State v. Fierro
| Citation | 853 N.W.2d 235 |
| Decision Date | 20 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 26890.,26890. |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Shauna FIERRO, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Jeffrey P. Hallem, Kelly Marnette, Assistant Attorneys General Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Delia M. Druley of Johnson, Heidepriem & Abdallah, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Joseph M. Kosel of Johns & Kosel, LLC, Lead, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.
[¶ 1.] In this intermediate appeal, we examine a magistrate court's suppression of blood evidence seized without a warrant pursuant to South Dakota's implied consent statutes. We affirm the suppression of the blood evidence.
[¶ 2.] On the evening of August 4, 2013, Shauna Fierro was riding her motorcycle to her home in Butte County, South Dakota. At approximately 11:18 p.m., South Dakota Highway Patrol Troopers Jerry Kastein and Richard Olauson stopped Fierro after she committed a traffic violation.
[¶ 3.] After reviewing Fierro's South Dakota driver's license, Trooper Kastein administered a number of standard sobriety tests and concluded that Fierro did not pass some of them. Fierro was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).
[¶ 4.] After making the arrest, Trooper Kastein, reading from a DUI advisement card, informed Fierro that she was required by law to give a sample of her blood. When Fierro specifically asked if she had to submit to a blood withdrawal, Trooper Kastein responded: “Yep, because state law says you have to.”
[¶ 5.] Both troopers escorted Fierro to the Meade County jail. Trooper Olauson escorted Fierro inside the facility, where she was required to submit to a blood draw performed by a county employee. While being processed, Fierro informed the officers that she wanted to refuse the blood test and consult with an attorney. When the technician first attempted to draw blood from Fierro's arm, she pulled away to avoid it. Ultimately, a sample was obtained.
[¶ 6.] Trooper Kastein made no attempt to obtain consent from Fierro for the blood draw. And, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Kastein remarked:
Trooper Kastein also testified that he had received training from his superior officers regarding the United States Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013).
[¶ 7.] On August 7, 2013, the State charged Fierro with alternative counts of driving under the influence in violation of SDCL 32–23–1(1) and (2). On October 11, 2013, Fierro filed a motion to suppress the blood test administration and results. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 25, 2013. The magistrate court heard testimony from Trooper Kastein, Trooper Olauson, and Fierro. The court also had the opportunity to view a video excerpt of the arrest. Ultimately, the court granted Fierro's motion to suppress.
[¶ 8.] On November 4, 2013, the State filed a motion to reconsider the suppression of the blood evidence and attempted to place new evidence into the record by filing a motion for judicial notice with various documents attached. A hearing on the motion to reconsider was held on November 22, 2013, and no additional evidence was presented. Again, the court denied the motion for reconsideration and reaffirmed its earlier ruling. The State's motion for judicial notice was never ruled upon by the court.
[¶ 9.] The court signed and entered its order granting Fierro's motion to suppress on November 27, 2013. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on December 2, 2013, the court found that Fierro was never asked to consent to the seizure of her blood, that she did not voluntarily consent to the seizure of her blood, and that she refused to voluntarily submit to the seizure of her blood before the procedure was administered at the Meade County jail. The court also found that there were no exigent circumstances provided by the State.
[¶ 10.] The court held: “In light of the McNeely ruling, the [c]ourt finds that the State's interpretation of SDCL 32–23–10 in this particular case requiring a mandatory blood withdrawal without a warrant and without proving a valid exception to the warrant requirement is unconstitutional.”1 The court concluded that the State's warrantless seizure of Fierro's blood violated the Fourth Amendment because the State did not demonstrate that an exception to the warrant requirement applied. Lastly, the court held that the arresting officer was aware of the McNeely ruling at the time of the search and that “[u]nder the particular facts of this case and in consideration of its future deterrent effects, ... suppression of the evidence [was] an appropriate remedy.”
[¶ 11.] On January 13, 2014, this Court entered its order granting the State's petition to appeal from the court's intermediate order. In this appeal, we review:
[¶ 12.] “We review the [ ] court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress involving an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right under the de novo standard of review.” State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 14, 851 N.W.2d 719, 723. “The [ ] court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but we give no deference to the [ ] court's conclusions of law.” Id. (quoting State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d 440, 444 ). And although “[f]actual findings of the lower court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, ... once those facts have been determined, ‘the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.’ ” State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77, ¶ 8, 839 N.W.2d 558, 561–62 (quoting State v. Hess, 2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 9, 680 N.W.2d 314, 319 ).
[¶ 13.] As to the first issue, the State contends that the court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the United States Supreme Court's holding in McNeely controlled, and that as such, the blood draw under the State's implied consent statute—SDCL 32–23–102 —was unconstitutional. The State argues that “[a]pplication of traditional Fourth Amendment analysis compels the conclusion that the South Dakota Legislature may constitutionally condition the privilege to drive within the state on a driver providing irrevocable consent to the withdrawal of blood and other bodily substance[s] following a lawful DUI arrest.”
The Fourth Amendment and blood draws
[¶ 14.] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Likewise, Article VI, § 11 of our state constitution guarantees our citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
[¶ 15.] “The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures requires generally the issuance of a warrant by a neutral judicial officer based on probable cause prior to the execution of a search or seizure of a person.” Smith, 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 15, 851 N.W.2d at 724 (quoting Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 13, 841 N.W.2d at 444 ). “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, apart from a few, [well-delineated] exceptions[,]” id. ¶ 15 (citation omitted), and it is the State's burden to prove that the search at issue falls within a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement. Hess, 2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 23, 680 N.W.2d at 324.
[¶ 16.] This principle applies to the type of search that is the subject of the present appeal, which involves a compelled, warrantless blood draw for alcohol content to be analyzed and used as evidence in a criminal investigation and prosecution. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1412, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) () (citation omitted). This type of invasion concerns an individual's “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy [.]” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). “Reasonableness of a search depends on balancing the public's interest in preventing crime with the individual's right to be free from arbitrary and unwarranted governmental intrusions into personal privacy.” State v. Hirning, 1999 S.D. 53, ¶ 11, 592 N.W.2d 600, 603.
Exceptions to warrant requirement
a. Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
[¶ 17.] The exigent circumstances exception is one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Zahn, 2012 S.D. 19, ¶ 30, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499. The United States Supreme Court's decision in ...
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State v. Smith, Docket No. 41661
...v. Gaede, 20 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); State v. Declerck, 317 P.3d 794, 803-04 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38, 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) rev.......
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State v. Smith, Docket No. 41661
...v. Gaede, 20 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); State v. Declerck, 317 P.3d 794, 803-04 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38, 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) rev.......
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State v. Smith
...488, 20 N.E.3d 1266, 1270 (Ill.App.Ct.2014) ; State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908, 317 P.3d 794, 803–04 (2014) ; State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D.2014) ; Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38, 41 (Tex.Ct.App.2014) ; Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex.Ct.App.2014) rev. pendi......
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State v. Villarreal
...an exception to the warrant requirement"; "[t]he implied consent law does not, in itself, create such an exception");11 State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 237 (S.D.2014) (implied-consent statute did not constitute stand-alone exception to warrant requirement); State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84,30......
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Search and seizure
...courts, did not hold that the failure to give implied consent admonitions makes consent invalid per se . • In State v. Fierro (2014) 853 N.W.2d 235, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the South Dakota implied consent statute does not provide an exception to the search warrant requirem......