State v. Farrington
| Citation | 476 P.3d 1231 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. S-1-SC-37355,S-1-SC-37355 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bradley Scott FARRINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of New Mexico |
The Law Office of Scott M. Davidson, Ph.D., Esq., Scott M. Davidson, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Eran Shemuel Sharon, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Defendant Bradley Farrington was convicted of first-degree murder (willful and deliberate) contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994), and received a life sentence. The Court is presented with two issues: (1) whether the district court erred by admitting hearsay statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception (forfeiture exception)1 and (2) whether sufficient evidence identifies Defendant as the perpetrator of the underlying homicide. As to the forfeiture exception, Defendant argues that admission of multiple hearsay statements from the murder victim, Defendant's estranged wife Cassy Farrington (Victim), did not satisfy the intent element necessary for the forfeiture exception to apply. That is to say, Defendant contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant killed Victim for the purpose of procuring her unavailability as a witness. Accordingly, Defendant claims admission of the hearsay statements was in violation of Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA.
{2} We hold that the district court properly admitted the statements under Rule 11-804(B)(5), and we take this opportunity to clarify New Mexico's rule-based form of the forfeiture exception. Defendant's intent to silence Victim can be inferred from his extensive history of domestic violence, the manner in which he leveraged his position in law enforcement to dissuade Victim from seeking help, and the contentious custody and divorce proceedings between Victim and Defendant. Further, we hold that sufficient evidence supports Defendant's convictions. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's first-degree murder conviction.
{3} On March 24, 2014, Victim, a twenty-three-year-old mother of two, was found dead in her Silver City home. Victim was found fully clothed, lying face down in her bathtub with significant bruising and visible signs of strangulation. Defendant, Victim's estranged husband and a former Silver City police officer, became the focus of the resulting homicide investigation. Defendant was eventually arrested and indicted on an open count of murder.
{4} Defendant had a history of domestic violence against Victim that included many incidents of physical and mental abuse. This extensive abuse ranged from Defendant beating Victim to preventing her from speaking with her family to Defendant "dry-firing"2 his police-issued service weapon at Victim's head, and many other incidents and forms of abuse. Defendant also subjected Victim to controlling behavior throughout their relationship.
{5} At the time of Victim's death, Victim and Defendant were going through a contentious and lengthy divorce. Custody of the couple's two young children was an area of particularly great conflict. For example, Defendant would take the children away and not allow Victim to know their location. On the night before Victim's death, Defendant became enraged when the couple's son referred to Victim's boyfriend as "Daddy David."
{6} Defendant was a Silver City police officer for much of the couple's relationship. During their relationship, Defendant intimated to Victim that it would be fruitless to report any abuse to law enforcement because he was a police officer. For example, Defendant told Victim, Defendant implied he could kill Victim and get away with it, saying, "If you don't stop fucking with me, I'll make it look like an accident, and I know how to do it because I'm a cop." He also told Victim, "I can do anything and not get caught." Defendant's status as a police officer rendered Victim reluctant, if not outright terrified, to report abuse to law enforcement.
{7} Victim described to friends and family many instances of domestic violence and other various abusive aspects of her relationship with Defendant. The State sought to introduce those statements at trial and filed a motion in limine for their admission under the forfeiture exception. The district court held a preliminary hearing on the forfeiture exception on March 3, 2017 (Hearing).
{8} At the Hearing, the district court heard testimony from twelve witnesses offered by the State in support of its motion in limine to admit statements made by Victim. The witnesses recounted Victim's various statements regarding Defendant's threats and acts of domestic violence. The twelve witnesses consisted of Victim's family members, friends, coworkers, her boyfriend at the time of her death, and her insurance agent.3
{9} While each witness offered a different perspective, the following summary of Hearing testimony highlights the relevant points for the forfeiture analysis.
{10} Based on the testimony at the Hearing, the district court concluded that the forfeiture exception applied. This included a finding that Defendant wrongfully procured Victim's absence as a witness. Regarding the intent to procure Victim's absence, the district court concluded that "an extensive history of domestic violence and threatened violence and death at the hands of [V]ictim's husband, a law enforcement officer[,]" supported the intent element of the forfeiture exception by a preponderance of the evidence. To alleviate potential Rule 11-403 NMRA concerns, the district court limited the State to two witnesses from Victim's workplace and otherwise prevented all witnesses from giving cumulative testimony and testifying to domestic violence incidents prior to 2013.
{11} At trial, seven of the twelve witnesses from the Hearing testified. The testimony at trial did not vary substantively from the testimony at the Hearing and will not be repeated here. After the four-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder (willful and deliberate). Defendant received a life sentence for the conviction.
{12} Defendant now appeals his life sentence directly to this Court pursuant to Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution and Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA.
{13} The forfeiture exception has historically served as a common law doctrine that "extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds." Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The exception is rooted in the maxim that a defendant cannot complain about the inability to confront and cross-examine a witness whose absence is a result of the defendant's own wrongful conduct. See, e.g. , Giles v. California , 554 U.S. 353, 359, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) ); Reynolds v. United States. , 98 U.S. 145, 158, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (same); State v. Maestas , 2018-NMSC-010, ¶ 22, 412 P.3d 79 (citing Giles and Reynolds ). While the forfeiture exception has historically served as an exception to a witness's right to confrontation, it has seen recent developments in American jurisdictions—including New Mexico—as an evidentiary exception to the rule against hearsay. See, e.g. , Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note on the 1997 amendment (providing that every federal circuit addressing the question has recognized the forfeiture exception); Rule 11-804(B)(5) advisory committee's note on the 2012 amendment ("[ Rule 11-804(B)(5) ] ... reflects a substantial body of state and federal case law."). Thus, the forfeiture exception is both an exception to confrontation rights and a codified evidentiary exception to the rule against hearsay.
{14} In light of Defendant's concession that Victim's statements were nontestimonial, as noted in footnote 1, paragraph 1, we will not analyze Defendant's constitutional challenge. Thus, in this opinion we will only address his challenges to the rule-based application of the forfeiture exception—namely, his argument that Victim's statements were improperly admitted under Rule 11-804(B)(5). Nevertheless, we will provide an overview of the common law-based forfeiture exception because, as described herein, the analysis for the common law- and rule-based forms of the forfeiture exception are the same.
{15} The United States Supreme...
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