State v. Fields

• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: VANDE WALLE; ERICKSTAD
• Citation: State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980)
• Decision Date: 26 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 710,710
• Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey Lynn FIELDS, Defendant and Appellee. Crim.

Page 404

294 N.W.2d 404

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey Lynn FIELDS, Defendant and Appellee.

Crim. No. 710.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

June 26, 1980.

Michael J. Maus, Asst. State's Atty., Dickinson, for plaintiff and appellant State of North Dakota.

Vince H. Ficek, Dickinson, for defendant and appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Justice.

The State of North Dakota appeals from an order of the Stark County court of increased jurisdiction entered January 9, 1980, granting a motion of Jeffrey Lynn Fields to suppress evidence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

On November 27, 1979, Deputy Sheriff Duane Knudson was informed by State Radio that there had been a car accident in Gladstone, North Dakota, and that the driver had been taken to a hospital in Richardton, North Dakota. Deputy Knudson went to investigate the accident scene. He then contacted Darrell Heinen, Richardton city police chief, and requested him to "go to the hospital, and, if he felt it was necessary, to obtain a blood alcohol test from the driver."

Officer Heinen went to the hospital and, upon locating Fields, asked him if he was the driver of the car at the time of the accident. When Fields answered "yes," Officer Heinen asked him if he would submit to a blood-alcohol test. Fields agreed and he was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. ¹ He was then informed of some of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). A blood sample was then taken from Fields.

Later, Deputy Knudson arrived at the hospital and visited Fields in his room. He indicated his purpose in visiting Fields was to obtain information needed to complete the accident report form and to issue a citation for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. No Miranda warnings were given to Fields by Deputy Knudson.

Prior to trial, Fields moved to suppress the results of the blood test and statements made by him to Officer Heinen and Deputy Knudson on the ground that he was deprived of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and equivalent provisions of the North Dakota Constitution. ² The trial court held that Fields had not been fully advised of his Miranda rights and granted the motion to suppress the evidence. The State now appeals from that order.

At the threshold, we consider whether or not the State has the right to take this appeal. The State has only such right of appeal in a criminal action as is conferred by law. State v. McEnroe, 69 N.D. 445, 287 N.W. 817 (1939). In State v. Iverson, 219 N.W.2d 191 (N.D.1975), this court held that the State does not have the right to appeal from an order suppressing evidence where there is no statutory authority for such an appeal. Subsequent to that case, Section 29-28-07, N.D.C.C., was amended to allow appeals from suppression orders. Section 29-28-07 now provides, in part, that an appeal may be taken by the State from:

"5. An order granting the return of property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, when accompanied by a statement of the prosecuting attorney asserting that the deprivation of the use of the property ordered to be returned or suppressed or of a confession or admission ordered to be suppressed has rendered the proof available to the state with respect to the criminal charge filed with the court, (1) insufficient as a matter of law, or (2) so weak in its entirety that any possibility of prosecuting such charge to a conviction has been effectively destroyed. The statement shall be filed with the clerk of district court and a copy thereof shall accompany the notice of appeal."

Fields, however, contends that even if there is statutory authority for this appeal, the State here has no right to take this appeal because it failed to file the required statement along with the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was filed on January 14, 1980, but the statement of the prosecuting attorney was not filed until April 21, 1980. While we do not condone this delay in filing, we do not believe it warrants a dismissal, particularly where the defendant has not challenged the content of the statement but only the date of its filing. See State v. Harris, 286 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1979); State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (1970).

However, our decision to allow the appeal should not be read as shifting to a defendant the burden of proving that the State could still reasonably prosecute without the suppressed evidence. Nor does it mean that in the future this court will not consider dismissing appeals for failure to file the prosecutor's statement with the notice of appeal.

We next consider if the trial court erred in suppressing Fields's answer to Officer Heinen's question as to whether or not Fields was driving the car at the time it was involved in the accident. The trial court suppressed Fields's answer on the ground that at the time the question was asked suspicion had focused on Fields as being the driver and as driving the vehicle in such a manner as to cause the accident. At that time, the trial court believed, it was incumbent upon the police officer to advise Fields of his right under Miranda, supra, to remain silent the right not to answer any questions including the question whether or not he was driving the vehicle itself. Because the police officer failed to advise Fields of his rights before asking the question, the trial court held that the responses would be inadmissible into evidence.

It was the basis of the trial court's decision, and now argued by the defendant on appeal, that because suspicion had focused on Fields, he should have been informed of his Miranda rights prior to any questioning. We do not agree. Mere investigatory focus does not require the giving of the Miranda warnings.

Prior to Miranda, supra, the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 986 (1964), held:

"(T)hat where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial."

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda, supra, to explore some of the problems not squarely decided in Escobedo, supra, "of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384 U.S. at 441-442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611, 16 L.Ed.2d at 705.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from the custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effected to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. ³ The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as questioning initiated by law-enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. By way of footnote the Court explained that this is what it meant in Escobedo, supra, when it spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused. Later United States Supreme Court cases also indicate that custody is the determinative factor in deciding if the Miranda warnings are required. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), the Court considered the admissibility of certain statements made by a defendant, not in custody, to Internal Revenue agents. There, the Court, citing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), and Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), held that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation that triggered the necessity for adhering to the specific requirements of Miranda, supra. The Court stated:

"Although the 'focus' of an investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding. Miranda implicitly defined 'focus,' for its purposes, as 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' " 425 U.S. at 347, 96 S.Ct. at 1616, 48 L.Ed.2d at 8.

In the more recent case of Roberts v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1364-1365, 63 L.Ed.2d 622, 631 (1980), the Supreme Court, in considering the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, stated:

"Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings create a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed."

In State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 956, 92 S.Ct. 322, 30 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971), this court did state:

"Our reading of Miranda is not that every person questioned in the process of a criminal investigation must be given the Miranda warnings, but rather that these warnings must be given to any person who is suspected of having committed a crime, or upon whom the investigation is focused." 187 N.W.2d at 14.

This would seem to indicate...