State v. Farrar
Decision Date | 11 January 1990 |
Docket Number | SC,C-20505 |
Citation | 786 P.2d 161,309 Or. 132 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Stephen Lewis FARRAR, Appellant. CC 86-S33949. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause, for appellant. With him on the brief were Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, and John P. Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem. Appellant filed a supplemental brief pro se.
Brenda J. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for respondent. With her on the briefs were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Rives Kistler, Timothy A. Sylwester and Douglas F. Zier, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salem, and Teresa Ozias, Certified Law Student, Salem on the supplemental brief.
Defendant appeals his conviction of aggravated murder and sentence of death. The review of this case will address all of defendant's 19 assignments of error raised in defendant's voluminous brief and addenda.
Pretrial proceedings; selective prosecution
The first question posed by defendant to this court is:
"Did the district attorney engage in an unfair selective prosecution in his decision to prosecute defendant for aggravated murder and in his refusal to engage in plea negotiations?"
In support of an affirmative answer to this question, defendant argues:
The facts relevant to this first question were developed during a January 5, 1987, pretrial hearing. At that hearing, District Attorney Penn testified concerning (1) the bases for the charging decisions and dispositions in Marion County's various homicide prosecutions arising after enactment of the present death penalty law and (2) his office's 1980 policy manual and additional unwritten guidelines.
Dale Penn testified he had been a deputy district attorney for eight years and district attorney for two years commencing January 1985. At the time of this hearing, Oregon's present death penalty statute had been in effect for 18 months. During this 18-month period, 25 to 30 homicides had occurred in Marion County. Charges had been brought on 15 to 18 of these killings. 1 The district attorney sought three aggravated murder indictments. He explained:
"These are the only three cases that upon investigation, we were able to develop evidence on all of the elements of the crime, plus the sentencing factors for the death penalty, and the only cases in which we were able to present that evidence to the Grand Jury and the Grand Jury would agree that there was sufficient evidence to proceed."
Defendant, Moen and Williamson were the three individuals charged with aggravated murders.
The district attorney and Williamson entered into plea negotiations, and Williamson pled guilty to two counts of murder. Penn described the case:
The district attorney and Moen entered into plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered a negotiated settlement, but Moen refused the offer. Penn explained:
In the present case, Farrar was age 29 on the date of his arrest. Farrar's attorney approached the district attorney regarding the possibility of plea negotiations. Penn explained his response:
The district attorney explained his unwillingness to engage in plea negotiations in the present case, as follows:
With this uncontested background, defendant sets forth two subsets of error under his first claim:
Defendant's claim that "the district attorney denied [him] equal treatment by the standardless election to commence a prosecution for aggravated murder" is without merit.
Defendant does not dispute that the state had a sufficient factual basis for charging him with aggravated murder. The district attorney's decision to seek an aggravated murder indictment against him was proper on its face. Placing defendant within the class of persons charged with aggravated murder was consistent with a proper application of a neutral, objective and appropriate standard: probable cause to believe that defendant committed the crime. The record shows that that was the district attorney's motive here.
Defendant does not contend, and no evidence in the record suggests, that the district attorney's decision to seek an aggravated murder indictment was prompted by improper motives, or indeed by any reason other than that the district attorney had sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed aggravated murder. The district attorney's decision to seek an aggravated murder indictment against defendant did not treat him differently from any other similarly situated person. Nothing in this record suggests that the district attorney ever has failed or refused to seek an aggravated murder indictment when he had probable cause to believe that specific persons committed aggravated murder in Marion...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Montez
...to the defendant. This court will reverse only when it can be said that the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 164, 786 P.2d 161 (1990); State v. Jones, 242 Or. 427, 433, 410 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Hoffman, 236 Or. 98, 108, 385 P.2d 741 The following exc......
-
State v. Williams
...Evidence that goes to the question of defendant's future probable violent behavior is relevant during the penalty phase. State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 175, 786 P.2d 161, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 212, 112 L.Ed.2d 171 (1990); State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 76, 786 P.2d 111 (1990); ORS 1......
-
State v. Nefstad
...must be unanimous. Acceptable instructions relating to evidence and proof of mitigating circumstances are set out in State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 786 P.2d 161 (1990). Any assignments of error not discussed have been considered and are either moot or without The judgment is affirmed as to t......
-
State v. Montez
...29, 791 P.2d 836; State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 73, 786 P.2d 111 (1990); Montez I, 309 Or. at 610-11, 789 P.2d 1352; State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 174-75, 786 P.2d 161 (1990); State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 178, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988) (Wagner I ), judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds 49......