State v. Fields

• Decision Date: 18 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-K-0388.,2002-K-0388.
• Citation: 842 So.2d 316
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Issac J. FIELDS, Jr.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

842 So.2d 316

STATE of Louisiana v. Issac J. FIELDS, Jr.

No. 2002-K-0388.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 18, 2003.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 2003.

Robert S. Glass, John W. Reed, New Orleans, for Applicant.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul D. Connick, District Attorney, Alan D. Alario, II, Terry M. Boudreaux, William C. Credo, III, Gretna, Andrea F. Long, Churita H. Hansell, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

With the question of defendant/relator's guilt turning at trial on whether he was aware that his girlfriend purchased sound equipment for him with a forged check, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's verdict of attempted forgery on grounds that relator possessed the requisite guilty knowledge to support his conviction as a principal. State v. Fields, 01-0862 (La. App. 5th Cir.12/12/01), 801 So.2d 1278 ("[T]he judge found the circumstances excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, including the defense theory of the case, that defendant did not know that his girlfriend was purchasing the equipment for him with a forged check.... [W]e cannot find error in the determination of the trial judge that the evidence shows that defendant and his girlfriend together planned to, and did, defraud Mobile One for the purpose of obtaining stereo equipment without paying for it.").

The court of appeal reached that conclusion in the following context. Around 12:30 p.m., on July 11, 1998, relator selected amplifiers and a speaker for his Chevy Tahoe from Mobile One Auto Center and informed the salesman, Thomas Henderson, that he would return later with his girlfriend, who would pay for the items with a check. Relator returned at 5:00 p.m. and his girlfriend arrived shortly after him. While relator waited at a nearby counter, the girlfriend gave Mr. Henderson a check in the amount of $1109.04 along with her driver's license. After the salesman received approval for the check, relator and his girlfriend left the store with the equipment. Relator then returned to the store the next day and bought additional equipment which he also had installed in his car; however, relator came back the following week and exchanged the speaker he had previously purchased. Shortly thereafter, the loss prevention manager for Mobile One learned that the check was forged and written against the account of Ann Buckwalter who was robbed of her checkbook at approximately 1:00 p.m. on July 11, 1998, the same day relator's girlfriend purchased the audio equipment. However, relator was not arrested until nine months later, in April, 1999, at which time he tendered full payment to Mobile One through counsel.¹ The state subsequently charged the defendant by bill of information with forgery. La.R.S. 14:72. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant guilty of attempted forgery.

When a trier of fact has reasonably rejected the hypothesis of innocence proposed by the defense at trial, the defendant is guilty unless an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that rational jurors must have a reasonable doubt as to guilt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984). However, we granted relator's application for review because a rational trier of fact could not reasonably have inferred guilty knowledge merely because his girlfriend wrote and transferred the check and because relator would benefit from her actions. The due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) does not permit a trier of fact to speculate when the evidence "is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable doubt." State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847, 850 (La.1990)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We now reverse.

Forgery is defined in R.S. 14:72 as "the false making or altering, with intent to defraud, of any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting to have legal efficacy. Issuing or transferring, with intent to defraud, a forged writing, known by the offender to be a forged writing, shall also constitute forgery." Additionally, the state charged that the defendant was a principal to the crime. A principal is anyone "concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime." R.S. 14:24; State v. Anderson, 97-1301, p. 3 (La.2/6/98), 707 So.2d 1223, 1224 ("Acting in concert each man then became responsible not only for his own acts but for the acts of the other.").

At trial, the state conceded that relator neither forged the check nor transferred the check; instead, the prosecution maintained that relator was guilty as a principal because his girlfriend had gone to the store at his request and thereafter conducted a fraudulent transaction inuring to his benefit. The state further contended that relator's failure to name his girlfriend and bring her into court constituted evidence of his guilty mind. However, the fact that relator's girlfriend wrote the check, and that relator would benefit from her actions, did not automatically make him a principal to her crime. See State v. Long, 94-0092, p. 6 (La.9/16/94), 643 So.2d 132, 135

("[A] trier of fact's determination that a wife aided and abetted the commission of the charged offense by her husband must rest upon more than mere speculation based upon guilt by association arising from relational status ... motive cannot alone provide the basis for determining that one spouse has `concerned' himself or herself in the fraudulent acts of the other spouse simply by reason of their common interests arising from their relational status."); see also State v. Pierre, 93-0893, p. 4 (La.2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427, 428 ("Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals .... [m]ere presence at the scene is therefore not enough to `concern' an individual in the crime."); cf. State v. Harrison, 505 So.2d 783, 792-793 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987)(knowledge that co-defendant was not authorized to use the signature machine to issue the checks would make the defendants principals to the forgery committed by him).

In State v. Tomlinson, 457 So.2d 651, 654 (La.1984), this Court held that the "mere possession of a forged writing does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the possessor has knowledge of the forgery and intent to defraud." Here, the state's evidence failed even to show that relator had possession of the check; instead, the evidence pointed to relator's lack of involvement in the obtaining, making, and transfer of the forged check. The evidence revealed that relator was never physically in a position to witness the fraudulent nature of his girlfriend's transaction because he was leaning against a counter about five to 10 feet behind his girlfriend when she made the purchase. Furthermore, the salesman testified that relator did not check the invoice bearing Ann Burkhalter's name; instead, the defendant carried the equipment while his girlfriend took the invoice. Even more compelling is the fact that at the time relator informed the salesman that his girlfriend would be purchasing...