State v. Folks
Decision Date | 07 February 2018 |
Docket Number | A160677 |
Citation | 414 P.3d 468,290 Or.App. 94 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jonathan Paul FOLKS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for murder, raising two assignments of error. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant's drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300.1 Defendant also argues that the court erred in requiring defendant to pay $3,627.30 in extradition costs. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant's transitory, drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300.2 We do agree, however, that, absent a finding of an ability to pay, the court erred in ordering defendant to pay $3,627.30 in extradition costs. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment requiring defendant to pay extradition costs, and otherwise affirm.
Defendant and his girlfriend, Perry, had come to Oregon from Mississippi. They lived in a motel room while here for seasonal construction employment. During their time in Oregon, defendant and Perry used methamphetamine and marijuana frequently.
Immediately after killing Perry, defendant drove to Mississippi. During the drive, defendant claimed that he heard Perry's voice through the radio, and he thought that the radio stations were talking to him. Days later, defendant confessed the murder to detectives and was arrested. The state charged defendant with murder, ORS 163.115, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894.
Two experts testified at trial, and their diagnoses were generally in agreement. At defendant's behest, Jerry Larsen, a psychiatrist, had examined defendant and diagnosed him with cannabis abuse, amphetamine dependence, and "probable amphetamine-induced psychotic disorder with delusions and hallucinations" at the time of the killing. He explained that a diagnosis of amphetamine-induced psychosis, also referred to as drug-induced psychosis, is made, in part, by "the presence of hallucinations or delusions" that the individual believes to be real. Larsen contrasted that diagnosis with a diagnosis of drug dependence, which is characterized by physical or emotional withdrawal symptoms. He said that the Larsen testified that defendant was not exhibiting signs of psychosis or mental disorder at the time that Larsen evaluated him.
Larsen's examination revealed that, in 2009 and 2010 when defendant was not incarcerated, he used methamphetamine daily, and, by 2014, he had "doubled his intake of methamphetamine." Defendant told Larsen that he had been using a quarter to half a gram of methamphetamine every day in Oregon. In the 12 hours leading up to Perry's death, he consumed a gram of methamphetamine—a "high dose." Larsen concluded that defendant's drug-induced psychosis was caused by his long-term methamphetamine use.
Eric Johnson, a clinical psychologist hired by the state, had also evaluated defendant and agreed with Larsen's conclusions. Johnson considered that defendant had a history of chronic substance abuse with an early onset. Defendant told Johnson that he had not slept for over a week prior to the killing, that he had been using methamphetamine continuously during that time, and that he was using "a lot of meth immediately leading up to her death."
Johnson addressed whether defendant exhibited any signs of an underlying mental disorder or continuing psychosis independent of the use of drugs. He explained that, as defendant drove back to Mississippi, the psychotic effects that he was originally experiencing, such as voices speaking to him from the radio, dissipated as the "meth was beginning to wear off and the further he got," which was "[c]onsistent with methamphetamine withdrawal." To determine whether there was "evidence of ongoing mental or emotional problems," Johnson reviewed records of defendant's medical history as well as mental health records from the jail after defendant was taken into custody. Johnson said that those mental health records were "unremarkable."3 Johnson concluded from his evaluation that defendant was suffering from "a methamphetamine-induced psychotic disorder based upon his voluntary use of that drug." Johnson elaborated, testifying that defendant was delusional and hallucinating at the time of the killing but that there was "no evidence" of "any lingering psychosis" or long-term mental disorder.
Later in his testimony, Johnson said that, with a drug-induced psychosis, it is theoretically possible that "some people who will experience some type of psychotic phenomenon that doesn't appear to fully resolve" and "can last a long time." But Johnson clarified that he and Larsen both concluded that, in this case, there was "no evidence whatsoever" that defendant had an "actual defect of the brain" from long-term drug use and that defendant did not "exhibit any evidence of any mental disorder other than that which was induced by his voluntary intoxication by methamphetamine." Johnson agreed that drug-induced psychosis is a "transient disorder." The psychosis"[s]tarts and stops when you use [the drug]," and, "when you remove the agent, the drug, the psychosis is no longer there." He concluded that "there's no evidence * * * to indicate that [defendant] has a psychotic disorder outside of his use of methamphetamine."4
Defendant tried his case on the theory that he did not act with the requisite culpable mental state. He argued that he lacked the ability to act intentionally based in part on mental disease or defect under ORS 161.300. He also asserted the affirmative defense of insanity under ORS 161.295. Among others, the trial court gave jury instructions for voluntary intoxication under ORS 161.125, diminished capacity under ORS 161.300, and guilty except for insanity under ORS 161.295. Over defendant's objections, however, the trial court instructed the jury that "[d]rug use, drug dependence, and drug-induced psychoses are not mental diseases or defects as the term mental disease or defect is used in these instructions." The jury convicted defendant as charged.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant's drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300. Defendant does not challenge the part of the instruction that says that drug use and drug dependence are not mental diseases or defects. See Tharp v. PSRB , 338 Or. 413, 420, 110 P.3d 103 (2005) ( ). However, according to defendant, a drug-induced psychosis should be included within the meaning of ORS 161.295, as a matter of law. Defendant argues that "insanity brought about by intoxication ha[s] long been considered a qualifying mental disease or defect under previous iterations of Oregon's insanity defense." Defendant contends that amendments to ORS 161.295 in 1983 did not affect that principle.
The state counters that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that drug-induced psychosis is not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300. The state relies on the legislative history of ORS 161.295, particularly as reviewed in a pair of subsequent cases.
We review for legal error whether a trial court's jury instruction correctly states the law. State v. Sandoval , 342 Or. 506, 510-11, 156 P.3d 60 (2007). To determine whether the legislature intended to include the diagnosis of drug-induced psychosis in this case within the definition of "mental disease or defect" in ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300, we consider the text, context, and legislative history of the relevant statutes....
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