State v. Fosse, 87-2186-CR-LV
| Decision Date | 12 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-2186-CR-LV,87-2186-CR-LV |
| Citation | 424 N.W.2d 725,144 Wis.2d 700 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael J. FOSSE, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Review Denied.
Paul M. Goetz, Colfax, for defendant-petitioner.
Donald J. Hanaway, Atty. Gen., and Daniel J. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.
Before CANE, P.J., and LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.
We grant Michael J. Fosse's petition to review a nonfinal order denying his motion to dismiss based on a claim of double jeopardy. Fosse contends that the trial court's mistrial order during an earlier trial on the same charges was an abuse of discretion. We conclude that further prosecution on these charges is not barred because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the mistrial.
Fosse was charged with arson, operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, and marijuana possession. Fosse pled no contest to the marijuana possession charge and a jury trial followed on the remaining charges.
Prior to the trial, defense counsel moved the court to advise three of the state's witnesses of their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and their right to counsel. The court stated that it would address such issues if they arose at trial.
The district attorney then moved the court to prohibit defense counsel from advising these witnesses not to testify unless they were granted immunity. The district attorney informed the court that he had no intention of charging any of these witnesses in connection with the incident. However, he expressed concern that this advice from defense counsel would have a "debilitating effect" on the witnesses' willingness to testify.
Defense counsel argued that he had the right to advise these witnesses of their fifth amendment right to counsel and their privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court disagreed. The court concluded that the request for immunity must come from the witness and that the role of the court or defense counsel was not to advise them of these rights prior to their inquiry. The jury was then impaneled, sworn, and opening statements were presented.
During the noon recess, the district attorney informed the trial court that a law intern for defense counsel had contacted one of the state's witnesses that morning and told her that she could be charged or "could get into trouble if she testified." The district attorney represented that this conversation intimidated this witness.
The district attorney then elicited testimony from the arson victim that defense counsel had contacted him the day before trial with an offer of $100 cash to settle the case. The witness stated that he believed this was done "as a way of buying me out."
Defense counsel subsequently acknowledged that he also contacted another of the state's witnesses. He stated that he informed the witness of his immunity privileges and that "as a possible suspect," he was entitled to his own counsel. The witness replied that he did not desire the assistance of counsel even though he had not been granted immunity.
The district attorney asked the court to grant immunity to these state's witnesses and to preclude the defense from impeaching them on cross-examination with proof that they had been granted immunity because defense counsel's conduct had necessitated the grant of immunity. Defense counsel denied any intent to intimidate the witnesses and offered to withdraw as Fosse's attorney if the court concluded that his conduct had been improper. The trial court declined to grant immunity and advised Fosse's attorney that the decision to withdraw would rest with Fosse and defense counsel.
After the noon recess, defense counsel advised the trial court that Fosse wanted him to remain as counsel and that he would not withdraw. The district attorney then moved for a mistrial. The court indicated that it would proceed with the trial and deal with the mistrial issue if it should arise during the trial.
Defense counsel next advised the trial court that he might have to be called as a witness at the trial regarding his contacts with the state witnesses. The district attorney agreed that this would likely occur. The trial court then granted the state's motion for a mistrial because it concluded that the anticipated testimony by defense counsel necessitated a mistrial or a reversal on appeal should Fosse be convicted.
The jury was discharged, and the case was placed on the calendar for retrial. Defense counsel at the original trial withdrew, and Fosse's new attorney moved to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion because the mistrial was the result of the original defense counsel's misconduct and because granting the mistrial was necessary for the reasons set forth in the record of those proceedings.
Jeopardy attaches at the time a jury is impaneled and sworn. Section 972.07(2), Stats. However, the double jeopardy prohibition does not preclude a trial court from terminating a trial without the defendant's consent if it finds a "manifest necessity" for doing so or "the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." Wheeler v. State, 87 Wis.2d 626, 630, 275 N.W.2d 651, 653 (1979) ). The "manifest necessity" test requires a "high degree" of necessity and precludes a trial court from ordering a mistrial irrationally or irresponsibly. State v. Copening, 100 Wis.2d 700, 711, 303 N.W.2d 821, 827 (1981).
The decision whether to grant a mistrial is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wheeler, 87 Wis.2d at 630, 275 N.W.2d at 653. "[O]n review, the test is whether, under all the facts and circumstances, giving deference to the trial court's first-hand knowledge, it was reasonable to grant a mistrial under the 'manifest necessity' rule." Copening, 100 Wis.2d at 710, 303 N.W.2d at 826-27. The trial court's exercise of discretion is entitled to "special respect" in cases where defense counsel's misconduct may serve to bias the jury against the state. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510-13, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832-34, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).
Fosse argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial because of defense counsel's misconduct. He contends that neither defense counsel nor his staff was guilty of misconduct. We believe that their contact with the state's witnesses was a violation of Supreme Court Rules and represents misconduct.
We agree that these witnesses have the fifth amendment right to counsel and against self-incrimination, and the statutory right to seek immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony. Section 972.08, Stats. We also agree that defense counsel has a right to fully investigate the circumstances of the charges and to speak with the state's witnesses, if they are willing to do so.
However, Sup.Ct.R. 20.38(2) provides that during the course of representing a client a lawyer may not:
Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of the person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.
Effective January 1, 1988, Rule 20.38 has been repealed and recreated to provide:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
The comment to Sup.Ct.R. 20:4.3 discusses the rationale behind this new rule: 1
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the...
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Glover v. EIGHTH JUD. DIST. COURT OF STATE
...witnesses for the State and told them that they should not testify unless they received a grant of immunity, State v. Fosse, 144 Wis.2d 700, 424 N.W.2d 725, 727-30 (App.1988). Second, the district court had multiple alternatives to a mistrial. Both federal and state courts have consistently......
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State v. Barthels
...denied, 414 U.S. 1008, 94 S.Ct. 370, 38 L.Ed.2d 246 (1973) (witness fell ill before testifying).10 See, e.g., State v. Fosse, 144 Wis.2d 700, 706-07, 424 N.W.2d 725 (Ct.App.1988) (defense counsel gave misleading advice to prosecution witness); State v. Duckett, 120 Wis.2d 646, 650-51, 358 N......
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State v. Callaway
...evaluation of the need for a mistrial is accorded the highest degree of respect. Arizona v. Washington; see also State v. Fosse, 144 Wis.2d 700, 424 N.W.2d 725 (Ct.App.1988). We agree with the state that situations in which the conduct of the defense has affected the trial create a difficul......
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State v. Rynes
...in the Madison drug scene. Whether to grant a mistrial is vested within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Fosse, 144 Wis.2d 700, 704, 424 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Ct.App.1988). The trial court denied the motion based on Rynes' agreement that the State could elicit testimony simply that P......