State v. Firth

• Decision Date: 25 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-482-C,96-482-C
• Citation: 708 A.2d 526
• Parties: STATE v. Thomas FIRTH. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 526

708 A.2d 526

STATE v. Thomas FIRTH.

No. 96-482-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 25, 1998.

Aaron Weisman, Assistant Attorney General and Annie Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff.

John F. Cicilline, Bristol, for Defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

The defendant, Thomas Firth (Firth), stands convicted on one count of first-degree murder by a Providence County Superior Court jury. Raising several issues before this court, Firth urges us to reverse his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we deny his appeal and affirm the conviction. A brief discussion of the relevant facts follows with additional facts elicited for the various legal issues raised in this opinion.

I Factual and Procedural History

On the afternoon of August 21, 1991, Gilbert Mann (Mann) drove his automobile into a vacant parking lot at the Reflections Lounge located in the town of Johnston. With Mann on this inauspicious occasion was his front-seat passenger, James J. Porter (Porter). The two men estimate that they had been parked, drinking beer, for approximately fifteen minutes when a green station wagon, occupied only by its driver, entered the lot and backed into a parking space, roughly one hundred feet from Mann's vehicle. Shortly thereafter, a gray Chevrolet Cavalier with two occupants pulled into the lot and parked adjacent to the station wagon. Mann and Porter, however, paid little attention to these vehicles. But within minutes their attention would again be drawn to the vehicles by the echo of gunfire.

Mann and Porter witnessed a large man, later identified as Firth, walk away from the station wagon, stuff a gun into his waistband, and enter the passenger-side door of the Chevrolet. As soon as the Chevrolet left the parking lot, Porter ran to the station wagon. There he discovered a man slumped behind the steering wheel, bleeding from multiple gunshot wounds to the head and "looking like he was dead." This man, who was later identified as John Gibson (Gibson), was described at trial as a friend of Firth's and another man, Albert Ursillo (Albert). ¹

That evening the investigation into Gibson's murder led the Johnston police to an apartment complex in North Providence where Patty Lyons (Lyons), whose sister was the live-in girlfriend of Gibson, resided. Prior to entering the complex to interview Lyons, however, police observed a gray Chevrolet resembling the description of the vehicle used in Gibson's murder parked behind the apartment complex. Apparently suspecting a more sinister connection to the Gibson homicide, Detective John Nardolillo (Nardolillo) notified police headquarters of the discovery and soon learned that the car was registered to Albert's daughter, Lori Ursillo (Lori). In the meantime Nardolillo observed another vehicle, a Cadillac, with three occupants enter the lot and park a few spaces from the Chevrolet.

Nardolillo watched Firth exit the Cadillac and enter the apartment complex. Subsequently, other officers from the Johnston police department began questioning the two remaining occupants of the Cadillac, and discovered a handgun inside the automobile. Since the officers were unable to determine who was in actual possession of the firearm, both occupants were taken into custody and turned over to North Providence police officers who were now assisting in the investigation. Firth was also taken into custody when he exited the building. He was transported to the North Providence police station, fingerprinted (hereinafter North Providence fingerprints), and released in the early morning hours of August 22, 1991. Firth's freedom, however, was short-lived.

On the partial basis of Firth's August 21 North Providence fingerprints, police were able to identify latent fingerprints from the victim's car as matching Firth's fingerprints. Consequently, on August 25, 1991, an arrest warrant was issued. Firth was arrested the next day and subsequently indicted on one count of murder in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-23-1. During a pretrial hearing, Firth sought to suppress his North Providence fingerprints and the results of any examinations conducted with those fingerprints on the ground that his August 21 North Providence arrest was without probable cause. The trial justice found the arrest to be without probable cause but nevertheless allowed the North Providence fingerprints and the results of the examinations to be admitted, reasoning that since the Providence police department also had a set of Firth's fingerprints on file (hereinafter Providence fingerprints), the latent prints would have inevitably been matched to Firth. As a result of this fingerprint identification that placed Firth in the victim's car, as well as corroborating eyewitness testimony, Firth was convicted of Gibson's murder and sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. Because Firth believes the North Providence fingerprints represent the foundation upon which his fate was sealed, he raises this issue and four others as grounds for this court to reverse his conviction.

II Did the Trial Justice Err by Admitting Firth's Fingerprints under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine?

Firth's first issue on appeal is grounded in the trial justice's decision to allow the North Providence fingerprints into evidence. The gravamen of Firth's argument is that since his August 21, 1991 arrest was without probable cause, and since an independent source did not exist to purge this taint, the fruits of that illegal seizure, the North Providence fingerprints, should be suppressed. Without the North Providence fingerprints, Firth argues, identification of the latent prints could not have been ascertained. At a pretrial hearing, the trial justice agreed with Firth that his August 21 arrest was constitutionally invalid. Despite this finding, however, the trial justice permitted the North Providence fingerprints and the results of the examinations conducted with those fingerprints, to be admitted into evidence reasoning that the latent fingerprints left in Gibson's station wagon would have inevitably been matched to the "clear and readable" fingerprints in the possession of the Providence police department. Consequently, the trial justice allowed the introduction of testimony that the latent prints from the victim's car matched Firth's known fingerprints.

On appeal Firth challenges the trial justice's determination that the Providence fingerprints were "clear and readable" and therefore argues that both the Providence and the North Providence fingerprints were needed to identify the latent fingerprints. As support for this argument, Firth directs our attention to the testimony of Detective Walter D. Williams (Williams) of the Providence police department. According to Firth, Williams testified that in order to compare Firth's known fingerprints to the latent prints, both the Providence fingerprints and the North Providence fingerprints were needed for purposes of clarity. Since the North Providence fingerprints were a necessary component to the positive identification, Firth contends, there was "no independent untainted investigation that could have inevitably uncovered the same evidence." See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).

As a preliminary matter we note that Firth's allegation of error rests on the trial justice's factual determination. Consequently, the trial justice's finding that the Providence fingerprints were "clear and readable" is entitled to great weight and shall not be disturbed unless the trial justice has misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or was otherwise clearly wrong. See State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862, 865 (R.I.1996); State v. Champagne, 668 A.2d 311, 313 (R.I.1995). Here, however, we believe Firth misconceives and overlooks Williams' testimony.

Contrary to Firth's claim, Williams' testimony supports the conclusion that Williams compared both the Providence and the North Providence fingerprints to determine which set of prints "had the best clarity." Specifically, defense counsel overlooks Williams' testimony wherein he indicates that both sets of fingerprints were clear. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Williams did in fact use the Providence fingerprints to assist his identification of the latent prints and that the Providence fingerprints had been available prior to August of 1991. Because the Providence police department had an identical set of Firth's fingerprints, we conclude that on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence, it can reasonably be inferred that the latent prints from Gibson's station wagon would have inevitably been matched to the Providence fingerprints even if Firth's August 21 arrest by the North Providence police had never occurred. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387-88 (1984); State v. Trepanier, 600 A.2d 1311, 1319 (R.I.1991). Therefore, "when, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." Nix, 467 U.S. at 448, 104 S.Ct. at 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d at 390. See also State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1170 (R.I.1987).

III Did the Trial Justice Err by Not Granting the Defense Motion for a Continuance?

Firth next challenges the denial of his midtrial request for a continuance to procure the presence of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent listed by the state as a potential witness but not called during its case in chief. ² In particular, defense counsel endeavored to present testimony that fiber-transfer examinations were conducted and that no fibers from Firth's clothing were found on Gibson or in his car and similarly that none of the fibers from Gibson's clothing or his station wagon were found on Firth. Counsel initially argued that the jury...