State v. Folland
| Decision Date | 27 April 1956 |
| Citation | 122 A.2d 268,100 N.H. 188 |
| Parties | STATE v. James FOLLAND. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Lindsey R. Brigham, County Sol., Exeter, for the State, filed no brief.
Robert Shaw, Exeter, and Richard P. Dunfey, for defendant.
The Exeter ordinance, adopted May 29, 1947, is one 'relating to the regulation of traffic and the use of public streets and highways * * * providing for the installation, regulation and control of the use of parking meters and the establishment of parking meter zones'. Article VII establishes certain sections of particular streets in Exeter as limited parking areas. One of these areas is the section of Water Street involved in this case (section 3) in which the ordinance makes it unlawful to park for a period in excess of one hour.
Article IX deals with 'parking meters and regulations covering the use thereof'. It was enacted by the police commission under the authority granted by Laws 1947, c. 74, § 3, now RSA 249:3. By the terms of section 1, the superintendent of police, under the direction of the police commissioners, is authorized to provide for the installation, regulation and use of parking meters in the limited parking areas defined in Article VII. 'The limit of time for such parking shall be indicated upon such meters as are installed * * * and shall display a signal showing legal parking upon deposit therein of a proper coin'.
Section 3 of Article IX provides: .
By the terms of section 4, article IX, it is made unlawful .
It is the defendant's basic position that the legality of parking in the restricted section of Water Street is controlled by the one hour limitation of article VII, section 3 and that parking in that area is in violation of the ordinance only if it exceeds that limitation. We cannot adopt this interpretation of the ordinance.
'Ordinances, like statutes, should be construed so as to effectuate their evident purpose.' State v. Sweeney, 90 N.H. 127, 128, 5 A.2d 41. In determining the purpose of the ordinance now before us, the provisions of article IX as well as those of article VII, section 3 must be considered. The latter clearly provides that it shall be unlawful to park in the area in question for a period in excess of one hour. Section 4 of article IX provides in equally clear language that it shall be unlawful to park in the same area 'while the parking meter * * * indicates that said vehicle is...
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State v. Sullivan
...complaints of violations. In view of its legislative history (Newell v. Moreau, supra) and its evident purpose (State v. Folland, 100 N.H. 188, 122 A.2d 268) we are of the opinion that the Legislature intended that a failure to comply with the clearly stated requirements of the statute pert......
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State v. Stone
...not defeat, the manifest objective sought by the statute, the regulation of controlled drugs in all its aspects. State v. Folland, 100 N.H. 188, 190, 122 A.2d 268, 270 (1956); Granville v. State, 287 A.2d 652, 654 (Del.1972). We hold that proof that the defendant made no profit or received ......
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Marsh v. Town of Hanover
...policy as a mere guideline. Plymouth School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 112 N.H. 74, 77, 289 A.2d 73, 75 (1972); State v. Folland, 100 N.H. 188, 190, 122 A.2d 268, 270 (1956); see 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 30.06 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972). Furthermore, since the town has permitted......
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