State v. Favela
Decision Date | 12 January 2015 |
Docket Number | 34,311. |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Cesar FAVELA, Defendant–Respondent. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
{1} This case concerns the weight to be given to two types of evidence in evaluating prejudice in immigration-related ineffective assistance of counsel claims: judicial warnings of immigration consequences and the strength of the State's evidence against the defendant. Defendant Cesar Favela filed a motion requesting permission to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after his attorney failed to advise him that his guilty plea would result in deportation. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant's attorney fails to advise that defendant of the specific immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea, a warning of such consequences by a judge during a plea colloquy does not, by itself, cure the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the attorney's deficient performance and should only be afforded minimal weight in the analysis of prejudice. The State appealed.
{2} We affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that a judge's warning of such consequences during a plea colloquy cannot alone cure the prejudice caused by the attorney's deficient performance, and, accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand the district court's order. State v. Favela, 2013–NMCA–102, 311 P.3d 1213, cert. granted, 2013–NMCERT–010, 313 P.3d 251. However, we decline to go so far as to declare that any particular type of evidence should be afforded minimal weight in deciding all claims of immigration-related ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, we maintain that the determination of the weight to be afforded to evidence of prejudice is appropriately made on a case-by-case basis.
{3} Defendant, who is a Mexican national and, at the time, was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–3–5(C) (1969) and one count of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, his second conviction contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66–8–102(F) (2003). Favela, 2013–NMCA–102, 311 P.3d 1213. At the plea and disposition hearing, during the plea colloquy, the district judge asked Defendant whether he had read the documents related to his plea agreement and discussed them with his attorney, and Defendant testified that he had. The district judge then asked Defendant if he understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty and the rights he would be giving up as a result of the plea, and Defendant testified that he understood. Before the judge accepted Defendant's plea, the following exchange occurred:
The district court accepted Defendant's guilty plea.
{4} Defendant was sentenced to twelve years and 364 days imprisonment, to be followed by two years of parole and a $1,000 fine. All of his prison sentence except three years was suspended; those three years were to be followed by five years of supervised probation and parole. With good time credit, Defendant served a total of twenty-one months at the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Upon his release, Defendant was immediately taken into the custody of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and detained in the Otero County Processing Center to await removal.
{5} Shortly after being taken into ICE custody, Defendant, through new counsel, filed a motion for relief from judgment or order and a request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 1–060 NMRA. Defendant asked the district court for an order allowing the withdrawal of Defendant's guilty plea on the grounds that his trial attorney did not inform him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Therefore, Defendant maintained that the guilty plea did not constitute a willful, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his rights. On July 6, 2011, the district court issued an order summarily dismissing Defendant's motion and request for hearing. Stating that it was “[t]aking as true the factual allegations in the motion ... for the purposes of this order,” the district court's findings of fact included:
The district court's conclusions of law included:
(Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the district court dismissed Defendant's motion.
{6} Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal and a supporting affidavit. The district court held a hearing on the motion to reconsider on November 21, 2011. Defendant testified that his trial counsel did not advise him that he would be deported as a result of pleading guilty. Defendant testified that he entered the guilty plea because his attorney told him to do so. Specifically, Defendant testified that he entered the plea because his attorney had instructed him to “just say yes, yes, yes and plead guilty ‘cause we already had signed [the plea agreement] and so nothing was going to change.’ ” Additionally, Defendant testified that he did not understand what the district judge presiding over his plea hearing was saying to him and that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known it would result in deportation because “[his] whole life is here in the United States.” Nonetheless, the district court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider “for the reasons set forth in the July 6, 2011 Order” without further explanation.
{7} Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to the Court of Appeals. Favela, 2013–NMCA–102, ¶ 1, 311 P.3d 1213. In resolving the issue, the Court of Appeals issued two holdings concerning “what weight, if any, should be given to the trial court advising Defendant during the plea colloquy that he would be deported.” Id. ¶ 23.The Court of Appeals held that “a court's warning or advisement to a defendant regarding possible immigration consequences of accepting a plea is never, by itself, sufficient to cure the prejudice that results from ineffective assistance of counsel in that regard.” Id. ¶ 26. Second, the Court held that “judicial statements made during the plea colloquy about the immigration consequences of a [defendant's] plea do not cure counsel's deficient representation and should only be given minimal weight in determining whether a defendant has demonstrated prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695–98 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984).” Id. ¶ 1. Additionally, the Court of Appeals noted:
Although our courts have recognized a direct relationship between the strength of the case against a defendant and the likelihood that he or she will plead guilty ..., when viewed in light of our acknowledgment that immigration consequences may often be the overriding concern of a criminal defendant, the strength of the evidence against a defendant is less indicative of whether the defendant may have taken a chance at trial.
Id. ¶ 30 n. 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of Defendant's motion for reconsideration and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
{8} The State appealed to this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in “holding that judicial statements made during a plea colloquy about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, as well as the strength of the State's evidence against a defendant, should only be afforded minimal weight in evaluating an immigration related ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
{9} “A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court's denial of such a motion only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Paredez, 2004–NMS...
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