State v. Fay

• Decision Date: 12 September 2017
• Docket Number: SC 19350
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM FAY

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM FAY

SC 19350

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued October 19, 2016

September 12, 2017

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald and Robinson, Js.^*

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights to present a defense and to compulsory process when it declined to conduct an in camera review of the victim's records, which were protected by the statutory (§§ 52-146d and 52-146e) psychiatrist-patient privilege, even though the defendant alleged that those records may contain information relevant to his claim of self-defense. At trial, the defendant did not deny shooting the victim, but claimed that he acted in self-defense, and sought to bolster his self-defense claim by presenting evidence of the victim's psychological state at the time of the shooting. The defendant filed motions seeking the victim's psychiatric records and the testimony of the victim's treating psychiatrist concerning any diagnoses or prescriptions that the victim had received relating to aggressive behavior, as well as the possible effects of any prescription medications on the victim's temperament at the time of the shooting. The victim's authorized representative declined to waive the psychiatrist-patient privilege. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant claimed that his right of confrontation under the federal constitution outweighed any privilege that might exist with respect to the victim's records, and that the policies safeguarding the psychiatrist-patient privilege are less compelling when the patient is deceased. The court concluded that the victim's records were privileged, that the records did not fall under any of the statutory (§ 52-146f) exceptions to the privilege, and that the court lacked the authority to create a nonstatutory exception to the general rule of nondisclosure. The court also concluded that, although State v. Esposito (192 Conn. 166) and other cases permit the court to strike a witness' testimony to protect a defendant's right of confrontation if the witness does not allow the court to conduct an in camera review of his privileged psychiatric records, Esposito does not allow a defendant access to privileged records without the patient's consent. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, held:

1. This court concluded that, when an accused makes a sufficient preliminary showing that his constitutional right to present a defense can be protected only by an in camera inspection of a homicide victim's privileged psychiatric records that are material to the accused's claim of self-defense, the interests of the accused must prevail over the victim's psychiatrist-patient privilege, and the trial court must undertake such a review; furthermore, in order to make the sufficient preliminary showing required to trigger an in camera review, the accused must demonstrate a compelling need for the trial court to undertake that review, and, in assessing that need, trial courts should consider, among any other relevant considerations, the centrality of the privileged material to the accused's claim of self-defense, the potential significance of those materials in establishing the defense, and the unavailability of less intrusive sources for the same information; moreover, when, after an in camera review, the court determines that the privileged information substantially supports the accused's claim of self-defense, it must disclose such material to the accused.

2. The defendant was not entitled to review of his unpreserved constitutional claims under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because the record was inadequate for such review: although the defendant expressed his disagreement with the trial court's refusal to review or disclose the victim's privileged psychiatric records, he did not bring before that court the due process and right to present a defense claims that formed the basis of this appeal, and those claims, therefore, were not preserved; moreover, the defendant could not make the required preliminary showing, without improperly supplementing the record on appeal, that he was entitled to a review of those records, the defendant having provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the victim's psychiatric records were necessary to his claim of self-defense, as he failed to demonstrate that the victim suffered from a psychiatric disorder involving aggressive behavior or that there was a link between the victim's prescribed medications and aggressive behavior, and the defendant did not present any testimony that the victim's use of, or his failure to use, his prescribed medications increased aggressiveness or that such medications were sometimes prescribed to mitigate preexisting aggressive behavior.

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the court, Markle, J., denied the defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Markle, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Allison M. Near, for the appellant (defendant).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin Lawlor, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

PALMER, J. In State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 179-80, 471 A.2d 949 (1984), this court held that, in certain circumstances, the privileged psychiatric records of a witness testifying for the state are subject to in camera review by the trial court so that the court can determine whether the accused's constitutional right of confrontation entitles him to access to those records; if the witness refuses to authorize such review, the witness' testimony generally must be stricken. In the present case, the defendant, William Fay, was charged with murder and, following a jury trial, was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56a. He claims that the trial court improperly declined to extend our holding in Esposito and thereby violated his constitutional right to present a defense when it refused to conduct an in camera review of certain records of the victim protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege; see General Statutes §§ 52-146d¹ and 52-146e;² even though the defendant alleged that-those records may contain information pertinent to the defendant's claim of self-defense.³ Although we agree with the defendant that the psychiatrist-patient privilege may be surmounted when an accused makes a sufficient showing that the privileged information is material to a claim of self-defense, we conclude that the record in the present case is inadequate for our review of the defendant's unpreserved claim of constitutional error under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts that the jury could have found, as well as the following procedural history, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On July 8, 2010, while at their shared apartment, the defendant shot the victim twice with the victim's own handgun, causing injuries to which he later succumbed. At trial, the defendant did not deny shooting the victim but claimed that he acted in self-defense.⁴ The defendant sought to bolster his self-defense claim by presenting evidence of the victim's underlying psychological state at the time of the shooting. He testified that the victim had a history of drinking and depression, both of which had worsened in recent months following the death of the victim's dog. According to the defendant, these bouts of drinking and depression had led to other violent encounters between them. The defendant also testified that the victim had been receiving treatment from a psychiatrist. In reliance on this evidence, the defendant filed several motions seeking records, as well as the testimony of the victim's treating psychiatrist, concerning any diagnoses or prescriptions that the victim had received relating to aggressive behavior, as well as the possible effectsof any prescription medications on the victim's temperament at the time of the shooting.⁵ These motions are the subject of the current appeal.

On February 1, 2013, the trial court held a hearing to address the defendant's motions. At the hearing, the court expressed concern that it did not have sufficient medical expertise to review the victim's records in camera to determine whether the information contained therein was exculpatory. Nonetheless, the court granted the motions and directed the defendant to subpoena the victim's psychiatric records to the clerk of the court, promising to review the records prior to trial in anticipation of a subsequent motion to allow an expert to present testimony pertaining thereto. By the time jury selection commenced on March 21, 2013, the records had been produced to the clerk, but the court indicated that it was awaiting a motion by the defendant for the admission of the privileged records before reviewing them.⁶

Shortly before the commencement of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the defendant filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing to present the testimony of the victim's psychiatrist, and, the next day, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's request. At the hearing, the defendant argued that his right of confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution outweighed any privilege that might exist with respect to the victim's psychiatric...