State v. Finch

• Decision Date: 21 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 49063,49063
• Citation: 223 Kan. 398,573 P.2d 1048
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Charlotte FINCH, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1048

573 P.2d 1048

223 Kan. 398

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Charlotte FINCH, Appellant.

No. 49063.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 21, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

In order to convict a defendant of theft by deception under K.S.A. 21-3701(b ) the state must prove that the defendant with the required intent obtained control over another's property by means of a false statement or representation. To do so the state must prove that the victim was actually deceived and relied in whole or in part upon the false representation.

Bruce N. Karstadt, Lindsborg, argued the cause, and Randall B. Jones, Washburn Legal Clinic, Topeka, and Alan L. Dunavan, Osawatomie, were with him on the brief for appellant.

Albert D. Keil, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., Gene M. Olander, Dist. Atty. and Kathy R. Vetter, Salina, were with him on the brief for appellee.

PRAGER, Justice:

This is a direct appeal from a conviction of theft by deception (K.S.A. 21-3701(b ).) The basic issue presented is essentially this: In order to prove a defendant guilty of theft by deception under 21-3701(b ), must the state prove that the intended victim was actually deceived and actually relied on the false representation?

The state's evidence disclosed the following factual circumstances: On January 4, 1976, at approximately 1:00 p. m. the defendant, Charlotte Finch, was observed in the Richman-Gordman store in Topeka by a security guard, Donna Snyder. For some reason Snyder became suspicious of the defendant and followed her as she made her way to the store's baby department. Snyder positioned herself behind a one-way mirror directly behind the baby rack where she could observe the defendant looking through baby dresses. Snyder testified that she observed the defendant take a baby dress from one side of the rack, go to the other side, and then remove a sales tag from a dress that was on sale and pin it to another dress. The dress on which she pinned the tag was not on sale. She observed the defendant repeat the procedure with another dress. The security guard then alerted the cashier, Carol Grandstaff, informing her that a customer had switched the price tags on some merchandise, was proceeding toward the checkout counter, and would probably be going through the line. Grandstaff was instructed by Snyder to let the defendant through the checkout and to charge her the sale price as indicated by the switched sale tags, unless the defendant asked her to check the correctness of the price. When the defendant went to Grandstaff's checkout counter with the dresses, Grandstaff noticed that the sales price tags had been removed and reinserted. Pursuant to her instructions, the cashier let defendant pay the $2 sales tag price for each of the dresses and permitted her to pass through the checkout counter with the dresses. Defendant then proceeded to leave the store. The defendant was stopped by Donna Snyder. Snyder introduced herself and asked the defendant to come back into the store. The defendant did so. Snyder then called the police. The defendant was arrested.

The defendant's testimony conflicted with the above narrative. She testified that, as she was browsing through the baby department, she noticed a rack marked "Clearance." Assuming that the entire rack was on sale, she browsed through the baby dresses and selected two dresses that were on sale for $2 each. Defendant testified that she did not switch any price tags on any dresses. Assuming, however, that there was a switch of price tags, it is clear from the evidence that the employees of Richman-Gordman were not deceived by such action. It is undisputed that the defendant Finch was permitted by the cashier to go through the checkout stand with the merchandise after paying the price marked on the sales tag at a time when the cashier had been informed that the sales tags had been switched.

At the outset we should examine the Kansas statutes which pertain to the crime of theft by deception to determine the elements of the crime. K.S.A. 21-3701 was enacted in 1969 (effective July 1, 1970) as a consolidated theft statute to combine the former crimes of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, extortion, receiving stolen property and the like into a single crime of theft. There is a comprehensive discussion of the historical background of the statute and the objective sought in the consolidation of the state's theft laws in an excellent article by Professor Paul E. Wilson. (Thou Shalt Not Steal: Ruminations on the New Kansas Theft Law, 20 Kan.L.Rev. 385 (1972).) The statute is also discussed in State v. Bandt, 219 Kan. 816, 549 P.2d 936. The crime of theft by deception is covered under K.S.A. 21-3701(b ) which states in pertinent part as follows:

"21-3701. Theft. Theft is any of the following acts done with intent to deprive the owner permanently of the possession, use or benefit of his property:

"(b ) Obtaining by deception control over property; . . ."

K.S.A. 21-3110 defines several of the words used in the theft statute:

"21-3110. General definitions. The following definitions shall apply when the words and phrases defined are used in this code, except when a particular context clearly requires a different meaning.

"(5) 'Deception' means knowingly and willfully making a false statement or representation, express or implied, pertaining to a present or past existing fact.

"(11) 'Obtain' means to bring about a transfer of interest in or possession of property, whether to the offender or to another.

"(12) 'Obtains or exerts control' over property includes but is not limited to, the taking, carrying away, or the sale, conveyance, or transfer of title to, interest in, or possession of property."

Because section (b ) of 21-3701 is the only provision in the 1970 criminal code dealing with the crime of obtaining property by deception or fraud, it is clear that that subsection incorporates therein the former crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. That offense was previously defined and made a crime in K.S.A. 21-551 (Corrick 1964) which was repealed when the new criminal code became effective. In prosecutions under the former statute the state was required to prove the following four elements to establish the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses:

(1) There must be an intent to defraud;

(2) there must be an actual fraud committed;

(3) false pretenses must have been used for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud; and

(4) the fraud must be accomplished by means of the false pretenses made use of for the purpose, that is, they must be the cause, in whole or in part, which induced the owner to part with his money or property. (State v. Handke, 185 Kan. 38, 340 P.2d 877; State v. Matthews, 44 Kan. 596, 25 P. 36; State v. Metsch, 37 Kan. 222, 15 P. 251.)

The requirement of a reliance upon the false pretenses which induced the owner to part with his property is generally considered to be an essential element of the crime of false pretenses throughout this country. In State v. Handke, supra, the court noted the following general rule as stated in 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 6, p. 811:

"Generally speaking, to constitute the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses there must be a false representation or statement of a past or existing fact, made by accused or someone instigated by him, with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to deceive and defraud, and adapted to deceive the person to whom it is made; and there must be, further, a reliance on such false representation or statement, an actual defrauding, and an obtaining of something of value by accused or someone in his behalf, without compensation to the person from whom it is obtained. . . ."

It is clear that under the facts of this case, the defendant could not have been convicted of the crime of false pretenses under the former statute. The state's failure to show actual deception and reliance would sustain, at most, a conviction of an attempt to obtain property by false pretenses. (State v. Visco, 183 Kan. 562, 331 P.2d 318.)

The first question which we must determine is whether the legislature, by incorporating the former crime of obtaining property by false pretenses within the crime of theft by deception in K.S.A. 21-3701(b ), intended to require the state to prove as an element of the crime of theft by deception that the defendant's false representation was the instrumentality or means by which he received or obtained possession of the property, that is, that the owner was genuinely deceived by the defendant's representations, and relied thereon in surrendering control over his property to the defendant. An examination of the cases from other jurisdictions which have enacted consolidated theft acts leads to the conclusion that in every such jurisdiction the basic elements of the various theft crimes included within the particular consolidated theft statute have not been changed, absent a clear showing of a contrary legislative intent. (People v. Ashley, 42 Cal.2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, 279 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 900, 75 S.Ct. 222, 99 L.Ed. 707 (1954); State v. Gale, 322 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.1959); People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 81 N.E.2d 817 (1948); State v. McCormick, 7 Ariz.App. 576, 442 P.2d 134, 139, vacated on other grounds, 104 Ariz. 18, 448 P.2d 74 (1968).)

Professor Paul E. Wilson, in his article on the consolidated theft act, makes the following observations:

" 'Theft' is a term that was not employed by the common law of crimes; at least, the term was not used to identify a common law offense. By the definition of a statutory crime of theft, was it intended to broaden significantly the scope of the traditional crimes within its purview? Consolidation does not mean enlargement.

There is authority that simplified stealing statutes neither broaden the crime of larceny nor proscribe conduct previously legal and that the fact of consolidation does not change the...