State v. Farnum

• Decision Date: 09 August 2005
• Docket Number: (SC 17254).
• Citation: State v. Farnum, 878 A.2d 1095, 275 Conn. 26 (Conn. 2005)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM FARNUM.

275 Conn. 26

878 A.2d 1095

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM FARNUM.

(SC 17254).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 8, 2005.

Officially released August 9, 2005.

Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Brian Preleski, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Joaquina Borges King, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The state appeals, following our grant of certification to appeal, from the Appellate Court's judgment reversing the conviction of the defendant, William Farnum, on one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of larceny in the third degree. State v. Farnum, 83 Conn. App. 326, 849 A.2d 393 (2004). The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of those charges. We agree with the state, and, accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 24, 2002, a branch of the American Savings Bank, located at 747 Farmington Avenue in New Britain, was robbed. After pushing aside a customer, the robber approached Agnes Ksiazak's teller station. He told her to "make it quick," and handed her a note demanding all of her $20, $50 and $100 bills, and warning that he had a gun. Ksiazak then handed the robber $2310, and he departed.

The following week, on January 31, 2002, a second New Britain branch¹ of the American Savings Bank was robbed. The robber approached Nadine Narog's teller window and gave her a note stating that he had a gun and that he wanted all of her $50 and $100 bills. He told her that she should "make it quick . . . ." Narog then gave the robber $200, and he left the bank.

The defendant subsequently was charged in connection with both robberies. As a result of the January 24 robbery, the defendant was charged in an information with one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4) and one count of larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (2). As a result of the January 31 robbery, the defendant was charged in a second information with one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (4) and one count of larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125b (a). The two cases were later consolidated and tried to the court. This appeal concerns only the charges arising from the January 24 robbery.

At trial, the state called eyewitnesses to both robberies. The witnesses to the January 24 robbery were unable to identify the defendant as the robber, but were able to describe the robber's height and skin color. The state also offered the testimony of Antonio Smith, a friend of the defendant. Smith testified as follows. Between mid-December, 2001, and February, 2002, the defendant visited Smith in New Britain on a number of occasions. In January, 2002, Smith gave the defendant a ride to Hartford and witnessed him being beaten there by several men. The defendant later explained to Smith that the men had beaten him because he owed them money for drugs and that he needed to appease them by paying his debt. To accomplish this, the defendant told Smith that he was planning a bank heist. Smith attempted to talk him out of this, but the defendant responded that his mind was made up; he was going to rob a bank because it was "fast money."

In February, 2002, Smith and the defendant were arrested on an unrelated matter and spent the weekend in jail together. While in jail, the defendant told Smith that he had gone through with a bank robbery at a bank located near Malikowski Circle² in New Britain and that he had stolen about $2000. The defendant told Smith that the robbery was easy, as he just went into the bank with a note. Prior to the confession, Smith had noticed that the defendant had ample cash with him, an unusual situation for the defendant. At the close of the state's case, the defendant made a motion for judgments of acquittal, claiming that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the robberies. The trial court denied the motion.

After the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found the following facts on the record with regard to the January 24, 2002 robbery. The robber was a short black man, approximately five feet, five inches to five feet, six inches tall, whose height is consistent with that of the defendant, who is five feet, five inches tall. The robber's mouth as depicted in the still photograph produced from the bank's surveillance videotape resembles the defendant's mouth. The trial court further found that it fully credited the testimony of all of the state's witnesses, including Smith. Accordingly, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed both robberies and rendered judgments of conviction on all counts.

The defendant appealed from those judgments to the Appellate Court, contending that the trial court improperly had denied his motion for judgments of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the robberies.³ The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction for the January 31 robbery, but reversed the conviction for the January 24 robbery, concluding that the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to those charges due to insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Farnum, supra, 83 Conn. App. 332. The Appellate Court further ordered that the case be remanded with direction to render judgment of not guilty for the January 24 robbery. Id., 336. Thereafter, we granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was the perpetrator of a robbery of the Farmington Avenue branch of the American Savings Bank in New Britain on January 24, 2002?" State v. Farnum, 271 Conn. 912, 859 A.2d 572 (2004). This appeal followed.

The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the January 24, 2002 robbery. Specifically, the state claims that the cumulative effect of the evidence of the defendant's confession to Smith, the defendant's motive to commit the crime, his declared intent to commit the crime, and his physical similarity to the witnesses' descriptions were sufficient to identify the defendant as the robber.⁴ The defendant responds that the Appellate Court correctly determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant was the perpetrator of the January 24 robbery because no witness could positively identify him as the robber, the witnesses' descriptions were inconsistent, and Smith's testimony was both self-serving and too general. We agree with the state.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence. . . . The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . because this court has held that a [trier's] factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable.. . .

"[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier's] verdict of guilty. . . . Furthermore, [i]n [our] process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 146-47, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). With these principles in mind, we turn to the state's claims.

In support of its claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the January 24, 2002 robbery, the state places substantial reliance on the defendant's confession to Smith of having committed the robbery. "A confession, while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact." 2 B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 113, p. 1088. Yet,...