State v. Fortes
| Decision Date | 24 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1136-E,1136-E |
| Citation | 293 A.2d 506,110 R.I. 406 |
| Parties | STATE v. Alfred A. FORTES, Jr. x. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Alfred A. Fortes, Jr., was tried before a Superior Court justice sitting without a jury on an indictment which charged him with unlawful possession and control of dexamyl, a barbiturate, in violation of G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 21-29-3(d). After being found guilty, he appealed. 1 1 We reverse because in our judgment the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt.
All of the direct evidence in the case came from prosecution witnesses, defendant having rested at the conclusion of the state's case. On the evening of February 26, 1969, defendant was a passenger in a 1963 Chevrolet convertible which was operated by Mrs. Joanne Keefe and was registered in her husband's name. The erratic manner in which that vehicle was proceeding along the highway attracted the attention of two police officers who were sitting in a police cruiser at an intersection waiting for a traffic light to change. As the vehicle came closer and went through the intersection the officers recognized it as one previously parked near a residence which was under police surveillance because it was frequented by 'narcotics users, pushers, prostitutes, and * * * gamblers and what-have-you.' They also identified the passenger in the vehicle as Alfred A. Fortes, Jr., a person believed to be a user and a pusher of drugs.
When the traffic light changed the police pursued the Keefe vehicle but were prevented by traffic and road conditions, as well as by its erratic operation, from coming alongside and ordering the operator to pull over to the side of the road and stop. That difficulty was obviated, however, when the Keefe vehicle, while attempting to negotiate a right-angle turn, skidded into a snowbank and came to rest.
The police officers then approached and ordered both the operator and the passenger to get out of the vehicle. As they alighted one of the officers examined the interior of the vehicle and observed two tablets in the bucket seat just vacated by defendant. Their size, color and shape suggested that they were dexamyl pills. The defendant was then frisked, but no drugs or weapons were found on his person. He was, however, arrested, and was subsequently tried and convicted.
In this court defendant has argued that his arrest was illegal, that the search of the Keefe motor vehicle and the seizure of what proved to be dexamyl pills were in violation of his constitutional rights, that there were several erroneous rulings during trial, and that the evidence in the case failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offense charged. Our conclusion that the exception embodying his final contention should be sustained makes it unnecessary for us to consider his other exceptions.
Only a few weeks ago, in State v. Gilman, R.I., 291 A.2d 425 (1972), we decided that to find an accused guilty of illegal possession or control of a barbiturate or a central nervous system stimulant under § 21-29-3(d) requires proof of 'a conscious possession of the contraband' and 'an intentional control of a designated object with knowledge of its nature.' The establishment of those elements, we went on to say, did not always require direct or positive testimony, but could be shown by '* * * evidence of acts, declarations or conduct of the accused from which an inference may be fairly drawn that he knew of the existence of narcotics at the place where they were found.'
A search of the record in this case fails to disclose any direct evidence which satisfies the Gilman standards. While there is ample testimony from which a fact finder could rationally conclude that defendant consciously possessed or intentionally controlled the pills there is no evidence whatsoever in that record which reasonably yields to the inference that defendant knew that the pills were barbiturates. Thus, an inference to that effect would, on this record, be conjectural and speculative, rather than reasonable and rational, and proof based solely on conjecture and speculation will not support a conviction.
Moreover, even the assumption that the missing inference could properly be drawn would not assist the state inasmuch as a conviction in a criminal case is justified only if all the facts and circumstances necessary to establish guilt have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. And a finding of guilt will be warranted only if those facts and circumstances, taken together, are not only consistent with the hypothesis that defendant was guilty, but also are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis that he was innocent. 2 State v. Franklin, 103 R.I. 715, 725, 241 A.2d 219, 225-226 (1968); State v. Montella, 88 R.I. 469, 476, 149 A.2d 919,...
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...doubt, there is no need to talk in terms of multiple hypotheses. We have referred to the Holland case in State v. Fortes, 110 R.I. 406, 409 n.2, 293 A.2d 506, 508 n.2 (1972), and the fact that federal courts no longer speak to the jurors about hypotheses. A year later in State v. Rose, 112 ......
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