State v. Feole
Decision Date | 21 May 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 99-241-C.A.,99-241-C.A. |
Citation | 797 A.2d 1059 |
Parties | STATE v. John FEOLE. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Virginia M. McGinn, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Paula Lynch Hardiman, Paula Rosin, Providence, for Defendant.
The defendant, John Feole, appealed a judgment of conviction for solicitation of murder, arguing that the trial justice erred by limiting any testimony that the defendant might give to a narrative form, without direct questioning by counsel, following the discretionary granting of the defendant's motion to reopen. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial justice, who granted the defendant's motion to reopen after the defendant rested.
At trial, one Alfred Korsak, Jr. (Korsak), testified that he had been acquainted with defendant for about a year when defendant, who lived about a mile down the road from Korsak in Chepachet, Rhode Island, went to Korsak's home, unannounced, on February 19, 1995. According to Korsak, defendant told him that The defendant allegedly explained to Korsak that he was seeking a new trial on a criminal conviction, and he wanted the witnesses"taken care of."1 Korsak told defendant to come back another time because he had visitors; defendant departed, only to return later the same day, still pressing his request. Korsak again told defendant to leave, and defendant returned the next morning, renewing his request that Korsak carry out the "shootings." Later that day, Korsak went to defendant's house, and after defendant drew diagrams in the backyard dirt to show Korsak where the witnesses resided, he rode with Korsak past each of the residences he had described. The defendant was carrying a gun and said he would supply Korsak with the gun for the murders.
Korsak contacted Lt. Jamie Hainsworth (Lt. Hainsworth) of the Glocester police and reported defendant's solicitation. The police asked Korsak to wear a tape recording device at a later meeting with defendant, during which defendant stated that he could not supply the weapon, but he agreed to pay $10,000 for the killings. Korsak returned to defendant's house later that day, again wearing a recording device, and defendant supplied him with bullets, a gun that he said was broken, $80 to fix the weapon or trade it in, and a bottle of Scotch. The defendant said he wanted the murders completed "on a Monday which was the eighth because he was due back in Court in front of the Judge for a motion for a new trial."
In addition to Korsak's detailed descriptions of his meetings with defendant, the state presented four state police officers and Lt. Hainsworth, who corroborated Korsak's story. His testimony was also substantiated by the testimony of one of the intended victims, whose house Korsak had identified as one defendant had pointed out, and also by tape recordings from his wiretapped conversations with defendant, by photographs of the markings in Feole's backyard, by the gun and ammunition Feole had supplied to Korsak, and by fingerprints on the glasses and the bottle of Scotch Feole and Korsak had shared. The state also established a motive for thecrime that was consistent with the evidence, namely, retaliation against the witnesses in his previous trial.
The defense cross-examined the state's witnesses on the theory that Korsak was lying to curry favor with the police, but rested without presenting any witnesses, subject to a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The judge reserved ruling on the motion until after the return of the verdict.
The next day, after both parties had rested and just before the attorneys were to begin closing argument s, defense counsel indicated to the trial justice that defendant was insisting that he and his brother be permitted to testify. The defense attorney explained that he had previously discussed with defendant that he "had no intention of putting [defendant] on the stand" and that defendant's brother could add nothing that would affect the outcome of the case. The defense had rested with the concurrence of defendant on the previous day.
The justice asked, "Do you want to testify in front of a jury?", and defendant stated,
The Court responded and addressed defendant:
The discussion continued:
After the jury returned, the trial justice said, "You're resting," and asked defendant, "Mr. Feole, do you wish to take the stand?" When defendant responded, "I don't have a lawyer," the justice rejoined,
That same day, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of criminal solicitation, and the trial justice denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. After denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial justice sentenced defendant to ten years in the Adult Correctional Institutions, with seven years to serve and three years suspended.2 The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial justice impermissibly limited his testimony after reopening and arguing that, by forcing him to forgo direct examination by an attorney, the trial justice forced him to choose between his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and his right to testifyon his own behalf. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that defendant's rights were not infringed by the trial justice's limitation in this case.3
The United States Supreme Court noted in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164, 106 S.Ct. 988, 992, 89 L.Ed.2d 123, 133 (1986), that the right of criminal defendant s to testify in their own defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, criminal defendants were disqualified from giving sworn testimony at their own trials because of their interest in the outcome of the...
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...Fifth and Sixth Amendments is subject to harmless-error analysis. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246; State v. Feole, 797 A.2d 1059, 1067 n. 7 (R.I. 2002). See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (confession obtained in violation ......
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...with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In a 4-1 decision the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. State v. Feole, 797 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 2002). The majority held that the trial judge's conditional decision to reopen the trial to permit Feole to give narrative testimony did n......
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