State v. Foster

• Decision Date: 14 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2000-467-CA.,2000-467-CA.
• Citation: 842 A.2d 1047
• Parties: STATE v. Julius FOSTER.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

842 A.2d 1047

STATE v. Julius FOSTER.

No. 2000-467-CA.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 14, 2004.

Aaron Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Paula Lynch for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Julius Foster, appeals from a Superior Court conviction for possession of cocaine, following the denial of his motion to suppress. This case came before the Court for oral argument on December 8, 2003, pursuant to an order directing all parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the case should be decided at this time. For the reasons stated below, we deny the appeal and affirm the conviction.

At approximately 3:40 p.m. on November 4, 1999, Providence Police Officer Martin Rawnsley was on routine patrol in his cruiser when he noticed a car execute a turn without signaling. Officer Rawnsley stopped the car because of this traffic violation. In addition to the driver, the car carried one passenger seated in the front and a second passenger, the defendant, seated on the passenger's side in the rear. After getting out of his cruiser to speak to the driver, Rawnsley observed the frontseat passenger make "furtive" movements down toward the area of his feet. His suspicions aroused, Officer Rawnsley immediately went over to the passenger side of the car, opened the door, and ordered the passenger to get out. As soon as the passenger exited the vehicle, Officer Rawnsley noticed in plain view a small, clear plastic baggy on the floor where the passenger's left foot had been. He seized the baggy, which he suspected contained cocaine, and arrested the passenger.

While Officer Rawnsley was taking the passenger to a Providence Housing Authority police cruiser that had by then arrived at the scene, he observed defendant, still seated in the rear of the stopped car, also "making some kind of furtive movement in his leg area, sock, knees area." After placing the passenger in the housing police cruiser, Officer Rawnsley returned to the stopped car and ordered defendant to get out. He conducted a "quick pat down" search of defendant, which revealed nothing. He then placed defendant into the rear of his cruiser. Officer Rawnsley testified at the suppression hearing that defendant had no choice but to get into the cruiser. He also testified that once defendant was placed in the cruiser, he was "locked in" because the rear doors of the cruiser do not open from the inside. After putting him in the cruiser, Officer Rawnsley went back to the car and searched for contraband and weapons in the area where defendant had been sitting. This inspection, however, also revealed nothing. Officer Rawnsley returned to his cruiser, with defendant now seated in the rear. He wrote traffic summonses for the operator of the car and ran warrant checks on all three of the car's occupants, which proved negative. He then released defendant from his cruiser. After doing so, he checked the rear seat of the cruiser where defendant had just been and found six packets containing what he suspected to be cocaine.¹ Officer Rawnsley seized these packets and placed defendant under arrest. The contents of the packets later tested positive for cocaine. The defendant was subsequently charged with cocaine possession, in violation of G.L.1956 § 21-28-4.01 (c)(1).

On July 25, 2000, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Officer Rawnsley on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, specifically the prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures. On August 1, 2000, defendant's motion was heard. The trial justice determined that defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while detained in the cruiser. Therefore, the trial justice denied the motion.

On August 2, 2000, defendant waived his right to a jury, and a bench trial proceeded and concluded that same day. The trial justice determined that defendant's furtive movements while the front-seat passenger was being placed in the housing unit's cruiser were sufficient to have raised a suspicion about defendant's activities to a level that justified the officer's return to the car and removal of defendant. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial justice also found that the state had satisfied its burden that defendant unlawfully possessed cocaine. Accordingly, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to two years of probation.²

On August 9, 2000, defendant filed an appeal of his conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice erred in ruling that because defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the rear of the police cruiser, he did not have standing to suppress the fruits of the search. The defendant contends that the issue is not whether he had an expectation of privacy with respect to the search, but whether he was seized illegally in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. He maintains that after the pat-down search of his person disclosed neither weapons nor contraband, any further search, including the seizure of his person, was constitutionally prohibited.

The state responds that it was constitutionally reasonable for the officer to detain defendant in his cruiser temporarily while the car was examined to ensure that it did not contain any weapons. The state contends that the officer's actions were not constitutionally defective in that the packets of cocaine that defendant subsequently abandoned in the cruiser were not the product of an unlawful search.

This Court reviews de novo alleged violations of constitutional rights. State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I. 2003) (per curiam) (citing State v. Saldarriaga, 721 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I.1998)). We also review de novo "a trial justice's determination of the existence or nonexistence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion." Id. at 329-30 (quoting State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I.1999)). However, "[i]n reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress, we give deference to the findings of the trial justice and shall not overturn his findings unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. at 330 (quoting In re John N., 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I.1983)).

Before determining whether the trial justice erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence as the product of an unlawful search, we first must determine whether the police officer unlawfully detained defendant. The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a person's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.³ Whenever a police officer detains a person, "even if briefly, the Fourth Amendment is implicated and the detention must [conform] with the strictures of that amendment." State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1071 (R.I.1997). A police officer has "seized" a person, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when he restrains that person's freedom to walk away. State v. Bennett, 430 A.2d 424, 427 (R.I.1981) (citing State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1227 (R.I.1981)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

(stating that a seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen").

It is undisputed that after Officer Rawnsley put defendant in his cruiser, defendant was not free to leave. Officer Rawnsley himself testified that defendant had no choice but to get into the cruiser and that, once there, he was "locked in." Although not formally under arrest at that time, defendant was nonetheless "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause support such a seizure, even if no formal arrest has been made. State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 444 (R.I.2002) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)). The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized that "some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity." Summers, 452 U.S. at 699, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Applying the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has balanced the intrusion on the defendant's privacy with the opposing interests of law enforcement in crime prevention and detection and the police officer's safety. Id. at 697-98, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)).

In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), the Supreme Court held that in evaluating the constitutionality of a stop, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into account. In determining whether the necessary particularized suspicion existed, the Cortez ...