State v. Faulds

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PEMBERTON, C.J. (after stating the facts).
• Citation: State v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 42 P. 285 (Mont. 1895)
• Decision Date: 11 November 1895
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HASKELL, Attorney General, v. FAULDS.

42 P. 285

17 Mont. 140

STATE ex rel. HASKELL, Attorney General, v. FAULDS.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 11, 1895

Proceedings in contempt, on relation of Henri J. Haskell, attorney general, against J. R. Faulds, for publication of a defamatory article in relation to the supreme court. Writ of attachment was issued, and the court, without ruling on defendant's motion to quash the writ, required him to file his answer. The answer denied that the language was intended to defame the court. Heard on motion to quash the writ and answer. Motion to quash denied. On answer discharged.

On the 30th day of October last, the attorney general of the state filed in this court an affidavit, wherein it is shown: That there were then pending in this court three cases, entitled respectively, "The State of Montana v. David J Whaley," "The State of Montana v. Clement P Whaley," and "The State of Montana v. Matthew L Whaley" (41 P. 852, 855), in which said cases the opinions of this court had been rendered and announced; but that no remittitur had been issued in either of said cases. That J. R. Faulds, the respondent, is the editor, publisher and proprietor of the Northwest Tribune, a weekly newspaper of general circulation, printed and published at Stevensville, Ravalli county, in this state. That, on the 25th day of said month of October, the said Faulds did publish and cause to be published at said town of Stevensville, among other things, the following false, malicious, contemptuous, and defamatory matter of and concerning the judges of the supreme court of the state, acting in their judicial capacity, which publication was a false and grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of the supreme court in the three cases above mentioned: "The supreme court of Montana, the highest tribunal of justice in the state, was the first to throw down the bars and deal out injustice to the people of Ravalli county. The dirty deal is made the more obnoxious through the action of Governor Richards in his reasons for granting pardon." That the same was done with the intent to hinder, embarrass, and defeat the administration of justice, and to insult and degrade the court, and to expose it and the members thereof to contempt. Upon the filing of said affidavit, a warrant of attachment was issued out of this court, and served upon the respondent, requiring him to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt. After filing a motion to strike out certain parts of the affidavit, which was overruled, the respondent filed a motion to quash the warrant of attachment upon, substantially, the following grounds: (1) The matters stated in the affidavit do not constitute a contempt. (2) It does not appear that, at the time of the publication of the matter stated in the affidavit, any of the cases referred to were then pending in court. (3) If the matter contained in the publication complained of is punishable at all, it is by criminal prosecution, and not in proceedings in contempt. Without ruling upon this motion, and reserving a decision thereon, the court required the respondent to file an answer. The answer is a complete and absolute denial that the language set out in the affidavit was intended by the respondent to refer to the court or to the judges thereof, but was intended to refer to other persons and things involved in a controversy with other persons in the town and vicinity where the same was published. The respondent denies all intention to insult the court or bring it into obloquy or contempt by said publication. This answer is under oath. The motion to quash the writ, and the answer, will both be treated in the opinion.

Henri J. Haskell, Atty. Gen., for relator.

Wilbur F. Sanders, for respondent.

PEMBERTON C.J. (after stating the facts).

This proceeding is based upon subdivision 7, § 293, of the Penal Code. Under this subdivision, "the publication of a false and grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of any court" is recognized as a contempt of court, and the perpetrator thereof is declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The first question that presents itself is this: Is the publication under discussion a report of the proceedings of this court in the cases referred to in the affidavit? We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. It refers to the cases, tells what was done by this court, and then says how and why it was done, in language contained in the statement. So that, if the publication constitutes a report of the proceedings of this court in the cases referred to, and is "false and grossly inaccurate," it amounted to and was a contempt of court. The language quoted in the statement is a part of a long editorial, in which the action of the court in its proceedings in the cases mentioned is referred to several times. We think any person, whether professional or layman, could come to no other conclusion, from reading the article, than that this court and its proceedings were referred to in the particular language alleged to be contemptuous. Nor do we have any doubt that the language constitutes contempt under the provisions of the Code cited above. It not only charges this court with dealing out injustice, but it alleges that it entered into a "dirty deal" for the purpose of doing so. This is a clear charge of improper, impure, or corrupt motive. We thing this sufficient to say in relation to respondent's first ground for quashing the writ in this case.

The respondent, as a second ground for quashing the writ in the case, contends that it does not appear that, at the time of the publication in question, any of the cases referred to therein were pending before this court. In this the respondent is in error, we think. The affidavit states that no remittitur had been issued by this court in any of the cases mentioned therein. This court obtained jurisdiction of the cases by appeal. It did not part with that jurisdiction as long as no remittitur had been issued returning the case to the district court. In Kimpton v. Mining Co., 41 P. 137, 42 P. 102, and 16 Mont. ___, on petition for rehearing, this court held that it had jurisdiction until the remittitur had been issued. See authorities cited in that opinion. See, also, Haynes, New Trials & App. § 293, and authorities cited. This proceeding having been instituted under the section of the Penal Code cited above, would it make any difference if the remittiturs had been issued in the cases? By the provisions of the Code, the contempt consists in publishing a "false and grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings" of the court. How could any report be published of the proceedings in question of the court until after the proceedings had been had, or of any opinion or decision of the court until such opinion or decision had been rendered? Although we deem it unnecessary to determine this question, we think it not inappropriate to quote in this connection what is said in State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, where this question was raised. The court says: "If an ignorant or impolite man stalks into a courthouse with his hat on, or makes a noise about the door, or disobeys process, all agree that he may be punished for contempt; but if a man has an important cause pending in court, and, willing to resort to desperate measures to succeed, publishes, on the eve of the trial, a libel, alleging that the judge has been bribed to charge the jury against him, and that all the witnesses who are to appear on behalf of the opposing party have been corrupted, and are unworthy of credit, it is no contempt, and the judge must labor under the embarrassment of sitting in the case, under such circumstances, with his mouth closed! Or if a judgment is rendered against a man, as soon as the judge leaves the bench, he is met at the door, insulted, and assaulted by the party, in consequence of his decision, and then a publication is made in a newspaper charging him with corruption in rendering the judgment, and calling upon the community to disregard and resist its execution, and yet this is no contempt!"

The respondent, as a third ground for quashing the writ, contends that, if the matter contained in the publication is punishable at all, it is by criminal prosecution, and not in proceedings in contempt. This contention is evidently urged upon the theory that the cases referred to in the affidavit and publication were not pending in this court at the date of the publication of the alleged contemptuous matter. But it becomes appropriate to notice this contention further, for the reason that, in their argument, the able counsel of respondent dealt eloquently and at length upon the constitutional liberty of the press, which they claim is involved in the case. This court is not less mindful of the importance and absolute...