State v. Ferron, 96-3425-CR
Citation | 579 N.W.2d 654,219 Wis.2d 481 |
Decision Date | 25 August 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-3425-CR,96-3425-CR |
Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, d v. Vance FERRON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Paul Lundsten, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Jane Krueger Smith, Oconto Falls.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Ferron, 214 Wis.2d 268, 570 N.W.2d 883 (Ct.App.1997), which reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court for Brown County, Peter J. Naze, Judge. The circuit court denied the defendant Vance Ferron's (Ferron) request to strike a juror for cause after the challenged juror said he "would certainly try" and "probably" could set aside his opinion that a criminally accused defendant who was truly innocent would take the stand and testify on his or her own behalf.
¶2 There are three issues before us on review. First, we consider the standard of review which appellate courts should employ upon review of a circuit court determination that a prospective juror can be impartial. Second, we apply that standard to the facts of this case to determine whether the circuit court committed an error of law by failing to strike the challenged juror for cause. Finally, we reply to the State's invitation to overrule our recent decision in State v. Ramos, 211 Wis.2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997).
¶3 Contrary to the court of appeals' decision, we hold that the appellate courts should overturn a circuit court's determination that a prospective juror can be impartial only where the juror's bias is manifest. A juror's bias can appropriately be labeled as "manifest" whenever: (1) the record does not support a finding that the prospective juror is a reasonable person who is sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or prior knowledge; or (2) the record does not support a finding that a reasonable person in the juror's position could set aside the opinion or prior knowledge.
¶4 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we conclude that the record does not support a finding that the prospective juror at issue was a reasonable person who was sincerely willing to put aside his opinion or bias. Accordingly, we hold that Ferron was deprived of his statutorily defined right to due process of law when he was compelled to use one of his peremptory challenges, as provided by Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1993-94), 1 to correct the circuit court's error.
¶5 Because we discern no sound reason either in law or public policy to do so, we also decline the State's invitation to overrule our decision in Ramos. Therefore, we modify the decision of the court of appeals and, as modified, we affirm that decision.
¶6 The relevant facts are not in dispute. On November 21, 1995, the State of Wisconsin (State) filed a criminal complaint charging Ferron and a codefendant, Timothy Nelson (Nelson), with party to the crime of burglary, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(1)(a) and 939.05. The case was later set for jury trial, where Ferron and Nelson were to be tried as codefendants. On March 26, 1996, the voir dire examination began.
¶7 The circuit court posed the first questions to the jury panel. Following these preliminary queries, Christopher Froelich (Froelich), counsel for Ferron, asked a series of questions to determine whether the prospective jurors could serve impartially. Attorney Froelich's questions were followed by the remarks and inquiries of codefendant Nelson's counsel, William Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald). The voir dire examination by Fitzgerald produced the following exchange between the court, Fitzgerald, and prospective jurors James Metzler (Metzler) and M.C. Clark (Clark): 2
MR. FITZGERALD: ... I'm going to argue that the State hasn't provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Nelson is guilty of anything.
Now, keeping that in mind, I may instruct Mr. Nelson that I don't think that he has to take the witness stand. And what I wonder is would any of you think to yourself, well, you're saying the State's case is lousy, but you didn't even have your guy testify so what does that make your case? Yes, Mr. Metzler.
And I think Mr. Metzler's reaction is a common reaction. You can't deny that but that's not the law. That may be the reaction you come into the courtroom [with], but as I said before, we have to set aside those personal beliefs or opinions that we have that conflict with the law that I'm going to give you. The question is, is there any one of you who cannot follow the law that I've just read to you?
The question is your opinion so strong or your belief so strong you're not willing to set those aside for the purpose of this case and follow the law that I've given you?
¶8 The circuit court continued to question Clark to determine if she could set aside her feelings. When Clark ultimately stated that she "would have a hard time that they didn't testify," the court excused her and proceeded with the voir dire examination accordingly. Following the examination, Ferron used one of his two peremptory strikes to remove Metzler from the jury panel. See Wis. Stat. § 972.03 ( ).
¶9 On March 27, 1996, Ferron was convicted of party to the crime of burglary. On appeal, Ferron argued that the circuit court committed reversible error when it refused to strike Metzler for cause, because Metzler exhibited a bias against defendants who decline to testify. According to Ferron, the circuit court's action compelled him to exercise one of his statutorily granted peremptory challenges to correct the court's error, thereby depriving him of his right to due process under state law. The State asserted that Metzler did not exhibit a manifest bias, and that the circuit court's determination should therefore be upheld.
¶10 The court of appeals held that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to strike Metzler for cause because his answers revealed that he was not indifferent as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1). 3 See Ferron, 214 Wis.2d at 276, 570 N.W.2d 883. The court of appeals also held that the circuit court failed to follow the directive in Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis.2d 400, 249 N.W.2d 524 (1977), that a motion to strike a juror for cause must be granted whenever the court...
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