State v. Fife, No. 81-88
| Docket Nº | No. 81-88 |
| Citation | 632 P.2d 712, 38 St.Rep. 1334, 193 Mont. 486 |
| Case Date | August 20, 1981 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Page 712
v.
Harold Melvin FIFE, Defendant and Appellant.
Decided Aug. 20, 1981.
Page 713
[193 Mont. 487] Stacey & Jarussi, Billings, for defendant and appellant.
Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Harold F. Hanser, County Atty., Billings, for plaintiff and respondent.
MORRISON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery. The defendant was first tried on the charge April 17, 1979, and convicted. That conviction was reversed by this Court and remanded for a new trial. State v. Fife (1980), Mont., 608 P.2d 1069, 37 St.Rep. 600. The appellant was accused of the December 14, 1978, robbery of Mr. and Mrs. Curtis Workman. The facts are set forth in the first opinion and will not be restated.
We reversed the conviction, holding the District Court had abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for continuance, made so that a subpoenaed witness, crucial to the defense of the case, could be compelled to attend and testify. Remittitur was ordered April 10, 1980. The State took no further action until September 11, 1980, when the District Court granted an order authorizing the return of the defendant from the Montana State Prison, to the Yellowstone County jail. On October 8, 1980, the appellant made motions to suppress evidence seized from appellant's truck and the apartment the appellant shared with two other persons. The appellant also moved to dismiss the case on the grounds the appellant had been denied bail following reversal of his first conviction. Section 46-9-104, MCA. Bail had been originally set in January 1979 at $20,000. Following a hearing on the [193 Mont. 488] motion to set bail October 9, the court reduced bail to $15,000. Appellant
Page 714
could not post the reduced bail. The record shows the appellant has been continuously incarcerated since his arrest.The second trial was set for October 21, however, before trial, on October 17, the appellant made a second motion to dismiss contending deprivation of his right to speedy trial. The motion was denied.
The second trial lasted three days and included the testimony of the absent defense witness. The appellant renewed his motion to dismiss for denial of his speedy trial right several times during the trial. After deliberation, the jury found the appellant guilty of robbery.
Following trial, the appellant filed a motion for directed verdict notwithstanding the judgment and a motion for further hearing on the denial of speedy trial motions earlier filed. A brief hearing was held November 25; both motions were denied. On November 26, the appellant was sentenced to 20 years and from that judgment, the defendant appeals.
Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Whether the District Court erred by denying appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial.
2. Whether comment by a witness revealing the first trial was reversible error.
3. Whether denial of the motion to suppress, which was based upon the record of the earlier trial, was reversible error.
We find the first issue determinative and consequently need not address the additional issues raised.
The right of any defendant to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. U.S.Const., Amend. VI; 1972 Mont.Const., Art. II, § 24. When faced with a claimed denial of the right, this Court has applied the four part standard of review stated in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. State v. Larson (1981), Mont., 623 P.2d 954, 38 St.Rep. 213; State v. Bretz (1979), Mont., 605 P.2d 974, [193 Mont. 489] 36 St.Rep. 1037; State v. Harvey (1979), Mont., 603 P.2d 661, 36 St.Rep. 2035; State v. Freeman (1979), Mont., 599 P.2d 368, 36 St.Rep. 1622; State v. Puzio (1979), Mont., 595 P.2d 1163, 36 St.Rep. 1004; State v. Tiedemann (1978), 178 Mont. 394, 584 P.2d 1284; State v. Collins (1978), 178 Mont. 36, 582 P.2d 1179.
The factors considered are (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant from delay. Application of this "balancing test" of course must be made on an ad hoc basis. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191. We have reviewed the circumstances peculiar to this case and after balancing many factors, we reluctantly must order reversal and dismissal of this cause.
The first factor, length of delay, has been termed the "triggering mechanism" to speedy trial inquiries. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-531, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-2192. The delay in this case is indeed sufficient to trigger further inquiry.
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City of Billings v. Bruce, No. 97-183
...764 P.2d 1271; see also State v. Bailey (1982), 201 Mont. 473, 655 P.2d 494 (186 days triggered the presumption); State v. Fife(1981), 193 Mont. 486, 632 P.2d 712 (194 days triggered the presumption). Nevertheless, in Dahms we held that a 161-day delay was not a sufficient delay to require ......
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State v. Ariegwe, No. 04-620.
...as an unacceptable reason for delay. See e.g. State v. Tiedemann, 178 Mont. 394, 399-405, 584 P.2d 1284, 1288-91 (1978); State v. Fife, 193 Mont. 486, 490, 632 P.2d 712, 715 (1981); State v. Barker, 261 Mont. 379, 383-84, 862 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1993); Blair, ¶ 24; see also State v. Johnson, 2......
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State v. Curtis, No. 89-422
...753 P.2d at 331-32, 45 St.Rep. at 716-17; State v. Chavez (1984), 213 Mont. 434, 442, 691 P.2d 1365, 1370; State v. Fife (Mont.1981), 632 P.2d 712, 714, 38 St.Rep. 1334, 1336. Against such policy considerations we must weigh the reality of an often overburdened court system. The goal of the......
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State v. Hall, No. 89-331
...the federal and Montana Constitutions. U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Art. II, [244 Mont. 165] Sec. 24, Mont. Const.; State v. Fife (Mont.1981), 632 P.2d 712, The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117, established a four-......
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City of Billings v. Bruce, No. 97-183
...764 P.2d 1271; see also State v. Bailey (1982), 201 Mont. 473, 655 P.2d 494 (186 days triggered the presumption); State v. Fife(1981), 193 Mont. 486, 632 P.2d 712 (194 days triggered the presumption). Nevertheless, in Dahms we held that a 161-day delay was not a sufficient delay to require ......
-
State v. Ariegwe, No. 04-620.
...as an unacceptable reason for delay. See e.g. State v. Tiedemann, 178 Mont. 394, 399-405, 584 P.2d 1284, 1288-91 (1978); State v. Fife, 193 Mont. 486, 490, 632 P.2d 712, 715 (1981); State v. Barker, 261 Mont. 379, 383-84, 862 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1993); Blair, ¶ 24; see also State v. Johnson, 2......
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State v. Curtis, No. 89-422
...753 P.2d at 331-32, 45 St.Rep. at 716-17; State v. Chavez (1984), 213 Mont. 434, 442, 691 P.2d 1365, 1370; State v. Fife (Mont.1981), 632 P.2d 712, 714, 38 St.Rep. 1334, 1336. Against such policy considerations we must weigh the reality of an often overburdened court system. The goal of the......
-
State v. Hall, No. 89-331
...the federal and Montana Constitutions. U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Art. II, [244 Mont. 165] Sec. 24, Mont. Const.; State v. Fife (Mont.1981), 632 P.2d 712, The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117, established a four-......