State v. Ferrigno
| Decision Date | 14 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-5041-16T2 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VICTOR FERRIGNO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 15-08-0994.
Kevin G. Roe, attorney for appellant.
Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William P. Miller, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
Following defendant Victor Ferrigno's guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for a second or subsequent violation of driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), the trial judge imposed a mandatory minimum 180-day jail sentence without parole eligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c). Guided by well-established law, we reject defendant's appeal in which he contends the Legislature did not intend the statute to limit the judge's discretion to sentence him to less than the mandatory minimum jail term. We also find no merit in defendant's federal and state constitutional arguments that the mandatory minimum jail term violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and deprives him of equal protection and due process. Accordingly, we affirm.
On October 31, 2014, a Norwood Borough police officer stopped defendant because his passenger side headlight was inoperable. Defendant gave the officer a New Jersey driver's license that the officer, upon close inspection, advised him was counterfeit. Defendant denied the accusation and, after providing a fake birthdate and social security number to the officer, agreed to the officer's request to sign a written consent form to search his car. In signing the form, defendant - in a Freudian slip - wrote his real name rather than thename that appeared on the counterfeit license. Defendant was arrested and later indicted for fourth-degree second violation of operating a motor vehicle during license suspension, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), and fourth-degree possession of a false government issued identification, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(d).
After defendant's application for a pretrial intervention program (PTI) was rejected, he filed motions to appeal the decision and to dismiss the indictment, claiming N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 was unconstitutional.1 The judge denied the motions.
Defendant thereafter entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to a second violation of operating a motor vehicle during license suspension and the State dismissed the charge of possession of a false government issued identification. The judge, despite finding that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, sentenced defendant to a mandatory minimum 180-day jail term based upon his interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. Defendant does not assert he was not on notice that subsequent violations of driving while suspended for DWI would result in a mandatory period of incarceration. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
As set forth in the plea agreement, defendant's jail sentence was stayed pending this appeal that the sentence was illegal.
In his merits brief, defendant contends:
We address these arguments in the order presented.
Defendant contends that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate a judge's discretion to sentence a violator of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 to a jail term of less than the 180-days in order to avoid an unjust result. He references remarks during the statute's floor debate by one State Assemblyperson, who avowed:
Because no one in the Legislature made any comment dismissing these remarks, defendant maintains that the Assembly Committee on Law and Public Safetyhad a "shared understanding" that the statute would "preserve[] judicial discretion" at sentencing. Defendant thus surmises the statute as written misconstrued the Legislature's intention to provide a sentencing judge with discretion to give a defendant less than a 180-day jail term, and has continuously induced this court to incorrectly uphold the penalty of a fixed minimum term. We conclude this argument is unconvincing, as it flies in the face of our well-settled rules of statutory interpretation.
In determining the interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo. State v. Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 105 (App. Div. 2016). It is well settled that a primary purpose of "statutory interpretation is to determine and 'effectuate the Legislature's intent.'" State v. Rivastineo, 447 N.J. Super. 526, 529 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011)). We start with considering "the plain 'language of the statute, giving the terms used therein their ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Ibid. And where "the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous result, the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic aids." Rivastineo, 447 N.J. Super.at 529. Hence, we do "'not "rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature [or] presume that the Legislature intended something other thanthat expressed by way of the plain language."'" Ibid. (quoting Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 329 (2009) (alteration in original)).
Yet, a statute's plain language "should not be read in isolation, but in relation to other constituent parts so that a sensible meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative scheme." Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). "'When all is said and done, the matter of statutory construction . . . will not justly turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation.'" J.H. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC, 454 N.J. Super. 174, 187 (2018) (quoting Jersey City Chapter, P.O.P.A. v. Jersey City, 55 N.J. 86, 100 (1969)). Simply put, "[a]n absurd result must be avoided in interpreting a statute." Gallagher v. Irvington, 190 N.J. Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 1983).
With these rules in mind, we are well aware that "when the Legislature has enacted a mandatory minimum term for the commission of a crime, the 'courts have no power' to impose a sentence that, in length or form, is different from that plainly provided in the statute." State v. Lopez, 395 N.J. Super. 98, 107-08 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 64-65(1983)). We still find instructive the words of Chief Justice Wilentz in Des Marets, that:
Applying these principles, we conclude the judge appropriately determined that he was required to impose the mandatory 180-day minimum jail term under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 because of the statute's clear and plain language. A lone legislator's comment, however well intended and firmly believed, prior to the statute's e...
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