State v. Forrest
| Decision Date | 10 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 86518.,SC 86518. |
| Citation | 183 S.W.3d 218 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Earl M. FORREST, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Janet M. Thompson, Office of Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Robert J. Ahsens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.
A jury convicted Appellant, Earl M. Forrest, of three counts of first-degree murder and recommended three death sentences. Judgment was entered consistent with the jury's recommendation. Appellant seeks reversal raising thirteen points of error. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. Affirmed.
The facts, which this Court reviews in the light most favorable to the verdict,1 are: On December 9, 2002, Appellant, who had been drinking, and his girlfriend, Angelia Gamblin, drove to Harriett Smith's home. Appellant and Smith apparently had a falling out over a dishonored agreement with Smith to purchase a lawn mower and a mobile home for Appellant in exchange for Appellant introducing Smith to a source for methamphetamine. Appellant demanded that Smith fulfill her part of the bargain. During the ensuing melee, Appellant shot Michael Wells, a visitor at the Smith residence, in the face killing him. He also killed Smith, shooting her a total of six times.
Appellant removed a lockbox from Smith's home containing approximately $25,000 worth of methamphetamine and returned to his home with Gamblin, where a shootout with the police ensued. Appellant shot Sheriff Bob Wofford in the abdomen wounding him. He killed Deputy Sharon Joann Barnes, shooting her once in her chest and a second time in the back of her head. Appellant sustained a bullet wound to his face. Gamblin was shot twice, once in her shoulder and once in her back.
Appellant finally surrendered and was charged with three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of Smith, Wells and Barnes. The jury found Appellant guilty on all three counts. During the penalty phase, the jury found the presence of multiple statutory aggravators to support its unanimous recommendation for a death sentence for each of the three murders. With regard to the murder of Harriett Smith, the jury found that: (1) her murder was committed while Appellant was engaged in the commission of another unlawful homicide, that of Michael Wells; and (2) Appellant murdered Smith for the purpose of receiving something of monetary value. The statutory aggravator found in relation to Michael Wells's murder was that he too was murdered for pecuniary gain. The murder of Joann Barnes carried the statutory aggravator of being committed against a peace officer while engaged in the performance of her official duty.
Appellant raises three points claiming evidentiary errors; points I, II, and XIII. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when admitting the testimony of two police officers that Appellant believed was hearsay and improper bolstering of other testimony during the guilt phase trial. He also alleges error with the trial court's admission of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct and victim impact testimony during the penalty phase trial.
"A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial."2 "This standard of review compels the reversal of a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence only if the court has clearly abused its discretion."3 "[T]hat discretion is abused when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration."4 Additionally, on direct appeal, this Court reviews the trial court "for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial."5 Trial court error is not prejudicial unless there is a reasonable probability that the trial court's error affected the outcome of the trial.6
The disputed testimony of the two officers involved their rendition of the shootout that occurred at Appellant's residence. A review of the transcripts reveals that the officers' testimony was repetitious when they were asked to describe some of the events that transpired when additional officers arrived on the scene and when Ms. Gamblin was shot. The statements involved whether other officers had stated if they heard gun shots coming from the house and whether Gamblin had stated that the Appellant was the first to shoot when the police arrived. Appellant objected to these statements at trial solely on the basis of being hearsay. Consequently, the Court applies abuse of discretion review to the hearsay argument but reviews the bolstering claim for plain error.
"A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the truth of the matter asserted and that depends on the veracity of the statement for its value."7 The testimony in question was clearly hearsay. However, the admission of the testimony, while being error, was not so prejudicial as to require reversal. To the "extent a declarant is available for live testimony, under oath, the dangers of hearsay are largely non-existent."8 The declarants in this instance did provide direct testimony and were subject to cross-examination. Moreover, Appellant offers nothing other than speculation in his attempt to claim prejudice, and there is no evidence to support the contention that the statements affected the outcome of trial.
"Improper bolstering occurs when an out-of-court statement of a witness is offered solely to duplicate or corroborate trial testimony."9 "However, if the out-of-court statement is offered for relevant purposes other than corroboration and duplication . . . there is no improper bolstering."10 Even assuming, arguendo, that the statements in question constituted improper bolstering, and that they did not have independent value or were merely cumulative, Appellant fails to demonstrate how the admission of these two statements would have prejudiced his case. Not only would simple prejudice be required under plain error review for this claim, but that prejudice must rise to the level of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice to rise to the level of reversible error.11 Because the evidence of Appellant's guilt was overwhelming, no manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has been shown that would entitle Appellant to relief under the plain error rule.12
Appellant also claims error with the trial court's admission of evidence concerning his alleged drug possession and distribution of illegal drugs in California — alleged crimes that were never adjudicated. "[T]his Court has repeatedly held that both the state and the defendant may introduce any evidence pertaining to the defendant's character in order to help the jury assess punishment in a penalty phase setting, even where that evidence constitutes unadjudicated bad acts."13 Appellant's claim of error is devoid of merit.
In his third claim of evidentiary error, Appellant claims multiple errors in association with the admission of the victim impact testimony from Joann Barnes's family members. Appellant contends that the court admitted hearsay; evidence ascribing blame to Appellant for the unrelated deteriorating health of two brothers; inappropriate evidence of the family's desire that Appellant receive the death penalty; and finally that the jury lacked instruction or guidance in how to consider and weigh this evidence or what standard of proof to apply to this evidence.
Victim impact evidence is admissible under the United States and Missouri Constitutions.14 "[J]ust as the defendant is entitled to present evidence in mitigation designed to show that the defendant is a uniquely individual human being, the State is also allowed to present evidence showing each victim's uniqueness as an individual human being."15 Victim impact evidence violates the constitution only if it "is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair."16
The alleged hearsay statements concerned the observations of one witness as to how Barnes's nieces and nephews reacted to her death. The transcripts reveal that the witness stated that the nieces and nephews talked about their Aunt Joann's death and that they couldn't believe what happened. There is no testimony as to what exactly what the nieces and nephews stated. This testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and does not constitute improper hearsay.
With regard to the testimony mentioning Barnes's brothers, one brother died subsequent to Ms. Barnes's murder and one experienced multiple strokes, there was no testimony directly linking, or even suggesting, that their deteriorating health was in any way related to Ms. Barnes's murder. "It is not necessary that every piece of victim impact evidence relate to the direct impact of the victim's death on the witness."17 The witness in question was testifying as to the many hardships the family endured following Barnes's murder. There is no evidence that supports the proposition that the jury was incapable of understanding the court's instructions during the penalty phase when it returned a recommendation for the death sentence.18 The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the statutory aggravators necessary to support its recommendation. There is absolutely no evidence that these statements prejudiced the jury and no evidence that the admission of this evidence renders Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair.
The statement calling for the imposition of the death penalty was made to the judge, after the penalty phase, during the sentencing hearing. There is no possible way that this statement could have influenced the jury's recommendation. Even if the statement was improper, "judges are presumed not to consider improper evidence during sentencing," and Appella...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McLaughlin v. Steele
...that every piece of victim impact evidence relate to the direct impact of the victim's death on the witness.” Id. (quoting State v. Forrest , 183 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Mo. banc 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 840, 127 S.Ct. 75, 166 L.Ed.2d 68 (2006) ).The Missouri Supreme Court's decision was not c......
-
State v. McLaughlin
...on passion, prejudice, and emotions. Victim impact evidence is admissible under the United States and Missouri Constitutions. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Mo. banc 2006); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 604 (Mo. banc 1997). "[J]ust as the defendant is entitled to present evidenc......
-
State v. Jackson
...rights unless “there is a reasonable probability that the trial court's error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. banc 2006). Here, any such prejudice from the refusal to instruct the jury on second-degree robbery seems logically inconsistent with ......
-
McGee v. Norman
...it over to them."A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to exclude or admit evidence at trial. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Mo. banc 2006). "An abuse of discretion is found when the decision to admit or exclude the challenged evidence is clearly again......