State v. Farris

• Decision Date: 29 November 1929
• Docket Number: 5360
• Citation: 48 Idaho 439,282 P. 489
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. G. W. FARRIS, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

282 P. 489

48 Idaho 439

STATE, Respondent, v. G. W. FARRIS, Appellant

No. 5360

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 29, 1929

CRIMINAL LAW - TRANSPORTATION OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS.

1. "Circumstantial evidence" is proof of such facts or circumstances, connected with or surrounding commission of crime charged, as tends to establish defendant's guilt or innocence, and such facts and circumstances must be sufficiently conclusive to convince jury of defendant's guilt to moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt before it can convict him.

2. Instruction that value of circumstances as evidence depends on degree of certainty on which they point to a particular conclusion held not objectionable, not being prejudicial to defendant.

3. Instruction that, while circumstantial evidence must create more than suspicion of guilt, a mere possibility of innocence will not prevent conviction, where conclusion or inference of guilt is logical, and that circumstances need not be given strained or artificial construction in determining whether they are consistent with innocence, held proper when considered in connection with instructions as whole.

4. Charge on circumstantial evidence need not be couched in any particular set of words or phrases, but is sufficient, if correct in substance and so expressed that jury can readily comprehend language from entire charge, it being essential only that language define or explain circumstantial evidence and intelligently state rule governing its effect.

5. In instructing on the law of circumstantial evidence, it is not error to omit going into detail and instructing as to all essential ingredients of such evidence to warrant conviction.

6. Instructions that facts and circumstances must be sufficiently conclusive to convince jury of defendant's guilt to moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt before it can convict him on circumstantial evidence, and that mere possibility of innocence will not prevent conviction, where conclusion or inference of guilt if logical, held not erroneous as not sufficiently charging jury that facts must be consistent with defendant's guilt and inconsistent on any reasonable theory with his innocence, instructions as whole placing burden of proof on state.

7. Refusal of instructions that facts must be absolutely incompatible with innocence and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis than guilt to warrant conviction on circumstantial evidence held not error, in view of instruction on reasonable doubt and instruction that probabilities or greater weight or preponderance of evidence will not warrant conviction, but that presumption of innocence has weight and effect of evidence for defendant and continues until rebutted by competent evidence displacing any reasonable doubt of his guilt.

8. Sufficiency of evidence to require instruction refused by court will not be reviewed, where not properly raised below but appellate court may presume that there was no evidence calling for such instruction.

9. Refusal of requested instructions, the substance of which was covered by the court's instruction, is not error.

10. Any legal evidence logically tending to prove or disprove a material fact in issue is relevant, and therefore admissible if not too remote or speculative or otherwise of such slight proba- tive value as to justify court in excluding it on ground of immateriality.

11. Exclusion of testimony in trial for transporting intoxicating liquor that witness left automobile, in which he and defendant were riding before being arrested, to answer call of nature, and accidentally found himself in presence of keg of liquor, held not prejudicial error, in view of evidence that he sought to repossess himself of keg immediately on reaching it and was apprehended in such act.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

G. W Farris was convicted of the crime of transporting intoxicating liquor, and he appeals from the judgment. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

W. A. Stone, for Appellant.

It is the invariable rule of law that to warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, such facts and circumstances must be shown as are consistent with the guilt of the party charged, and cannot upon any reasonable theory be true and the party charged be innocent. (State v. Brazzell, 168 Iowa 480, 150 N.W. 683; State v. Andrews, 62 Kan. 207, 61 P. 808; People v. Gosset, 93 Cal. 641, 29 P. 246.)

The law of Idaho makes the jury in a criminal case judges of the facts, and a mandatory instruction, either on the admitted facts or on the facts hypothetically stated, is a violation of the defendant's rights to have the jury judge the facts. (Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 522, 33 Am. Rep. 787; Hooper v. State, 52 Ga. 607; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480; People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200, 42 N.W. 1106.)

The mere fact of finding the liquor on the premises of a man of a family or in a place in which others have free access, without showing his actual conscious possession thereof, discloses only a prima facie constructive possession and is not such a possession as will justify an inference of guilt by reason thereof. (State v. Brock, 112 Ore. 59, 228 P. 920; State v. Moss, 95 Ore. 616, 182 P. 149, 188 P. 702; State v. Drew, 179 Mo. 315, 101 Am. St. 474, 78 S.W. 594; People v. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74, 44 Am. Rep. 55.)

W. D. Gillis, Attorney General, and Leon M. Fisk, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Circumstantial evidence is the proof of such facts as tend to show the guilt or innocence of the accused, and all facts and circumstances when taken together must be sufficiently conclusive to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. (State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766, 107 P. 993; State v. Dawn, 42 Idaho 210, 245 P. 74.)

The evidence need not demonstrate the guilt of the defendant beyond the possibility of his innocence. (State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718; State v. Dawn, supra; People v. Ward, 105 Cal. 335, 38 P. 945.)

It is not error to instruct that circumstantial evidence is legal evidence without further instructing as to the essential requirements of circumstantial evidence. (State v. Ramirez, 33 Idaho 803, 199 P. 376.)

BUDGE, C. J. T. Bailey Lee, Wm. E. Lee and Varian, JJ., concur. Givens, J., dissents.

OPINION

BUDGE, C. J.

Appellant was charged with and convicted of the crime of transporting intoxicating liquor. This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment, to reverse which appellant specifies numerous alleged errors. We shall consider only such thereof as are deemed necessary to a proper disposition of the cause.

Assignments of error 1 and 2 attack instructions 9 and 10, given by the trial judge of his own motion. Instruction 9 reads as follows:

"Circumstantial evidence in criminal cases is the proof of such facts or circumstances connected with or surrounding the commission of the crime charged as tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the party charged, and these facts and circumstances must be sufficiently conclusive to convince the jury to a moral certainty, and beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the defendant as charged in the information before the jury can convict him; and if the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case are sufficient to satisfy the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, then such facts and circumstances are sufficient to authorize the jury in finding the defendant guilty. The law demands a conviction wherever there is sufficient legal evidence to show the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence."

Practically the same language as that of the foregoing instruction was used by this court in State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766, 787, 107 P. 993, and it is apparent that the instruction was taken from that opinion. It is a correct statement of the law in this jurisdiction.

Instruction...