State v. Fancher
Decision Date | 05 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 33253.,33253. |
Citation | 186 P.3d 688,145 Idaho 832 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert Martin FANCHER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daniel W. Bower, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Robert Martin Fancher appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
In June, 2005, Angela Marshall was appointed as the temporary emergency guardian and conservator for James Strong, an incapacitated adult. Pursuant to that authority, Marshall issued two letters to the Boundary County Sheriff's Office, requesting that "all persons currently at or residing at the property of George Strong, be trespassed from his property immediately," and authorizing law enforcement officers to search the entirety of Strong's property.1 Bonner's Ferry Police officers responded to Strong's property that same day to conduct the search and remove everyone from the property. When they arrived, Strong and Isayah Skinner, a juvenile, were both present in the main residence. While searching the main residence, the officers encountered a locked door. They were informed that this was "Marty" Fancher's bedroom, and that he possessed the only key. Upon further inspection, the officers determined that the door could be locked only from the inside; it was not a lock typically opened by a key. By applying a limited amount of force, the officers were able to open the door and gain access to the room. In plain view inside the room were assorted pieces of drug paraphernalia. Further inspection revealed more paraphernalia and over thirty-one grams of marijuana, along with scales and baggies for individual packaging. During this search, Fancher arrived at the house and admitted to using marijuana and selling it to friends, as well as using methamphetamine. Following Fancher's arrest, officers interviewed Skinner and Angelica Lindsey, Fancher's niece, who was a minor. Lindsey shared a bedroom with Skinner in the residence, and both admitted to police that they delivered marijuana for Fancher, and used it with him. Skinner further informed officers that Fancher had a hiding spot on the property where he concealed drugs and paraphernalia.
Fancher was charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), distribution of a controlled substance to persons under the age of eighteen, felony, I.C. § 37-2737, and manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance where children are present, I.C. § 37-2737A. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of his room, alleging that Marshall did not have the authority to consent to the search. He also moved the court to suppress all statements made by him as fruits of the poisonous tree. The district court denied Fancher's motion, whereupon he entered into a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion. Fancher pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years determinate. This appeal followed.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.2 State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 738, 85 P.3d 1135, 1137 (Ct.App.2004). Specifically, a person has the right to "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Fourth Amendment; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. This does not imply that no search of a man's home will occur unless he consents; rather, it means that no "search will occur that is `unreasonable.'" Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 158 (1990). A man's residence is "a place especially protected against unreasonable police intrusion" pursuant to these constitutional safeguards. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3 (2004).
The state contends that Fancher has no basis to object to the search of his room in Strong's house, because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that room. Application of the constitutional safeguards from unreasonable search and seizure depends on whether the person invoking protection had a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy which was invaded by some governmental action. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580-81, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226-27 (1979); Spencer, 139 Idaho at 738, 85 P.3d at 1137. As such, a Fourth Amendment analysis involves a determination of whether the defendant has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the defendant's expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, was reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1994); Spencer, 139 Idaho at 738, 85 P.3d at 1137. An expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable when it is legitimate, justifiable, and one society should both recognize and protect. Spencer, 139 Idaho at 738, 85 P.3d at 1137; State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 862, 893 P.2d 806, 809 (Ct.App.1995). Such expectation of privacy must be more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 n. 12 (1978); Spencer, 139 Idaho at 738-39, 85 P.3d at 1137-38. The burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Spencer, 139 Idaho at 739, 85 P.3d at 1138; State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 251, 76 P.3d 990, 995 (Ct.App.2003).
The district court specifically found that Fancher was living with George Strong and managing his affairs for him. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Detectives knew that Fancher had been living on the property for some time, and had reason to believe that Fancher stayed in one of the rooms in the house. In fact, Fancher resided with Strong for as many as nine months prior to the search and it was understood by police that Strong and Fancher had the same address. The state failed to show that Fancher was residing in Strong's home without permission to do so. Therefore as a resident of Strong's house, Fancher had an expectation of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 154 n. 2, 983 P.2d 225, 227 n. 2 (Ct.App.1999) ( ); United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.2003) ( ). Additionally, Fancher took specific steps to maintain his privacy within Strong's house. By locking the door, Fancher was protecting his privacy from the general public, as well as from the other residents in the house. See State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562, 565, 961 P.2d 653, 656 (Ct.App.1998) ( ). Fancher's reasonable expectation of privacy has been recognized by this and other courts. See State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931, 934, 71 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Ct.App.2003) ( ); United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.2008) ( ). Fancher met his burden to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the premises.
Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and violates the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be made reasonable by an individual's consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct.App.1998). In such instances, the state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct.App.1997). Here, Fancher did not consent to the search of his room, Marshall did, and Fancher claims she had no authority to do so. Consent need not come directly from the person whose property is searched, but may come from a "third party who possesses common authority over the premises." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. at 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d at 156. Common authority arises out of "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes." Id.; State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). The state has the burden of establishing common authority. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181...
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