State v. Featherston

• Decision Date: 09 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20180290-CA,20180290-CA
• Citation: 470 P.3d 473
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. James Paul FEATHERSTON, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

470 P.3d 473

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.James Paul FEATHERSTON, Appellant.

No. 20180290-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 9, 2020

Emily Adams, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Kate Appleby concurred.

Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 James Paul Featherston pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen years to life in prison. During the sentencing hearing, the State breached the plea agreement. Featherston appealed. On appeal, the State conceded the breach, and the parties requested remand for resentencing before a new district court judge. Accordingly, this court remanded the case to the district court for that purpose. On remand, Featherston moved to withdraw his guilty plea; the court denied that motion and again imposed a sentence of fifteen years to life. Featherston again appeals, this time arguing his prior appellate counsel performed deficiently by agreeing to resentencing as the correct remedy for the State's breach instead of requesting remand to seek plea withdrawal. Featherston seeks reversal under this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, he argues that the sentencing court erred in considering this court's prior order as mandating only resentencing when two possible remedies for the State's breach were available to Featherston on remand. Because Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute applies and bars appellate review of Featherston's claims of error, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Featherston with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult, obstruction of justice, and criminal mischief. After his victim (Victim) testified at the preliminary hearing, Featherston and the State entered into a plea agreement. As part of that agreement, Featherston pleaded guilty to aggravated kidnapping, and in return, the State dismissed the remaining three charges and agreed to recommend a sentence of six years to life in prison, as opposed to the statutory fifteen years to life. During the sentencing hearing, the State emphasized the "depravity" of Featherston's crime and argued that the plea agreement was "against [the State's] better judgment." The State further alleged Featherston "violated the protective order" in favor of Victim and "sent his former cell mate to visit her to shake her down." Despite the State's "recommendation" of six years to life in prison, the district court imposed a prison sentence of fifteen years to life. Featherston appealed, alleging that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a clearly excessive sentence and that the State breached the plea agreement.

¶3 In the first appeal, the State conceded that it breached the agreement by undercutting its purported recommendation with its ancillary commentary, and Featherston withdrew his abuse of discretion claim. Pursuant to a stipulation between Featherston and the State, this court issued an order reversing Featherston's sentence and remanding the case to the district court for resentencing before a new judge.

¶4 Back before the district court, citing this court's decision in State v. Smit , 2004 UT App. 222, 95 P.3d 1203, Featherston moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that when the State breaches a plea agreement, the district court has discretion to determine whether specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea is the appropriate remedy for the State's breach. In support of his motion, Featherston alleged that the State improperly pressured Victim and Featherston's grandparents, which pressure he claimed forced him to plead guilty. Victim also recanted her preliminary hearing testimony, claimed she was unsure whether Featherston was her attacker, and supported Featherston's allegation of prosecutorial pressure.

¶5 At the new sentencing hearing, the court denied Featherston's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, explaining that under the mandate rule,¹ "the appeal addressed only the sentence." The court noted that (1) "the mandate from the Court of Appeals was [that Featherston was] ‘entitled to a new sentencing hearing’ "; (2) "the language of the [Court of Appeals’ order] itself is clear, come back for sentencing before another judge"; and (3) the parties had stipulated to the resentencing.

¶6 Before imposing Featherston's sentence, the sentencing court "asked for mitigation" but, having heard from Victim and Featherston, determined that nothing presented during the hearing "suggest[ed] mitigation." Instead, the court noted "aggravating circumstances" and that "[t]he offense caused substantial physical and psychological injury to [Victim]. It was characterized by extreme cruelty and depravity." The court stated that Featherston did not admit guilt or show "remorse or contriteness, but rather defiance," and it consequently found no evidence to support deviation from the statutory "presumption of 15 years to life." The court then imposed the original sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. Represented by new appellate counsel, Featherston again appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶7 Featherston raises two main issues on appeal. First, he argues his prior appellate counsel was ineffective for not seeking plea withdrawal as a remedy for the State's breach when he and the State stipulated to remand. An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. Layton City v. Carr , 2014 UT App. 227, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 587.²

¶8 Second, Featherston alleges that the district court incorrectly applied the mandate rule after this court returned the case to the district court for resentencing. "We review the application of the mandate rule for correctness." Fish v. Fish , 2016 UT App. 125, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 890.³

ANALYSIS

I. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

¶9 Featherston asserts that his former appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to request plea withdrawal as a remedy for the State's breach of the plea agreement. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show both objectively deficient performance of counsel and that the deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Featherston's ineffective assistance claim hinges on his assertion that Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (LexisNexis 2017), does not apply when the State breaches a plea agreement and that his prior appellate counsel should therefore have requested a remand for plea withdrawal rather than resentencing. We disagree and hold that the Plea Withdrawal Statute applies to all plea withdrawals and limits a defendant who has not timely moved to withdraw a plea to challenging that guilty plea or the denial of a plea withdrawal request through post-conviction proceedings. See State v. Badikyan, 2020 UT 3, ¶ 17, 459 P.3d 967 ; State v. Flora , 2020 UT 2, ¶ 26, 459 P.3d 975. And because Featherston did not comply with the Plea Withdrawal Statute by moving to withdraw his guilty plea before he was sentenced originally, the statute prevents this court from considering his challenge to his guilty plea on appeal and resolves the issue of whether his appellate counsel rendered deficient performance.

¶10 Through the Plea Withdrawal Statute, our legislature has dictated that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn "only upon leave of the court and a showing," "before sentence is announced," "that [the plea] was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a)–(b). Once a defendant has been sentenced, the statute expressly states that any challenge to a guilty plea may be pursued only under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Id. § 77-13-6(2)(c). Precedent from our supreme court supports this conclusion. See Flora , 2020 UT 2, ¶ 12, 459 P.3d 975 ("Any challenge to a guilty plea that does not meet [the] requirements [of the Plea Withdrawal Statute] must be pursued under the [PCRA] ...." (quotation simplified)); State v. Allgier , 2017 UT 84, ¶¶ 14, 18, 416 P.3d 546 (explaining that "the Plea Withdrawal Statute limits a defendant's right to appeal by requiring the defendant to either withdraw the plea prior to sentencing, or pursue postconviction relief after sentencing," and that "the plain language of the current Plea Withdrawal Statute explicitly provides the procedural roadmap for post-sentencing motions to withdraw a plea—and that is through postconviction relief" (quotation simplified)).

¶11 Thus, there is a fundamental problem with Featherston's assertion that his prior appellate counsel was ineffective for not demanding the option of plea withdrawal as a remedy for the State's breach of the plea agreement: because Featherston did not seek to withdraw his plea before he was sentenced, the district court could have no jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw the plea on remand. See Grimmett v. State , 2007 UT 11, ¶ 24, 152 P.3d 306 (determining that a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty plea on resentencing); State v. Saenz , 2016 UT App. 95, ¶ 6, 373 P.3d 220 ("[B]ecause [the appellant] made his motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider it."). Rather, any challenge to the plea would have had to be pursued in postconviction proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (stating that any challenge to a guilty plea made after sentencing must be pursued under the PCRA); see also Gailey v. State , 2016 UT 35, ¶ 20, 379 P.3d 1278 ("We therefore reaffirm our prior caselaw holding that after sentencing is entered, a defendant may not file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or directly appeal the plea, but must pursue...