State v. Finley
| Decision Date | 10 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 66658,66658 |
| Citation | 17 Kan.App.2d 246,838 P.2d 904 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Donald E. FINLEY, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. When an officer has "reasonable suspicion" that the occupant of a vehicle has just been involved in criminal activity, the officer may stop the vehicle and demand the name and address of the suspect and an explanation of the suspect's actions.
2. "Reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than "probable cause." To establish "reasonable suspicion," the officer must be able to point to specific articulable facts which reasonably create a suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has committed a crime. Inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunches will not suffice.
3. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the totality of the circumstances that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.
Thomas J. Bath and Robb Edmonds, Asst. Dist. Attys., Paul J. Morrison, District Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Joseph L. Dioszeghy, Overland Park, for appellee.
Before BRISCOE, C.J., and ELLIOTT and PIERRON, JJ.
On Sunday, November 11, 1990, at approximately 12:28 p.m., Lenexa, Kansas, police officers were dispatched to the Days Inn Motel in Lenexa, Kansas, Johnson County. The dispatch was to Room 350 of the motel where a woman had been heard screaming for help. Three officers responded to the dispatch: Officer Sarah (Keating) Vogelsberg was the first to arrive. Officer Rusty James arrived shortly thereafter. The last to arrive was Officer Marc Halvorson.
As he arrived on the scene, Halvorson noticed a white male in a blue Thunderbird approaching what Halvorson knew to be the only exit from the motel parking lot. The other two officers had already driven toward Room 350 to investigate the reported disturbance. Halvorson noticed that other than the marked police cars, the Thunderbird was the only vehicle moving in the parking lot. There was also testimony that the individual in the car "stared at" the officer. Halvorson followed the Thunderbird since he "believed that it might be the suspect vehicle."
Halvorson followed the Thunderbird for about six-tenths of a mile and then decided to stop it. As to what took place while Halvorson followed the Thunderbird, the parties differ.
It is undisputed that after he stopped the vehicle, Halvorson asked the defendant what had happened at the motel. The defendant answered that he and his girlfriend had a fight because he thought she had been sleeping with his best friend.
Officer James arrived at the scene and told Halvorson they had received enough information to link the occupant of the car to the disturbance at the motel. Finley was placed under arrest. The search of his person revealed a vial of cocaine. It was also found that Finley was driving with a suspended driver's license. Officer James testified he saw what appeared to be seeds on the passenger's seat. He conducted a search of the trunk where he found a quantity of hypodermic needles (syringes). He proceeded to look under the hood where three bags of marijuana were found.
Finley was charged with six counts: Count I--Battery; Count II--Criminal Damage to Property (for damage at the Days Inn Motel); Count III--Driving With a Suspended License; Count IV--Possession of Drugs with Intent to Sell; Count V--Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Count VI--Possession of Cocaine. Counts I and II were later dismissed.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the drugs and drug paraphernalia, alleging that they were illegally obtained. In particular, he claimed that the stop of his automobile was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred. After two hearings the trial judge granted the defendant's motion and suppressed the evidence. This is the State's interlocutory appeal of the trial court's suppression of the evidence.
A great deal of the time spent by the parties at the hearings was devoted to the issue of what information was relayed to Halvorson by the other two officers prior to stopping the vehicle. The trial court found after an analysis of the admittedly confusing and contradictory testimony that Halvorson received no information from the other officers prior to making the stop. The court then found there was insufficient information available to the officer to justify the stop when it occurred.
We find that although we accept the trial court's reading of that evidence, there was sufficient information available to the officer to justify a car stop under these facts.
The trial court is to determine the reasonableness of a search based upon the facts and circumstances unique to that case. State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. 506, 514, 819 P.2d 644 (1991) (citing State v. Kirby, 12 Kan.App.2d 346, 353, 744 P.2d 146 [1987], aff'd 242 Kan. 803, 751 P.2d 1041 [1988]. In reviewing a trial court's decision, an appellate court must consider whether the findings of the court on the motion to suppress are based upon substantial evidence. McKeown, 249 Kan. at 514, 819 P.2d 644. Substantial evidence is described as:
" Lansing-Delaware Water District v. Oak Lane Park, Inc., 248 Kan. 563, 572-73, 808 P.2d 1369 (1991) (citing Leeper v. Schroer, Rice, Bryan & Lykins, P.A., 241 Kan. 241, 244, 736 P.2d 882 (1987)).
Before touching upon the reasonableness of the search involved in the case at hand, we must first determine whether the stop of the defendant's vehicle was lawful. The law governing the stop involved in this case is found at K.S.A.1991 Supp. 22-2402(1):
The statute is a codification of the rule governing a stop and frisk under the United States Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Kansas Supreme Court recently discussed this statute in State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. at 509, 819 P.2d 644. In McKeown, the court noted that even if a law enforcement officer does not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, he may still approach an individual on the street for investigative purposes. The officer may request identification of the individual, who must be free to leave. 249 Kan. at 509, 819 P.2d 644 (citing State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 713, 703 P.2d 761 [1985], and State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 708-09, 602 P.2d 1344 [1979].
An officer is not, however, afforded this opportunity if the individual is in a moving vehicle. The court held that the stop of a vehicle pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2402 always constitutes a seizure. McKeown, 249 Kan. at 510, 819 P.2d 644. "Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402 and Terry." 249 Kan. at 510, 819 P.2d 644. The court continued, "[t]o stop a vehicle to investigate circumstances which provoke suspicion, an officer must be aware of 'specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion' that the vehicle contains individuals involved in criminal activity." 249 Kan. at 510, 819 P.2d 644.
At the motion to suppress hearing, the...
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