State v. Ford, Cr. N
Decision Date | 21 November 1985 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 377 N.W.2d 125 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Larry Vern FORD, Defendant and Appellant. o. 1085. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Kenneth L. Dalsted, Asst. State's Atty., and Charles J. Gilje, State's Atty., Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Kenneth L. Dalsted.
Mackenzie, Jungroth, Mackenzie & Reisnour, Jamestown, for defendant and appellant; argued by William A. Mackenzie.
Larry Ford (Ford) appeals from a judgment of conviction for gross sexual imposition and from an order denying his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Ford was charged with having engaged in a sexual act with his twelve-year-old daughter, Audrey, in violation of Section 12.1-20-03(1)(d), N.D.C.C. The alleged act occurred during December 1983, and the charge was brought after Audrey's disclosure of the incident to a nurse who was conducting a sexual awareness presentation to students at Audrey's elementary school on April 12, 1984. Ford was convicted of the offense by jury verdict, and following entry of his judgment of conviction he filed this appeal.
On appeal, Ford has raised two issues:
(1) Whether prosecution should have been barred under Section 12.1-20-01(3), N.D.C.C., because the offense was not timely reported; and
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Ford's motion for a new trial.
Ford asserts that because the offense was not timely reported, prosecution was barred under Section 12.1-20-01(3), N.D.C.C., which, at all times relevant to this case, provided:
The charge alleges that the offense occurred during December 1983, and it is undisputed that the offense was brought to the notice of public authority on April 12, 1984, when Audrey disclosed the incident to a nurse at her school. Ford asserts, however, that Audrey's mother, Barbara Ford, learned of the offense from Audrey during December 1983 and failed to report it within three months as required under the foregoing statute. The State asserts, to the contrary, that Audrey's mother did not learn of the offense until she was informed of the incident by the school nurse following Audrey's disclosure on April 12, 1984, and that the offense was therefore timely reported.
Ford asserts that the trial court should have determined, as a matter of law, that during December 1983 Audrey "told" her mother of the incident and thus her mother "learned" of the incident at that time and did not timely report it. We disagree. When there are issues of fact concerning the applicability of a statute of limitations, it is appropriate for the trial court to refer the matter to the jury. See Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471 (N.D.1985); Bormann v. Beckman, 73 N.D. 720, 19 N.W.2d 455 (1945); Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn.1982); Farris v. Beecher, 85 Mich.App. 208, 270 N.W.2d 658 (1978). We agree with the trial court's determination that there was conflicting evidence as to when Audrey's mother learned of the incident and with the court's submission of that issue to the jury.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there is evidence in the record upon which the jury could have concluded that Audrey's mother learned of the incident during December 1983 but, choosing not to believe that it happened, failed to report the incident. We further conclude, however, that there is also evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that Audrey failed to make sufficiently specific reference to the December 1983 incident to apprise her mother of its occurrence. We believe that the following testimony of Audrey's mother constitutes substantial evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that she understood Audrey's vague statements as referring to a prior incident which occurred several years in the past and that she did not learn of the offense, therefore, until May 1984:
Section 12.1-20-01(3), N.D.C.C., is a statute of limitations, and the State must prove compliance with the statute by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Tibor, 373 N.W.2d 877 (N.D.1985). We conclude that the State met its burden of proving compliance with the statute in this case.
Ford asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion for a new trial. The motion was primarily based upon Barbara Ford's desire to recant her testimony. At the hearing on the motion, Barbara testified, contrary to her trial testimony, that she did not believe the December 1983 incident occurred. At the hearing, Sonya Ford, Ford's daughter and a half sister to Audrey, testified that she had...
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