State v. Franklin, No. 98-2420-CR

Citation596 N.W.2d 855,228 Wis.2d 408
Decision Date20 May 1999
Docket Number No. 98-2421-CR., No. 98-2420-CR
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jonathan L. FRANKLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Archie E. Simonson of Madison.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, with Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general.

Before Dykman, P.J., Eich and Deininger, JJ.

EICH, J.

Jonathan L. Franklin was convicted, on his guilty plea, of felony murder and aggravated battery, as a party to the crimes. He was sentenced to sixty years in prison. He appeals from the judgments of conviction, and from the circuit court's orders denying his motions to suppress evidence and withdraw his pleas.2 He argues that the court erred in ruling that: (1) statements he made to police after invoking his right to counsel were voluntary, and therefore admissible—for impeachment purposes only3—even though they were obtained by the officers through further questioning after Franklin had invoked his right to counsel, and thus in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); and (2) he did not establish a "fair and just reason" to withdraw his pleas. We reject the arguments and affirm the judgments and orders.

Jonathan Daniel was killed in September 1996, during a drug transaction in Madison. Franklin was identified as being the driver of the getaway car and another man, whose identity was unknown at the time, was said to have been the "shooter." Franklin was arrested and brought to the police station for questioning. It is undisputed that police detectives, hoping to learn the shooter's identity from Franklin, intentionally elected to continue questioning him after he had invoked his right to counsel—knowing that, because they were violating his rights under Edwards, they would lose the opportunity to use any self-incriminatory statements as substantive evidence. During the interrogation, Franklin identified the person who had done the shooting and accompanied the detectives to a house in Madison, which he pointed out to them as the shooter's residence.

After he was charged as a party to the crimes of murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon, Franklin moved to suppress the statements he made to police. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that, while the Edwards violation required suppression of any evidence of Franklin's statements in the State's case-in-chief, because the statements were voluntarily made, they could be used by the State for impeachment or rebuttal purposes should Franklin elect to testify at his trial. As indicated, Franklin eventually pled guilty to the murder charge, and to an unrelated charge of aggravated battery. Prior to sentencing, Franklin moved to withdraw his pleas, and the circuit court denied the motion, concluding that he had not put forth a fair or just reason for withdrawal.

Franklin argues first that the circuit court erred in determining that the statements he made to police while in custody were admissible for impeachment purposes. It is a two-part argument: He says first that the court erroneously failed to consider the "presumption of involuntariness"—which he says applies to all statements obtained by police after the suspect's invocation of his or her right to counsel; and, second, that the court erred in ruling that his statements were voluntary.

[1-3]

An accused person has an absolute right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). Once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is invoked, all policeinitiated questioning must stop until counsel is present—unless the accused initiates further communication with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. An involuntary statement obtained in violation of these principles is inadmissible at trial for any purpose. State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 93, 457 N.W.2d 299, 308 (1990). If, however, the statement is voluntary, even if it was secured by the police in violation of Miranda and/or Edwards, we are satisfied, as we explain below, that it may be used to impeach the defendant's conflicting testimony—although it is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. [4, 5]

Whether a statement is voluntary or involuntary depends on whether it was compelled by coercive means or improper police practices. State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987). We look to the "totality of the circumstances" to resolve the question, weighing the defendant's personal characteristics—such as his or her age, education, intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with the police—against the coercive police conduct. Id. at 236, 401 N.W.2d at 766. Matters relevant to the coercive nature of the police conduct include the length of the interrogation, delay in arraignment, the general conditions under which the questioning took place, whether excessive physical or psychological pressure was brought to bear on the accused, whether the police used inducements, threats, or "strategies" to compel a response, and whether the accused was informed of his or her constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. Id. at 237, 401 N.W.2d at 766. In this context, "voluntariness" is a question of constitutional fact, which we review de novo. State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 640, 551 N.W.2d 50, 59 (Ct. App. 1996)

. The circuit court's findings of historical fact, however, will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

Franklin cites McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991), for the proposition that statements taken in violation of Miranda and/or Edwards are presumed to be the involuntary product of police coercion and are therefore inadmissible at trial for all purposes. He does not elaborate, nor does he discuss the case further. While it is true that the Supreme Court stated at one point in McNeil that statements taken in violation of Edwards are "presumed involuntary," id. at 177, the sentence in which that phrase appears concludes by stating that such statements are "therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards." Id. (emphasis added). We do not see the Court's remark as a holding that all statements taken in violation of Edwards are presumed to be coerced—and thus inadmissible for any and all purposes—including impeachment. Rather, as the Court plainly stated, they are inadmissible only as "substantive" or affirmative evidence. Indeed, the case cited by the Court for its statement, Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990), held that, while a post-invocation waiver of counsel obtained by police "in violation of the [Miranda rules]"4 is presumed to be invalid, and that evidence obtained pursuant to such a waiver "is inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief," the evidence would nonetheless be "admissible to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant." Id. at 345, 349, 350.

We are satisfied that McNeil does not stand for the proposition advanced by Franklin. We are equally satisfied that, under McNeil and related Wisconsin cases, a statement, even if obtained in violation of Miranda and/or Edwards (and thus inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief), may, if shown to have been voluntarily made, be used to impeach the defendant's conflicting testimony. And we believe our holding in this regard—and our reading of the Supreme Court cases—is supported by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996), and State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990). In Harris, the court cited McNeil for the proposition that "following an assertion of the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel, police-initiated interrogation renders purported waivers ineffective and thus statements so obtained are inadmissible as substantial evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief even if proceded by a purported waiver." Harris, 199 Wis. 2d at 251,544 N.W.2d at 554-55 (emphasis added). In Moats, the court, faced with the State's concession that the defendant's statements were taken "in . . . violation of the defendant's rights under Miranda and Edwards," stated that both it and the United States Supreme Court had held that, while compelled involuntary testimony is inadmissible at trial for any purpose, a "constitutionally tainted confession" that is not compelled or involuntary "may be used to impeach a defendant who chooses to testify in his own behalf at trial,"5 and went on to consider the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. Moats at 93-94, 457 N.W.2d at 308. Finally, in State v. Camacho, 170 Wis. 2d 53, 487 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1992),rev'd on other grounds,176 Wis. 2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993), we rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to use post-invocation-of-counsel statements he made to police to impeach his trial testimony. Upholding the trial court's determination that the statements, even though obtained in violation of Edwards and Miranda, were voluntary, we stated that "a statement is not presumed compelled simply because interrogators may have taken it in violation of Miranda," and, further, that "[s]uch statements are barred from use only during direct examination." Id. at 75, 487 N.W.2d at 76.

We next consider whether the trial court erred when it ruled that the challenged statements were voluntary; and we conclude that it did not. The court proceeded properly by balancing Franklin's personal characteristics against any coercive police practices and, doing so, determined that his statements were voluntary, and that, while the officers concededly questioned him in violation of Edwards, no...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • State v. Garcia
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 2020
    ...to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendant."); Harris , 401 U.S. at 223-26, 91 S.Ct. 643 ; State v. Franklin , 228 Wis. 2d 408, 412-16, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1999). This impeachment exception is applicable only if the excluded statements are found to have been made voluntarily.11 ......
  • State v. Ward, 2007AP79-CR.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • June 30, 2009
    ...strong command of language. Third, Ward had a prior conviction, and she is the daughter of a police officer. State v. Franklin, 228 Wis.2d 408, 413, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct.App. 1999). For example, the following dialogue occurred when Ward was read her Miranda warnings the first [Schaepe]: ... [......
  • State v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • September 30, 2014
    ...intercourse with him, and that Anderson and Billups then fled with stolen items, including a cell phone. See State v. Franklin, 228 Wis.2d 408, 412, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct.App.1999) (holding that voluntary statements secured in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant's conflicti......
  • State v. Halfrod, 00-0722
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 2000
    ...is present, unless the accused initiates further communication with police and validly waives the right. See State v. Franklin, 228 Wis. 2d 408, 412, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1999). ¶34. We agree with the State that the May 27 statement was improperly admitted. The June 9 statement, however......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT