
¶ 23 We held in State v. DeVore, 1998 MT 340, 292 Mont. 325, 972 P.2d 816, that jurors should be disqualified based on their prejudices only where they have "form[ed] fixed opinions or the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court." DeVore, ¶ 21, overruled in part by Good (quoting Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, Etc. (1980), 186 Mont. 433, 439-40, 608 P.2d 116, 120 (citations omitted)) (emphasis added). Further, we noted that "[i]t is not a district court's role to rehabilitate jurors whose spontaneous, and thus most reliable and honest, responses on voir dire expose a serious question about their ability to be fair and impartial." DeVore, ¶ 28 ().
¶ 24 Given our jurisprudence, we turn to the specific questions and answers at issue under Falls Down's challenges for cause. We will address and analyze the answers of each potential juror in turn.
¶ 25 The first potential juror, A.C., who was challenged for cause, stated the following upon questioning:
¶ 26 When questioned by defense counsel (Mr. Selvey) about whether A.C. had formed an opinion regarding Falls Down's guilt, A.C. stated the following:
¶ 27 Here, A.C. initially stated that she had not firmly formulated an opinion regarding Falls Down's guilt. Any impartiality concerns she had arose from her having already heard and read about the case in the media. Unlike the jurors in DeVore, A.C.'s concerns did not arise from her unwavering belief that Falls Down was guilty. Indeed, A.C. stated that initially she assumed that Falls Down was guilty, but did not know if she still believed that when questioned by Mr. Selvey. Further, A.C. stated that she could follow the court's instructions in basing her decision solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. These facts demonstrate that A.C.'s opinion regarding Falls Down was not fixed. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Falls Down's challenge for cause...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Miller
...facie showing of purposeful discrimination. See United States v. Vasquez-Lopez , 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). See also State v. Falls Down , 2003 MT 300, ¶¶ 12 and 46-48, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797 (declining to address whether the State's removal of "the only juror of a different ethn......
-
State v. Crosley
...as rape survivor advocate and been stalked by ex-boyfriend could set aside experiences to look at facts objectively); State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶¶ 25-36, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797 (concluding that challenged jurors demonstrated no fixed opinion of guilt based on what they heard in ......
-
State v. Bar-Jonah
...any bias or prejudice that would have prevented a fair trial and the voir dire examination failed to reveal any such prejudice); State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶ 27, 318 Mont. 219, ¶ 27, 79 P.3d 797, ¶ 27 (potential juror was not subject to removal for cause in prosecution for deliberate......
-
State v. Jay
...the difference between a potential juror who has a “fixed opinion” and a potential juror who has mere preconceptions. In State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶¶ 25–26, 28, 31, 33, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797, four potential jurors indicated that they had formed opinions as to Falls Down's guilt......