State v. Fischer
| Decision Date | 24 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | Cr. N |
| Citation | 231 N.W.2d 147 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick Arthur FISCHER, Defendant-Appellant. o. 486. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial until reasonable grounds are established to the court to the contrary.
2. Evidence of competency of defendant may consist of lay observations as well as those of experts.
3. If reasonable grounds are established challenging the competency of the defendant to stand trial the court is required to fix a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Section 29--20--01, N.D.C.C.
4. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for mistrial and competency hearing under Section 29--20--01, N.D.C.C., in a criminal action, where trial court weighed evidence that defendant changed his mind about testifying, on his own behalf, during trial, and defendant had been hospitalized for mental problems, in the past, which information was available to and had been considered by the State Hospital shortly after defendant was bound over for trial on first degree murder and State Hospital report concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial, along with the trial court's observations of the defendant's demeanor and responses at the hearing on the motion.
5. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and if when so considered they clearly advise the jury as to the law, they are sufficient although portions thereof standing alone may be insufficient or erroneous.
Bjella & Jestrab, Williston, for defendant and appellant, argued by John R. Gordon, Williston.
Leroy P. Anseth, State's Atty., Williston, for plaintiff and appellee.
SAND, Judge (On Reassignment).
The appellant, Patrick Arthur Fischer, was convicted in Williams County District Court of murder in the second degree for the fatal shooting of Ruby Ramsey, on February 8, 1973, in the City of Williston. On February 22, 1974, a criminal judgment and order of commitment to the state penitentiary at Bismarck was entered by the district court, sentencing the appelant for an indeterminate term of from 27 to 30 years. It is from this judgment and order of commitment that Mr. Fischer appeals.
Two allegations of error are the bases of Mr. Fischer's appeal. They are:
1. The district court erred in refusing to order mental examination of the defendant required by § 29--20--01, N.D.C.C., and in refusing to hold a hearing to determine the competence of defendant to stand trial and assist in his own defense, and thereby denied defendant's constitutional right to due process and a fair trial.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to give Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions numbered 1 and 2.
Those requested jury instructions are:
Defendant's requested Jury Instruction No. 1.
'If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.'
Defendant's Requested Jury Instruction No. 2.
'If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree.'
During the course of Mr. Fischer's trial, his appointed counsel moved the court on his behalf to declare a mistrial on the basis of Mr. Fischer's incompetency to stand trial and assist in his defense. His counsel further moved the court to fix a time for a hearing to determine Mr. Fischer's competency to stand trial, pursuant to Section 29--20--01, N.D.C.C., which provides:
One of the pertinent questions before us is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion for a hearing regarding defendant's competency to stand trial at the time.
The evidence before the trial court, in addition to oral examination by the court and the discourse between the defendant and the court, consisted primarily of affidavits of defendant's court-appointed attorneys and a report from the State Hospital consisting of a letter from Hubert A. Carbone, M.D., with attached copies of the mental examination dated March 17, 1973, psychological evaluation dated March 29, 1973, social history dated April 13, 1973, diagnostic staff conference dated April 16, 1973, and a letter to Harry M. Pippin, co-counsel for the defendant, dated May 8, 1973, from Dr. Hubert A. Carbone.
The chronological sequence of events, for a better understanding, is as follows:
February 8, 1973--The homicide occurred.
February 14, 1973--The warrant of arrest was issued.
March 8, 1973--Court appointed counsel, Harry Pippin.
March 20, 1973--Court issued order sending defendant to the State Hospital for mental and competency evaluation.
April 16, 1973--Defendant was returned from State Hospital.
April 16, 1973--Mr. Harry Pippin received letter from Dr. Hubert A. Carbone stating his conclusions as to the mental competency of the defendant, together with the reports of the examination, psychological evaluation, social history and diagnostic staff conference. (Report concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.)
May 8, 1973--Letter to Harry M. Pippin from Dr. Carbone stating that he has no way of knowing the length of time defendant may have been in remission prior to his arrival at the Hospital.
September 19, 1973--Preliminary examination was scheduled but because counsel Pippin was hospitalized it was continued.
At about the same time two co-counsel were appointed.
October 9, 1973--The preliminary examination was held and defendant was bound over for trial to the district court.
October 16, 1973--Defendant was arraigned; but the arraignment was continued to permit the defense to prepare a motion in advance of the entry of plea. Also, defendant for the first time admitted a recollection of events occurring on February 8, 1973. (Defendant had previously stated to authorities at the State Hospital that he had no recollection of events of February 8, 1973.)
January 7, 1974--Motion to suppress certain physical evidence was made and granted.
January 16, 1974--Defendant entered plea of not guilty.
February 6, 1974--Defendant's motion in limine to limit cross-examination was heard. Motion was denied.
February 7, 1974--Pre-trial conference was had.
February 9, 1974--Defendant reiterated to Neff, his attorney, his willingness to testify.
February 11, 1974--Trial commenced. Defense counsel in opening statement stated that defendant was to testify on his behalf.
February 12, 1974--After one full day of trial the defendant, at 8:30 p.m., told his counsel he refused to testify and that this decision was final.
February 13, 1974--Defendant moved for mistrial on the ground that the defendant is incompetent to assist in his own defense and requested the court fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental condition pursuant to Section 29--20--01, N.D.C.C.
Each of the three court-appointed attorneys for the defendant, John R. Gordon, Vern C. Neff and Aldean Allen Wahl, submitted supporting affidavits on the motion for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Section 29--20--01, N.D.C.C.
The affidavit of Neff in substance stated that he informed the defendant that the State was willing to accept a plea to manslaughter but defendant refused to plead. Defendant said he was entitled to a jury trial and would testify on his own behalf.
An opening statement was made predicated upon defendant's assurance that he would testify on his own behalf. On February 12, 1974, defendant, for the first time, informed the affiant he would not testify. Defendant told this affiant that Gordon, one of his attorneys, told the jury what happened and that is all the jury needed to know. (This apparently refers to the opening statement.)
The affiant stated that in his opinion the defendant's decision was not rationally arrived at or rationally conceived and that the defendant did not have the ability to make a decision or have a rational understanding of the situation.
Gordon, in his affidavit, in substance stated that he was appointed as defense counsel by the county court on September 24, 1973, and was also appointed as defense counsel by the district court on October 16, 1973. Affiant stated that he had examined the report from the State Hospital and decided that there was no basis for a defense of insanity.
On October 16, 1973, defense counsel secured cooperation of the defendant, who admitted recollection of the events on February 8, 1973, but the defendant refused to disclose full details until February 11, 1974, when he did so at approximately 4:30 p.m.
On January 15, 1974, defendant advised that he would not enter a plea of...
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State v. Storbakken
...103 (1975); Rand v. Swenson, 501 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1972); and State v. Fischer, 231 N.W.2d 147 (N.D.1975). The only suggestion contained on the record in the district court that Storbakken might not be competent to plead came at the sen......
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In the Interest of T.S. v. T.S.
...Here, T.S.'s behavior and his demeanor before the juvenile court do not raise sufficient doubt about his competency. See State v. Fischer, 231 N.W.2d 147, 153 (N.D.1975) (stating the record contained no evidence of defendant's irrational behavior); Dahl, at ¶ 12 (explaining the record conta......
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...a defendant's fitness to stand trial may be presented in the form of lay observations and expert medical testimony. State v. Fischer, 231 N.W.2d 147 (N.D.1975). Furthermore, considering that the issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial is a legal question to be decided by the trier ......
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