State v. Field

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HOLMES
• Citation: State v. Field, 847 P.2d 1280, 252 Kan. 657 (Kan. 1993)
• Decision Date: 05 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 68005,68005
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Todd A. FIELD, Appellee.

Page 1280

847 P.2d 1280

252 Kan. 657

STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Todd A. FIELD, Appellee.

No. 68005.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 5, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. To justify the stop of a vehicle pursuant to K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2402, an officer must be aware of specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle contains individuals who are committing, have committed, or are about to commit a crime.

2. The reasonable suspicion necessary to warrant the stop of a vehicle pursuant to K.S.A.1992 Supp. 22-2402 is discussed and applied.

3. In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle pursuant to K.S.A.1992 Supp. 22-2402, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that trained law enforcement officers may be permitted to make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.

4. To justify the stopping of a vehicle, an officer is not, in every instance, required to have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring, has occurred, or is about to occur. Public safety or assisting persons in distress, among other reasons, may constitute sufficient reasons to stop an automobile so long as the officer has specific and articulable facts upon which to base the officer's suspicion that such reasons exist.

5. In an appeal by the State from an order of the district court dismissing a traffic complaint, the record is examined and it is held: The district court erred in finding that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion, pursuant to K.S.A.1992 Supp. 22-2402, to stop the defendant's vehicle.

6. In State v. Vistuba, 251 Kan. 821, 840 P.2d 511 (1992), we considered the question of reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant's vehicle pursuant to K.S.A.1992 Supp. 22-2402 and stated, "Our standard of review is abuse of discretion." We are now convinced that the quoted statement was erroneous, and it is hereby disapproved.

Glenn R. Braun, County Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were on the brief, for appellant.

Donald E. Reif, Jr., Hoisington, was on the brief, for appellee.

HOLMES, Chief Justice.

The State appeals the dismissal of a complaint charging Todd A. Field with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See K.S.A. 8-1567. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss based upon its finding that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle.

The facts are not in dispute. On February 20, 1992, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Hays police officer David Bunger was on routine patrol in Hays. Officer Bunger testified that while driving northbound on Vine Street, at approximately the 2200 block, he observed a white pickup driven by the defendant. In the 2200 block the truck "weaved from the middle of its lane to the outside of the lane, to the inside of the lane and back to the middle." Between the 2500 block and the 2700 block of Vine Street, Officer Bunger observed defendant's vehicle weave within its lane three additional times. In about the 3300 block of Vine, the officer stopped defendant's vehicle. When asked why he stopped the defendant, the officer testified: "It has been my training that given the hour of day--and this was approximately ... 2:13 in the morning--and if the driver, regardless whether they make a traffic infraction or not, if they are weaving within their lane a number of times, they may be impaired to some degree." After further investigation the defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. The State appeals the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1).

The sole issue the State raises on appeal is whether the officer's observation of a vehicle weaving within its own lane over the course of several blocks gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver was driving while under the influence of intoxicants to justify a stop for further investigation. K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2402(1) provides:

"Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand ... the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions."

The statute is a codification of the United States Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which held that an officer may stop and frisk an individual even though the officer does not have probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed if the officer is able to point "to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

In State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. 506, 819 P.2d 644 (1991), this court, in discussing a stop pursuant to our statute and the requirements set forth in Terry, stated:

"Such a stop always constitutes a seizure. Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402 and Terry. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391 [1400-1401] (1979). To stop a vehicle to investigate circumstances which provoke suspicion, an officer must be aware of 'specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion' that the vehicle contains individuals involved in criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 95 S.Ct. 2574 [2581] (1975)." 249 Kan. at 510, 819 P.2d 644.

In State v. Finley, 17 Kan.App.2d 246, 249-51, 838 P.2d 904, rev. denied 251 Kan. ----, 828 P.2d 373 (June 3, 1992), the Court of Appeals reviewed the distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, stating:

"Reasonable suspicion is not the same as probable cause. In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989), the Court conducted a thorough examination into the meaning of reasonable suspicion. The Court stated:

'The officer, of course must be able to articulate something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' " [Citation omitted.] The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal level of objective justification" for making the stop. [Citation omitted.] That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.' 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585.

"In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 110 S.Ct. 2412 [2416] (1990), the United States Supreme Court expounded on the differences between reasonable suspicion and probable cause:

'Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.... Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the "totality of the circumstances--the whole picture" (citation omitted) that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.'

See also State v. Hayes, 3 Kan.App.2d 517, 597 P.2d 268, rev. denied 226 Kan. 793 (1979), for a discussion of the distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion.

....

"It is important to remember that ... the law enforcement officer does not have to know that the defendant committed a crime. Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop."

In applying this standard, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances and the fact that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make "inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). See State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983).

On appeal, defense counsel urges this court to affirm the dismissal, contending that in the absence of a traffic violation, the officer could not have had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify stopping defendant's vehicle. The State, on the other hand, contends Officer Bunger's testimony regarding the defendant's erratic driving was enough to create a reasonable suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The State points out that an officer need not witness a criminal act in order to make a valid stop and that the stop may be made upon grounds separate and apart from the statute. This court's most recent statement of this principle is found in State v. Vistuba, 251 Kan. 821, Syl. p 1, 840 P.2d 511 (1992): "A civil or criminal infraction is not always essential to justify a vehicle stop. Safety reasons alone may justify the stop if the safety reasons are based upon specific and articulable facts."

In Vistuba, a police officer observed defendant's pickup truck drift towards a ditch, swerve back, drift towards the ditch again, and then jerk back onto the roadway. The pickup drove off the roadway onto the dirt shoulder; however, it always returned to...