State v. Farris

Decision Date06 July 1920
Docket NumberNo. 33555.,33555.
Citation189 Iowa 505,178 N.W. 361
PartiesSTATE v. FARRIS.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; John W. Anderson, Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried to a jury, and convicted of the crime of sodomy, and appeals. Reversed.Sears, Snyder & Gleysteen, Vail E. Purdy, and H. C. Harper, all of Sioux City, for appellant.

H. M. Havner, of Marengo, F. C. Davidson, of Emmetsburg, and Ole T. Naglestad, of Sioux City, for the State.

PRESTON, J.

1. The transaction and the evidence is so vile and nauseating that we shall refer to it as briefly as possible, and in such language as that a reading between the lines may be necessary at some points. The indictment follows:

The grand jury of the county of Woodbury, in the name and by the authority of the state of Iowa, accuse M. Farris of the crime of sodomy committed as follows: The said M. Farris on or about the 24th day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, in the county of Woodbury and state of Iowa, did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously have copulation with and carnally know one Bert Stevens in an opening of the body of the said M. Farris other than the sexual parts, to wit, the mouth of the said M. Farris.

[1] At common law there was some question as to whether sodomy could be committed in the manner here charged, that is by the mouth, though the weight of authority seems to be that it could. 8 R. C. L. p. 334. But our statute, section 4937, as later defined by section 4937a, Code Supp., is broader than the definition at common law. State v. McGruder, 125 Iowa, 741, 101 N. W. 646. The literal charge in the indictment is that the male organ of Bert Stevens penetrated defendant's mouth. The defendant can be held, if at all, only as an accessory or an accomplice.

The evidence, if believed, tends to show that Stevens and Barnes were together at the room of the defendant, and were both on the bed at the same time, and that the act was committed by or on Stevens about a minute before a similar act was committed by or on Barnes. Both Stevens and Barnes would be guilty of sodomy, because there was copulation by each inserting their own organ in defendant's mouth, and they say they consented to it. Their conviction might be as salutory as the conviction of the defendant, though he too should be punished, if it has been shown, by competent evidence, that he is guilty. It is conceded by the state that Stevens would be an accomplice of the defendant as to the act with him, and we think, for a like reason, that Barnes would be an accomplice as to his act. It is clear then that in that sense both Stevens and Barnes are accomplices. It is contended by appellant that Barnes is an accomplice of both Stevens and the defendant as to the act with Stevens, and the act relied upon by the state for a conviction. This is denied by the state, and it is argued by the Attorney General that the two offenses were distinct and separate.

[2] Going back now for a moment to the indictment, we are of opinion that defendant could be indicted as a principal for the offense charged, even though he was but an accomplice. This rule applies to offenses where two could not have committed the act, as in rape, or where a man is charged with rape upon his own wife. State v. Comstock, 46 Iowa, 265, 266;State v. McAninch, 172 Iowa, 96-110, 154 N. W. 399, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 559;Foster v. State, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 467. In the last case there was an indictment against three men for sodomy, committed on the same man, at the same time, and the indictment was held good, because one could have done the act and the others aided him. The defendant could not be guilty, except as an accessory or accomplice. We think the indictment is good.

2. This brings us to the real point in the case, and that is whether Barnes, as well as Stevens, was an accomplice. Appellant contends that they both, as well as the defendant, were accomplices, and that it does not matter how many accomplices there may be; they must be corroborated. 16 Corpus Juris, 710. Going now to the evidence to determine whether Barnes was concerned in the crime charged, it appears from the testimony of Stevens that, some days before the time of the commission of the alleged offense, he went to defendant's rooms, that at that time he stayed a half an hour, and had some drinks, but there was nothing out of the way at that time. He says that Barnes was with him at the time the alleged crime was committed, some time in November or December; that he telephoned from the billiard parlor to Barnes, asking if he wished to make some easy money; and that Barnes thought that was all right. Barnes then went to the pool hall, and Stevens told Barnes that defendant did such things as that charged; that the two together then went to defendant's room, and they had several drinks of whisky; that, after they had been in the room for a time, defendant went to the bed and motioned for them to come over to the bed, and they both went over and sat down on the bed with defendant; that defendant unbuttoned their trousers, both Barnes and Stevens at about the same time; and that then the act was committed on both. Stevens says he practiced sodomy once after that when no one else was present. No charges were made against either Barnes or Stevens. They were about 18 years of age, and both testified that they made no resistance, but consented to the act. Barnes testifies that, before they went to defendant's room, Stevens said that, if they would go there, there would be $3 or $4 in it and some whisky, and so he went; that he knew before they went that they were going to defendant's room for the purpose of having this act of sodomy committed upon them; that the way he happened to go with Stevens was that Stevens phoned him and asked if he wanted to make some easy money, and that Stevens told him how, after he got to the pool hall; that Stevens then said defendant would do this, and give me $3 or $4, and that there is whisky in it; says he knew what he was doing all the time he was there, although they had used considerable whisky; that defendant said nothing out of the way to either Stevens or to witness. He describes the act substantially as Stevens; that defendant did not ask him over to his room, but that it was Stevens; defendant did not pay them any money. Some time after the transaction in question, both Barnes and Stevens, with another party or two, went to the defendant's room, evidently by arrangement with the officers. This was late at night, and defendant was in bed. He was then arrested. There is no claim that any improper conduct took place at that time. Barnes says he never saw defendant but twice.

[3] Section 5299 of the Code provides that all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, shall be indicted, tried, and punished as principals. The words “aid” and “abet” in the statute seem to apply to persons not present, though of...

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5 cases
  • State v. Daves
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 20, 1966
    ...Iowa 1063, 135 N.W.2d 525, 528; State v. Farr, 33 Iowa 553, 562; State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630, 635, 118 N.W.2d 548, 551; State v. Farris, 189 Iowa 505, 510, 178 N.W. 361. Any evidence circumstantial or direct, must be sufficient to raise a fair inference of guilt. It must generate something......
  • State v. Panetti
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1938
    ...if found true, supplied the necessary corroboration of the testimony of Allen, the accomplice. Defendant excepted. In State v. Farris, 189 Iowa 505, 178 N.W. 361, the statute as to the testimony of an accomplice being the same as our section 9903, the court held that under the Iowa Code per......
  • State v. Panetti, 31740.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1938
  • Meier v. Meier
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1920
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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