State v. Ferguson

• Decision Date: 18 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2015 KA 0427.,2015 KA 0427.
• Citation: 181 So.3d 120
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Shannon C. FERGUSON.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

181 So.3d 120

STATE of Louisiana

v.Shannon C. FERGUSON.

No. 2015 KA 0427.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 18, 2015.

M. Bofill Duhe, D.A., Walter J. Senette, Jr., Asst. D.A., Franklin, LA, for Appellee State of Louisiana.

Katherine M. Franks, Louisiana Appellate Project, Abita Springs, LA, for AppellantDefendant—Shannon C. Ferguson.

Shannon C. Ferguson, Angola, LA, Pro Se/Appellant.

Before WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, and DRAKE, JJ.

WELCH, J.

The defendant, Shannon Charles Ferguson, was charged by bill of information with possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (cocaine), a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2)(count I), and simple battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:35 (count II).At the arraignment, the defendant pled not guilty.Following three Faretta hearings, the defendant was, along with standby counsel, allowed to represent himself.SeeFaretta v. California,422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562(1975).Following trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged on count I by a unanimous jury.¹A motion for new trial was filed, but denied by the trial court.The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for five years and fined $5,000.00.

An amended habitual offender bill of information was filed by the State, alleging the defendant to be a sixth-felony habitual offender.Following a hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a fifth-felony habitual offender.²His earlier sentence was vacated, and the defendant was sentenced to serve sixty years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.A "Motion to Reconsider Multiple Offender Ruling" was filed by the defendant, but denied by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that the trial court granted the defendant's motion for appeal.The defendant now appeals with six counseled assignments of error, and seven pro se assignments of error.To facilitate our discussion of the numerous assignments of error, we will discuss similarly situated claims, both counseled and pro se.For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and habitual offender adjudication, but amend the sentence by removing the restriction on parole eligibility, and affirm as amended.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 4, 2011, Officer Seth Dantin of the Franklin Police Department was dispatched in response to a battery occurring near the courthouse in Franklin, Louisiana.Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Dantin observed the defendant being detained by St. Mary Parish Sheriff's deputies.Officer Dantin then spoke with nearby witnesses, who described seeing the defendant approach a vehicle and punch the driver in the nose.The defendant was arrested and transported to the Franklin police station, where, after being handcuffed, he was searched by Officer Dantin in the police station's booking room.Along with a wallet, screwdriver, loose coins, and a bag of tobacco, Officer Dantin also located a "crack rock" on the defendant.Specifically, Officer Dantin testified that he initially discovered the cocaine after feeling something "hard" in the defendant's front right pocket.Officer Dantin conducted a field test on the substance, which returned positive for cocaine.The substance was later submitted to the Acadiana Crime Lab where Amanda Hebert, an expert in the field of forensic chemistry, tested the substance, and verified it to be a 30–milligram rock of cocaine.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

In the defendant's first pro se assignment of error, he challenges his conviction based on the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial.First, he contends that Officer Dantin's testimony regarding the discovery of the cocaine "was a recantation of his sworn [a]ffidavit ... which is inconsistent with [his] sworn [testimony]."Second, the defendant claims that the cocaine found in his pocket by Officer Dantin did not belong to him and argues "[t]he little piece of crack, as the officer [described] it, could have come off a cigarette pack, a debit card, been scooped off of the counter of a place of business with his change, been on a soda can or bottle [and then] transferred to the defendant's hand."For the above reasons, the defendant claims his conviction cannot stand.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime and defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime.Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979);State v. Patton, 2010–1841(La.App. 1st Cir.6/10/11), 68 So.3d 1209, 1224.In conducting this review, we must also be mindful of Louisiana's rule as to circumstantial evidence, i.e.,"assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."La.R.S. 15:438;State v. Millien, 2002–1006(La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/03), 845 So.2d 506, 508–09.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.State v. Wright, 98–0601(La.App. 1st Cir.2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 487, writs denied, 99–0802 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 and 2000–0895(La.11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C) requires proof that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II.³Whether an accused knows a substance he possesses is a narcotic may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.A conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance may rest on the possession of mere traces or residue of the substance, even absent admissions by the defendant, which might constitute guilty knowledge.State v. Leblanc, 2004–1032(La.App. 1st Cir.12/17/04), 897 So.2d 736, 739, writ denied,2005–0150 (La.4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1063, cert. denied,546 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 254, 163 L.Ed.2d 231(2005).Furthermore, guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of cocaine.However, since knowledge is a state of mind, it need not be proven as fact, but rather may be inferred from the circumstances.State v. Major, 2003–3522(La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 803.

During Officer Dantin's testimony, he stated that when he completed his arrest report, he mistakenly indicated the cocaine was located inside the defendant's left pocket.However, in anticipation of his trial testimony, Officer Dantin reviewed the booking room video, and observed that, in fact, the cocaine was located inside the defendant's right pocket.The defendant cross-examined Officer Dantin on this point and further argued it to the jury during his closing argument.Regardless of which pocket the drugs were located in, Officer Dantin responded "yes" when asked by the State at trial whether he was "absolutely certain"he retrieved the cocaine out of the defendant's pocket.Additionally, as discussed above, Amanda Hebert, an expert in the field of forensic chemistry with Acadiana Crime Lab, testified the retrieved material was cocaine.

After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced the evidence presented in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of possession of cocaine and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that offense.The unanimous verdict rendered against the defendant indicates the jury accepted the testimony of the State's witnesses and rejected the defendant's attempts to discredit them.As the trier of fact, the jury was free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.State v. Johnson, 99–0385(La.App. 1st Cir.11/5/99), 745 So.2d 217, 223, writ denied,2000–0829 (La.11/13/00), 774 So.2d 971.An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of exculpatory hypotheses of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury.SeeState v. Calloway, 2007–2306(La.1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418(per curiam ).The jury reasonably rejected the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant, i.e., that Officer Dantin's mistake regarding the location of the cocaine indicated that he somehow planted the drugs on the defendant.When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.SeeState v. Moten,510 So.2d 55, 61(La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,514 So.2d 126(La.1987).No such hypothesis exists in this case.Therefore, after reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them.SeeState v. Ordodi, 2006–0207(La.11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

RIGHT TO SELF–REPRESENTATION

In his first counseled assignment of error, the defendant claims "[t]he trial judge erred in allowing [him] to represent himself without a competency hearing to determine if he could make a valid waiver where the record contains numerous indicia of [his] mental illness."Specifically, the defendant claims that

[w]hile the judges did inquire of [him] if he were competent to

...