State v. Farley
| Decision Date | 14 January 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-349-C.A.,2006-349-C.A. |
| Citation | 962 A.2d 748 |
| Parties | STATE v. Barry A. FARLEY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Aaron Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Paula Rosin, Providence, for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.
The defendant, Barry A. Farley, was convicted by a jury of first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, and four counts of second-degree child molestation upon his stepchildren. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial justice erred by: (1) allowing the prosecution to elicit testimony from a witness that it had not disclosed in discovery in violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, (2) allowing a witness to testify about her son's cognitive ability, and (3) refusing to give a cautionary instruction to the jury about comments the prosecutor made about defense counsel's use of leading questions during cross-examination at trial. The defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Barry and Deborah Farley married in 2000, approximately eight years after they started dating and seven years after defendant moved in with Deborah and her two children, Sean and Lily.1 The defendant quickly assumed the role of the children's father figure: he was the parent to whom they would go for money and for permission to do things, and he was the family disciplinarian.
For reasons about which we can only speculate, Sean had trouble reconciling defendant's place within their family and his assumption of the father-figure role. Sean said many times, including at trial and in conversations with his mother and sister, that he would do whatever was necessary to get defendant out of his life. In autumn 2001, Sean called the hotline of the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) and alleged that defendant had hit him in the stomach and face. His complaint prompted an investigation by the DCYF. In a subsequent DCYF interview, however, Sean recanted. He said he had lied and the accusations were false. Lily, likewise, testified that she was angry at defendant and resented his role as disciplinarian and the punishments he administered. Sean testified that defendant's only form of punishment for misbehavior was to make him stand in a corner. Lily testified, however, that defendant punished both her and her brother by spanking them and putting them in their room, in addition to making them stand in a corner.
According to Mrs. Farley, Sean suffered from mental delays because of seizures he experienced at the age of three months. She further testified that when Sean was approximately sixteen or seventeen, she and defendant jointly decided to place Sean in a group home.2 Sean lived at the group home during the week and came home on weekends.
At trial, both Sean and Lily testified to a number of incidents of sexual assault that defendant committed upon them. Without elaborating on the lurid details of the children's testimony, suffice it to say that they both recounted acts of sexual depravity that, if found credible by the jury, clearly establish the factual predicate of the crimes with which defendant was charged.
The jurors evidently did find the children to be credible, for on February 22, 2006, they returned a verdict of guilty on the aforementioned counts of first-and second-degree sexual assault upon Sean and four counts of second-degree child molestation upon Lily.3 The defendant moved for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. Mr. Farley was sentenced to a cumulative term of thirty years imprisonment, fifteen years to serve and the balance suspended with probation. A judgment of conviction was entered on June 19, 2006, from which defendant appealed.4
The defendant contends on appeal that the trial justice committed reversible error when he allowed Lily to testify that defendant had been physically abusive toward her brother. He asserts that the prosecution did not disclose this expected testimony before trial in violation of Rule 16.5 The state denies any discovery violation, arguing that the prosecutor did not intend to elicit from Lily any information concerning defendant's physical abusiveness toward her brother. Even if the prosecutor had so intended, the state asserts, the information was not such a principal aspect of Lily's testimony as to require disclosure under Rule 16(a)(8). Moreover, the state contends that, even assuming there were merit to defendant's claim of a discovery violation, it was not a deliberate violation requiring a mistrial. Finally, the state contends that Lily's comment was harmless in light of the other evidence educed during the four-day trial.6
The disputed testimony came about when the prosecutor questioned Lily about her feelings toward defendant. The exchange went as follows:
At that point, defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial justice denied the motion at a bench conference, stating:
When the trial resumed the following colloquy occurred:
The questioning then moved on to other topics. Lily did not further discuss the methods of punishment defendant employed, nor did she ever expound on what she meant by "abusiveness." Nor did defense counsel voice any further objection to this line of questioning.
When reviewing a determination of whether a Rule 16 violation occurred, this Court applies a narrow standard of review: "`the trial justice must have committed clear error.'" State v. Stravato, 935 A.2d 948, 951 (R.I.2007); see also State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 280 (R.I.2006) (). The discovery ruling of a trial justice "will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion." Stravato, 935 A.2d at 951. However, the trial justice's discretion under Rule 16 is "not a blank check." Stravato, 935 A.2d at 951. Rather, it "is limited, bounded by law, and reviewable." State v. Oster, 922 A.2d 151, 163 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I.1982)).
Rule 16 provides for the mutual exchange of information among the parties before trial and governs the state's obligation to notify the defense of its evidence. This Court has "described Rule 16 as among the most liberal discovery mechanisms in the United States." State v. Squillante, 622 A.2d 474, 478 (R.I.1993) (citing Coelho, 454 A.2d at 244). Rule 16(a)(8)7 requires the state to disclose, before trial, the substance of a witness's expected testimony at trial.8 This rule requires that the state provide all relevant, recorded data on which it will base its witness testimony. State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1192 (R.I.1988). When the state does not possess such information, it must provide the defense with a summary of the expected witness testimony. Id. Rule 16(a)(8) "do[es] not obligate the state to provide a defendant with a detailed narration of the testimony of its witnesses." Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1192. This Court has held:
State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 531 (R.I.1994).
Notably, "the state cannot evade a proper Rule 16 discovery request by providing defendant with similar information found in other sources." Stravato, 935 A.2d at 955. Furthermore, "[t]he fact that the state did not act in bad faith, or that the defense may have received the same information through other means, is not determinative." Id.
In the case at bar, we are convinced that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant's motion for a mistrial based on a Rule 16 violation. First, it is not at all clear to us from the context of the state's questioning that the prosecutor intended to elicit from Lily testimony that defendant had been physically abusive toward Sean.9 The prosecutor asked the question "[w]hat kind of punishments?" in a line of questioning relating to Lily's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State v. Thibedau
-
State v. Thibedau, 2015-163-C.A.
...755 (R.I. 2005)). "The discovery ruling of a trial justice 'will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.'" State v. Farley, 962 A.2d 748, 753 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Stravato, 935 A.2d at 951). "However, the trial justice's discretion under Rule 16 is 'not a blank check.'" Id. (q......
-
State v. Vose
... ... addressing [whether expert testimony is necessary to ... establish mental disability] have applied a case-by-case ... approach to assess whether lay evidence proffered at trial is ... sufficient to establish the victim's diminished mental ... state." State v. Farley , 962 A.2d 748, 755-56 ... (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Gardiner , 895 A.2d ... 703, 712 n.11 (R.I. 2006)) ... Numerous ... witnesses in the case at bar testified that Pauline was found ... roaming the streets, often dressed inappropriately for the ... ...
- State v. Nichols, 2015–238–C.A.(P1/13–2586AG)