State v. Farner

Decision Date11 December 2001
Docket Number99-00491
PartiesSTATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN R. FARNER, JR
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
STATE OF TENNESSEE

v.

JOHN R. FARNER, JR.

No. E1999-00491-SC-R11-CD

October 5, 2001 Session- Heard at Gallatin 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

Filed December 11, 2001

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals, Criminal Court for Sullivan County, No. 40,003, R. Jerry Beck, Judge

The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether Tennessee law recognizes a co-perpetrator rule which bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide on the basis that the victims were co-participants in the drag race. After fully and carefully considering the record in this case in light of the relevant authorities, we conclude that no rule of Tennessee law bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide as a matter of law. We hold that causation in criminal cases generally is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, that a victim's contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of death, and that a jury's determination of the causation issue will be reviewed on appeal under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and not disturbed so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. Because the trial court in this case failed to provide the jury with an instruction on proximate causation, an essential element of the offense, and because the jury was erroneously provided an instruction as to criminal responsibility, a theory that the State now concedes is inapplicable, the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide must be reversed.

To prevent needless litigation and to promote judicial economy, we exercise our discretion and address two other issues which will likely arise at any retrial - the propriety of Officer Farmer testifying as an expert and the admissibility of the computer animated visualization of the accident. We conclude that Officer Farmer may properly testify as an expert so long as the trial court is assured that Officer Farmer's opinions are based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not upon mere speculation. However, we further conclude that the computer animated visualization should not be admitted unless the State can establish that the visualization is based on accurate and complete information and that it fairly illustrates the expert opinion of Officer Farmer as to how the accident occurred. The convictions for criminally negligent homicide are therefore reversed; the convictions for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, drag racing, and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death are affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Case Remanded to the Trial Court

R. Wayne Culbertson, Richard A. Spivey, and Timothy Reid Wilderson, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellant, John R. Farner, Jr..

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; Patricia C. Kussmann, Assistant Attorney General; H. Greeley Wells, District Attorney General; and Teresa Murray-Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

Background

This case arose from a drag race between the defendant, John R. Farner, Jr., who was driving his red Chevrolet Camaro, and the victim, Landon Baker, who was driving his white Mitsubishi 3000 GT. The race, which occurred between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on March 20, 1997, began at a Coastal Mart in the Colonial Heights neighborhood just south of Kingsport, Tennessee. From the Coastal Mart, the defendant and Baker raced northbound toward Kingsport on Fort Henry Drive, a four lane highway, for a distance of 3,432 feet, approximately six and one-half tenths of a mile. The race ended when Baker lost control of his Mitsubishi in a curve and collided with two other vehicles traveling toward Johnson City, in the southbound, oncoming lanes of Fort Henry Drive, a Chrysler minivan and a green Volvo. Baker, and his passenger, Christopher Bostrum, died as a result of the collision. The persons driving the other vehicles, Teresa Gilliam and Priscilla Redwine, sustained serious injuries. The defendant's car was not physically involved in the collision. However, the defendant, and his alleged passenger, Steven Moore, were each charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of drag racing, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident knowing that it involved death.

The case proceeded to trial on these charges. At the close of the State's proof, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Moore. With respect to Farner, the proof offered by the State established that he instigated the drag race. Prior to Baker's arrival at the Coastal Mart, the defendant had asked Holly Harris, who was driving a Camaro, when they were going to race. Harris responded, "Yeah, right." As soon as Baker arrived, Harris overheard the defendant ask Baker when he wanted to "run them." 2 Baker merely shook his head from side to side. When the defendant left the Coastal Mart a short time later, he drove from the parking lot onto Colonial Heights Road, stopped in the road, and revved his engine. Intending to leave by the same exit, Baker waited for the defendant to pull up to the traffic light at the intersection of Colonial Heights Road and Fort Henry Drive. However, the defendant remained in the middle of the road some distance from the intersection, revving his engine. Eventually, Baker pulled onto Colonial Heights Road ahead of the defendant and stopped at the red light, before turning right onto Fort Henry Drive. The defendant immediately followed Baker, not yielding for oncoming traffic.

Tracy Shipley, who was driving north toward Kingsport on Fort Henry Drive, approached the intersection and saw a red Camaro with tinted side windows turn onto Fort Henry Drive immediately behind a white car. Shipley said a Toyota pickup truck, approximately two car lengths ahead of him in the right lane, 3 had to swerve into the left lane to avoid hitting the red Camaro. The cars then accelerated out of sight, but Shipley saw them again when he rounded a curve, going side by side across the railroad trestle, with the red Camaro in the left, inside lane, and the white car in the right, outside lane. Shipley estimated the cars were traveling in excess of seventy miles per hour, and he did not see brake lights on either car. As Shipley stopped at the Roadrunner Market near the railroad trestle, he heard a noise, which he believed was made by the shifting of a ladder on the back of his truck, but a worker in the market commented that the two cars had wrecked. Shipley arrived at the scene of the accident two to three minutes after leaving the market. He saw a red Camaro sitting astride the white, dotted line, facing south, in the direction of Johnson City. Someone jumped into the passenger side of the red Camaro, and it then made a U-turn and drove north toward Kingsport at a high rate of speed. The car had tinted side windows, but Shipley could not identify the person who jumped into the car nor could he say for sure that the red Camaro was the same car he had seen earlier.

Kregg Klingman, driving southbound on Fort Henry Drive toward Johnson City, was south of the Texaco when he heard loud revving engines and saw two cars, side by side, going northbound on Fort Henry Drive, toward Kingsport. Klingman estimated the vehicles were traveling approximately eighty miles per hour, but he was unable to see the make, model, or color of the cars. Although Klingman saw the cars disappear around the curve in his rearview mirror, he did not recall seeing brake lights on either car.

Elizabeth Reynolds, who worked at the Texaco service station on the corner of Fort Henry Drive and Moreland Drive, was outside shortly before 10 p.m. on March 20, 1997 when she heard the roar of car engines and two cars traveling north toward Kingsport at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour. Although she could not determine the make or model of the cars, Reynolds said the red car was in the left, inside lane, and the white car was in the right, outside lane. Neither car applied its brakes as the cars disappeared around the curve. Reynolds almost immediately heard a loud boom, and believing the vehicles had wrecked, she called for emergency assistance.

Anthony Bowman was stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Moreland Drive and Fort Henry Drive, headed south, when he heard loud revving engines. He saw two vehicles approaching from the opposite direction, "neck and neck," at a very high rate of speed, at least seventy to seventy-five miles per hour. Bowman said the car in the left, inside lane near him was red.

Brian Bishop and Stanley Hodges, detectives with the Second Judicial Drug Task Force, were parked near the intersection of Moreland Drive and Fort Henry Drive shortly before 10 p.m. when they heard the sound of vehicles approaching at a high rate of speed from the Colonial Heights area, heading toward Kingsport. Officer Bishop did not see the cars, but Officer Hodges saw a red car in the left, inside lane, pass through the intersection, at approximately eighty-five miles per hour. "Almost immediately" after the red car passed the officers heard the sound of skidding and a collision. Both officers called for emergency assistance, reported the accident, and proceeded to the scene. They searched the area for the red car, using a flashlight to look over the...

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    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
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    ... ... II, 2. Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court has recognized that [t]he power to define what shall constitute a criminal offense and to assess punishment for a particular crime is vested in the legislature. State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn.1996); see also State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 200 (Tenn.2001). Given the analytical shortcomings of the Denton test and the lack of any textual or historical basis suggesting that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution mandates its adoption, we conclude that the time has come to abandon the Denton test ... ...
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    ... ... However, “[i]t is the task of the [L]egislature, ... not this Court, to define what shall constitute a criminal offense and to assess punishment for a particular crime.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 567 (quoting State v. Farner ... ...
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  • § 14.03 PROXIMATE CAUSE (OR "LEGAL CAUSE")
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 14 Causation
    • Invalid date
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    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 14 Causation
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