State v. Fitzpatrick

• Decision Date: 31 January 1887
• Citation: 16 R.I. 60,11 A. 773
• Parties: STATE v. FITZPATRICK.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

11 A. 773

16 R.I. 60

STATE

v. FITZPATRICK.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

1887.

Liquors claimed by William Fitzpatrick, the defendant, were seized, and proceedings taken to condem them. The defendant moved to quash the proceedings as being illegal, and the cause came to this court upon the certificate of the court below of constitutional questions raised.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Clarence A. Aldrich, for the State. Hugh J. Carroll, for defendant.

DURFEE, C. J. This is a proceeding under Pub. Laws, cc. 596, 634, for the seizure and forfeiture of certain intoxicating liquors, and the vessels containing them. The proceeding was begun in the district court of the Tenth judicial district by complaint and warrant, under which certain liquors claimed by the defendant were seized, and brought before said court. The defendant moved the court to quash the proceedings, for the reason that it, and the law purporting to authorize it, are illegal and unconstitutional. The court overruled the motion, and the cause now comes before us upon its certificate of the constitutional questions raised.

The only questions which can be brought before us by such certificate are questions involving the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly and therefore any question in regard to the legality or constitutionality of the proceeding cannot properly be considered here, unless the question is in effect a question in regard to the constitutionality of the act under which the proceeding was instituted or carried on. The better mode of presenting such questions is to present them directly as questions in regard to the acts, or parts of acts, meant to be impeached, mentioning the acts, or parts of acts.

The first ground assigned for quashing the proceeding is because "it does not definitely describe the liquors to be seized and condemned, nor does it definitely give the value of the same; for which reason it does not appear that a district court has the power to condemn by forfeiture the goods seized." The objection, on the face of it, is simply an objection to the sufficiency of the complaint, and therefore, unless we go below the face, does not present any proper question for decision or certificate. The complaint, however, follows substantially the form given to be used in proceedings for seizure and forfeiture in Pub. Laws, R. I. c. 596, § 27, and it is therefore constitutional if the section is constitutional. We will treat the objection as if made to the act. The first point made is that the liquors to be seized are not definitely described. The description begins: "A certain quantity of rum, being about and not exceeding one hundred gallons," and goes on to specify whiskey, gin, brandy, ale, wine, strong beer, lager beer, describing them severally in the same manner, also, "other strong and malt and intoxicating liquors, being about and not exceeding one hundred gallons," etc., and adds, by way of further description, "contained in barrels, kegs, jugs, jars, bottles, decanters, and other vessels." The constitution of the state requires that a search-warrant, when issued, shall describe, "as nearly as may be, the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." We think the description given in the complaint and warrant in this proceeding is full enough, and definite enough, considering what were the objects of the search, to answer the requirement. In Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 97 Mass. 63, the liquors to be seized were described as certain quantities of rum, gin, brandy, whisky, strong beer, ale, and wine, being "about and not exceeding 500 gallons" each. The officer made returns that he had searched and seized "the honors described in the written warrant, to-wit: About 125 gallons of whisky, about 49 gallons of gin, about 75 gallons of rum, and about 12 gallons of wine." The court held that the description of the liquors intended to be seized was sufficient, and that the variation between the quantities described and seized was not cause enough for dismissal of the complaint. See, also, Downing v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 13 Allen, 52, 58. The second point is that the liquors mentioned are not valued, and therefore the complaint does not show that the proceeding is within the jurisdiction of a district court. This point, so far as it is a proper matter for consideration, will be more appropriately considered under the second ground.

The second ground assigned for quashing the proceedings is "because section 15, c. 634, P. L., is unconstitutional in giving power to district courts to condemn prohibited liquors, whatever may be the value of the property seized." Under this ground, the question is whether there is anything in the constitution to prevent the general assembly from conferring original jurisdiction on district courts in proceedings like this, whatever the value of the property seized may be. We know of nothing. The constitution, (article 10, § 2,) declares that "the several courts shall have such jurisdiction as may from time to time be prescribed by law." The power is broadly given, and we do not knew of any limit upon it, except such as may result from provisions in the constitution, which secure the right of jury trial. These provisions debar the general assembly from conferring final jurisdiction in many matters on courts sitting without jury, but it is well settled that they do not debar the general assembly from conferring original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, subject to appeal to courts sitting with jury, except criminal cases, in which the accused can only be put on trial "on presentment or indictment by a grand jury." Weaver v. Sturtevant, 12 R. I. 537; Beers v. Beers, 4...