State v. Flores

• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
• Decision Date: 10 May 2023
• Docket Number: 21-1676
• Citation: State v. Flores, 21-1676 (Iowa App. May 10, 2023)
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELSON CARLOS FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

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STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELSON CARLOS FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-1676

Court of Appeals of Iowa

May 10, 2023

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Crawford County, Zachary Hindman, Judge.

Nelson Flores appeals his convictions for crimes relating to sexual abuse of a child. AFFIRMED.

Tyler D. McIntosh and Christopher J. Roth of Roth Weinstein, LLC Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Badding, J., and Doyle, S.J. ^[*] VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A jury found Nelson Flores guilty of several crimes relating to sexual abuse of a child. On appeal, Flores challenges (I) a claimed violation of his speedy trial right; (II) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's findings of guilt; (III) the admission of a recorded interview of the child; (IV) the admission of coconspirator statements concerning a plan to leave the state; (V) the denial of his motion for new trial; and (VI) his attorney's performance.

I. Speedy Trial

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 2.33(2)(b) states: "If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant's right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown."

The State charged Flores with crimes in two separate cases. The trial information in the first case was filed on July 14 2016. Two-and-a-half weeks later, Flores waived his ninety-day speedy trial right. The trial information in the second case was filed on April 12, 2021. Flores demanded his right to a speedy trial in the second case. Both cases were consolidated for trial. The State moved to postpone the trial date beyond the speedy trial deadline, citing the need to obtain Flores' release from federal custody. The district court granted the motion. Trial was held after the deadline.

Flores acknowledges he waived his speedy-trial right in the first case but argues his demand in the second case and the consolidation of both cases militate in favor of finding a violation. He also asserts the waiver in the first case was invalid because there was no evidence that it "was explained to [him] in his native language." Finally, Flores contends the State could have sought his release from federal custody at an earlier date, undermining its claim of good cause for the violation.

Our review of a claimed denial of a speedy trial right is for corrections of errors of law. See State v. Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 2008) (citing State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001)). We review a good cause determination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Watson, 970 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Iowa 2022).

There was no speedy trial violation in the first case. First, Flores waived his right. Second, the document containing his waiver stated Flores could "read and understand the English language with the help of an interpreter," leading to an inference that he had an interpreter. Third, Flores' attorney could have waived the right for him. See State v. LeFlore, 308 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Iowa 1981) (stating "the statutory right to a speedy trial under [the former version of rule 2.33(2)(b)] is not a personal right that can be waived only by the defendant" and "[d]efense counsel acting within the scope of his or her authority may waive this right on the defendant's behalf without the defendant's express consent"). Fourth, Flores essentially reaffirmed his waiver by seeking sixteen postponements of trial in the first case. Finally, the first case was not consolidated with the second case until after Flores demanded speedy trial in the second.

We turn to whether the State established good cause for seeking a delay of the consolidated trial. In granting the State's motion, the district court cited Flores' potential unavailability, twelve pending motions in the case, and the court's need to preside over another jury trial with a speedy trial deadline. On appeal, the State points to Flores' own request to postpone trial due his attorney's planned vacation. The State also notes that its request for a seven-day postponement was based in part on "the relatively rare occurrence" of having to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain Flores' release from federal custody.

"The decisive inquiry in these matters" is "whether events that impeded the progress of the case and were attributable to the defendant or to some other good cause for delay served as a matter of practical necessity to move the trial date beyond the initial ninety-day period required by the rule." State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2006). Although the State acknowledges it "could have perhaps requested custody [of Flores] earlier," whether and when Flores would be released was entirely up to the federal government. As the prosecutor stated at a hearing on the State's motion, "unless and until . . . the feds release [Flores] to [the State] . . . we can't get him here." The prosecutor also pointed to "a number of unplanned roadblocks" associated with witness depositions. Again, those depositions could have been taken earlier, but logistical issues resulted in delays. Flores' attorney conceded as much, stating "[t]he State has-has set forth I guess accurately as far as the problems that we're running into." Finally, both sides filed numerous pretrial motions in the weeks before and after the good cause motion was filed. It is true "the mere existence of the motions or the request for discovery" may not excuse a failure to comply with the speedy-trial rule. See State v. Winters, 696 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Iowa 2006). At the same time, "the time required for the court to rule on motions filed by a defendant can amount to delay attributable to the defendant and constitute good cause for the failure to comply with the speedy trial deadline." Id. at 908. In the same vein, "good cause for pretrial delay under the speedy-trial rule can result from the need to complete pretrial discovery." Id. at 909.

We conclude a confluence of circumstances, some outside the State's control, caused the delay in bringing Flores to trial within the ninety-day speedy trial deadline. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to grant a short continuance to facilitate resolution of pretrial matters and Flores' presence at trial.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The jury found Flores guilty of one count of second-degree sexual abuse, one count of lascivious acts with a child, one count of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, three counts of third-degree sexual abuse, one count of conspiracy to commit a felony (suborning perjury), one count of conspiracy to commit an aggravated misdemeanor (obstruction of prosecution), one count of lascivious conduct with a minor, one count of tampering with a witness (threatening the child believing the child "had been or may be summoned as a witness in a judicial proceeding"), and one count of dissemination and exhibition of obscene materials to a minor.^[1] Flores asserts "there was insufficient evidence to convict [him] of any of the charges." In his view, "the State's entire case was based upon the credibility of one witness."

That witness, a child who was sixteen years old at the time of trial, testified that Flores sexually abused her from the ages of nine to fifteen. She provided a detailed, anatomically-specific description of multiple sex acts. She said that Flores also touched her inappropriately "[w]henever [her] mom would turn around or leave to use the rest room." And he showed her pornography on his phone.

The child recounted Flores' efforts to have her remain silent about the abuse. While he was sexually assaulting her, he told her, "Don't tell your mom," and "you're going to get in trouble if you tell somebody that I did this to you." When he learned she intended to report details to authorities, he said, "Don't tell them what I did." Notwithstanding Flores' orders, the child disclosed the abuse to health professionals and law enforcement authorities. She was later interviewed by child protective personnel.

Flores pressured her to take back her statements. He threatened her with having "to go to foster care," where people would hurt her and she would never "see the family again." He told her he knew a cop, a disclosure that made her feel "[a]nxious" because she thought she "might get in trouble."

The child's mother was present when Flores made some of these comments. She and the child's grandmother supported Flores. According to the child, the mother's response was, "this all depends on you. Whatever you say could affect us majorly." They would "[o]ften" tell her "that it's all made up, everything that you're saying is just a dream." Their comments made her feel "[n]ervous, scared" and "regretful." She "feared that something would happen to [her] mom or [her] grandma" and "something bad was going to happen if [she] didn't say what they wanted [her] to say."

The child recanted statements she made during an initial interview with a child abuse professional. She testified to doing so "because [she] was being pressured." Flores continued to sexually abuse her following her disclosures and following entry of a no-contact order.

Flores and the child's mother crafted a plan to abscond with the child. When the child was fifteen, Flores told her he would take her "[s]omewhere far away." They would say, "Let's just go somewhere where we could be a family again, where we wouldn't have court."

The child's testimony, together with other evidence, amounted to substantial evidence in support of the findings...