State v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 08 January 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 13914,s. 13914
• Citation: 584 A.2d 1157,217 Conn. 73
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory FLOYD. STATE of Connecticut v. Kenneth WRIGHT. STATE of Connecticut v. John PARADIS. to 13916.

Page 1157

584 A.2d 1157

217 Conn. 73

STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory FLOYD.

STATE of Connecticut v. Kenneth WRIGHT.

STATE of Connecticut v. John PARADIS.

Nos. 13914 to 13916.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 30, 1990.

Decided Jan. 8, 1991.

Carolyn K. Longstreth, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Steven M. Sellers, Asst. State's Attorney, for appellant (state).

Robert N. Chatigny, with whom was Stacey L. Savin, for appellees (defendant in each case).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, HULL and BORDEN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

These consolidated appeals concern the constitutionality of General Statutes § 53a-167b, ¹ which makes it a class A misdemeanor for any person to refuse to assist a peace officer or fireman authorized to command assistance in the execution of his duties. The three defendants, Gregory Floyd, Kenneth Wright and John Paradis, were charged under this statute when they failed to assist a Southington police officer who had sought their aid in subduing and arresting a fellow employee at their place of employment. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that the application of the statute to these defendants constituted an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and deprived the defendants of the due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. ² The state moved for and received permission to appeal the trial court's judgment in each case. Because we construe the statute to authorize a peace officer or fireman to command assistance only in cases of demonstrated necessity, and only if such assistance is reasonable under all the circumstances, we conclude that the statute is not unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cases for further proceedings.

Although the trial court purported to invalidate the statute "as applied" within the factual nexus of the charges against these defendants, its judgment rests solely on a one paragraph "statement of essential facts" alleged by the state ³ and on the representations of counsel at oral argument on the motion to dismiss. Relying, without an evidentiary hearing, on the state's conclusory allegation that the original arrestee was "endangering" the police officer, the court determined that the defendants would have been compelled to risk physical injury to comply with the officer's call for assistance. On this record, the court essentially has held that a police officer never can be constitutionally justified in commanding assistance in order to effect the arrest of a misdemeanant, when the assistance that is commanded involves a risk of physical injury to the individual whose aid is commanded. The court's invalidation of the statute "as applied" is therefore tantamount to a facial invalidation of the statute, ⁴ and we review it accordingly.

The following facts were claimed to constitute the offense charged in this case. The state alleged that, on August 5, 1989, Officer Nicholas Spratto of the Southington police department went to the Pratt & Whitney factory in Southington to issue a traffic infraction to a Pratt & Whitney employee, Michael Jamieson, who had been involved in a traffic accident earlier in the day. ⁵ When Spratto confronted Jamieson, Jamieson "refused to take the infraction" and became "obnoxious." Spratto then asked defendant Floyd, a uniformed Pratt & Whitney security officer, how the company deals with disorderly employees. The defendant referred Spratto to his supervisor, Kenneth Wright, who responded that the company policy in such a situation was to call the Southington police department. Spratto again attempted to issue the infraction to Jamieson, who continued to behave in an "obnoxious, tumultuous manner," and Spratto then placed Jamieson under arrest for breach of the peace, a misdemeanor in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 punishable by up to six months imprisonment. When Spratto attempted to take Jamieson into custody, Jamieson resisted arrest by struggling and fighting. Spratto then asked defendant Floyd, defendant Wright, who was also a uniformed security officer, and defendant Paradis, a Pratt & Whitney maintenance supervisor who was standing nearby, to assist him in subduing Jamieson. None of the three defendants came to Spratto's assistance; defendant Paradis indicated that he "could not" help Spratto. Spratto called for assistance from the Southington police department and effected Jamieson's arrest when a second Southington police officer arrived. The defendants were subsequently charged with the crime of failure to assist a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167b and were arrested by warrant.

The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute was overbroad and vague in violation of their rights to due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution. The trial court rejected these claims, which have not been renewed by the defendants as alternative grounds for affirmance.

The trial court nonetheless ruled in favor of the defendants by finding a violation of their rights to personal security under the fourth and the fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. On the basis of the facts alleged by the state, the trial court determined that Spratto's command to the defendants for their assistance was an unreasonable "seizure" of each man under the fourth amendment. Such a "seizure," according to the court, was an unconstitutional abridgment of each man's right to be secure from unreasonable governmental intrusions upon his physical safety. The court also held that the application of § 53a-167b to these defendants offended the interest in personal security guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Applying a due process analysis, the court reasoned that any historical justification for state actions threatening the personal safety of individual citizens by requiring their aid in law enforcement efforts had been eliminated by the establishment of paid organized police forces in the nineteenth century.

The state's appeal urges us to overturn the trial court's judgment of dismissal. With regard to the trial court's fourth amendment ruling, the state maintains that the amendment (1) does not apply; (2) does not characterize the conduct in this case as a seizure; or (3) does not sanction as unreasonable any seizure that may have occurred in this case. With regard to the court's fourteenth amendment ruling, the state contends that § 53a-167b does not violate substantive due process. Finally, the state contends that dismissal of the prosecution was inappropriate because the defendants could have raised their concerns, at trial, by requesting the court, through an appropriately limited construction, to enable them to mount a factual defense to the charges against them. We agree with the state that the trial court's dismissal of the charges was premature.

I

Before we undertake our particularized review of the constitutionality of § 53a-167b, we note that the constitutional challenge to this statute comes to us in the posture least likely to succeed. This court has frequently noted the imprudence of adjudicating constitutional questions in a "factual vacuum." Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 234, 571 A.2d 691 (1990); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 75, 523 A.2d 486 (1987). "A party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute's adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven.... We do not give advisory opinions, nor do we sit as roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of legislative enactments." Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neill, supra.

A party attacking the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 269, 562 A.2d 1060 (1989); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507-508, 542 A.2d 700 (1988). We will indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality; State v. Breton, supra; and, when called upon to interpret a statute, we will search for "an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably accords with the legislature's underlying intent." Id.; McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 705-706, 553 A.2d 596 (1989). These principles of statutory construction apply equally to criminal and to civil statutes; State v. Breton, supra; and they conjoin to commend to us a search for a judicial gloss on § 53a-167b that will effect the legislature's will in a manner consistent with constitutional safeguards.

Our analysis begins, therefore, with an evaluation of the constitutional grounds on which the trial court dismissed the charges. We consider in turn the factors that may constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment or a deprivation of privacy or liberty without due process of law under the fourteenth amendment, and we examine the balancing tests that must be applied to determine whether a violation of constitutional norms has occurred. We then turn to § 53a-167b to determine whether it can be construed to incorporate the relevant constitutional commands.

II

A

The fourth amendment to the federal constitution, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, provides in relevant part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,...