State v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 21 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. S,S |
| Citation | State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1986) |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Joseph Paul FRANKLIN, alias James Clayton Vaughan, Appellee. /C/80 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Gordon W. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
Jerry H. Summers, Hugh J. Moore, Jr., Chattanooga, for appellee.
This case presents an unusual issue. Defendant, Joseph Paul Franklin, although represented by counsel at every stage of his prosecution, spontaneously requested and was permitted by the trial court to make a closing statement to the jury along with the arguments of his two court-appointed attorneys.
Defendant was indicted on March 7, 1984, by the Hamilton County Grand Jury on charges of malicious injury to structures with explosives, T.C.A. § 39-3-703(a) (bombing), and unauthorized possession of explosives, T.C.A. § 39-3-706. Convicted by a jury, Defendant was sentenced to 15 to 21 years for bombing and to 6 to 10 years for possession of explosives, to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel and that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing Defendant to participate in closing argument, reversing and remanding the case for a new trial. Having granted the State's application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11, T.R.A.P., we now reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. From the beginning, we emphasize the exceptional nature of this case.
On July 29, 1977, just before 9:00 p.m., the Beth Shalom Synagogue in Chattanooga was completely destroyed in an explosion. Explosives had been placed in the center of the building by way of a crawl space beneath it and had been detonated by an electrical extension cord that ran approximately two hundred feet from the synagogue to a nearby motel, where it had been plugged into an outside electrical socket to ignite the charge. During the investigation of the explosion, investigators noted the strong odor of exploded dynamite.
While all leads in the investigation had been pursued without success, Defendant did not become a suspect until after the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) had closed the case in November, 1979. Almost five years later, the Chattanooga Police Department received information that Defendant had made statements regarding this synagogue bombing; the Department then contacted the BATF investigator previously assigned to the case. At the time, Defendant was incarcerated in the Federal Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, which is a maximum security prison, serving four consecutive life sentences for murder. On February 29, 1984, at Marion, in the presence of a BATF agent and a Chattanooga Police Officer, Defendant, having waived his Miranda rights, voluntarily confessed to the bombing and possession of explosives for which he was convicted in this case. Defendant stated that he had intended for the explosion to be timed with an evening service when the synagogue would have had people in it. Fortunately, the service had ended early that evening and only the building was destroyed without loss of life or injuries. Defendant openly advocates racist political and religious beliefs, which apparently motivated this bombing, and has committed a number of crimes in conformity with these beliefs. 1 While incarcerated at Marion, Defendant was on one occasion attacked and stabbed fifteen or sixteen times by other inmates; he was then isolated from the population in a special housing unit.
Proof at trial revealed that Defendant had obtained the explosives (dynamite and Tovex) by using an alias, James Clayton Vaughan, to purchase dynamite from a Chattanooga supply store in late June of 1977, and the Tovex from a Charleston, West Virginia, supplier in early July, 1977. Defendant's fingerprints on the BATF Explosives Transaction Records of these sales were compared to Defendant's known prints and identified by an expert. Additionally, a handwriting analysis was made of Defendant's signature of his alias on these forms; these signatures were determined to be written by Defendant.
Trial of this case was held from July 10 to 12, 1984. 2 Two prominent attorneys were appointed by the Court to represent the Defendant. The defense strategy was to show that Defendant had confessed to numerous crimes throughout the country to obtain a transfer from Marion, where he lived with restricted privileges because his life was threatened. The defense was highly unusual in that it informed the jury of Defendant's political and religious beliefs, and of his prior offenses as well as of crimes to which he had only confessed but for which he had not yet been tried or convicted. The tactical problem was to get the jury to believe that Defendant was lying when he confessed to the details of the bombing in Chattanooga as part of his ulterior motive to get out of Marion. This defense was stressed on voir dire and in the opening statements of Defendant's counsel. The prosecution strategy, also somewhat unusual, was to corroborate the confession carefully to insure the jury would find Defendant credible. Both sides recognized the unique positions in which their strategies placed them. In their opening statements, the State's attorneys noted that this was a different type of case in which the defense would ask the jury to believe that Defendant, a well-read individual garnered the details of the bombing from various media accounts but that he didn't actually commit the crime. The State repeatedly referred to the Defendant's personality and radical beliefs. Further, during a subsequent jury-out conference regarding excision of portions of Defendant's confession, the trial court noted that "[t]his is an unusual situation in that the defendant has put before the jury the fact that he has been convicted in these other cases and that he has been charged with crimes all around the country."
Over the course of the trial, the defense questioned the State's witnesses regarding the extent of media coverage and the details of the bombing (to demonstrate contradictions between Defendant's confession and the actual events). The defense attempted to show that the circumstantial evidence that pointed to Defendant was insufficient without the confession, which was to be discredited by revealing Defendant's ulterior motive and a superficial familiarity with the facts surrounding the bombing. The defense never actively contested the charge on illegal possession of explosives. Another aspect of the defense effort to discredit the confession was to show that the investigating officers led Defendant through many of the details of the bombing to establish corroboration for his confession.
At two points in the trial, Defendant chose to absent himself from the courtroom and, on the first occasion, he executed a written waiver of his right to attend his trial, authorizing his court-appointed counsel to defend him "as they see fit during [his] absence on the morning of July 11, 1984," but reserving his right to be present during any other stage of the trial "if [he should] wish to attend." The trial court instructed the jury that Defendant's absence was the result of the exercise of his constitutional right to be present or absent and that his absence could not "be considered for any purpose against him, nor [could] any inference be drawn from the fact."
The only witness called for the defense was John M. Cowart, the Lawrenceville, Georgia, police officer who had been assigned to investigate the ambush shooting of Larry Flynt, the publisher of Hustler magazine. In Defendant's confession to this bombing in February, 1984, he specifically denied being involved in the shooting of Larry Flynt. Officer Cowart had previously spoken to Defendant, who was at Marion, in December of 1983, regarding the Flynt case. At that time, Defendant expressed his desire to be removed from Marion and stated that he would cooperate with Officer Cowart if the officer would try to help "get [him] out of here." Defendant then confessed to the Larry Flynt shooting. In this statement to Officer Cowart, Defendant remarked, "Ill tell you I'm getting to a point now where I'd say anything just to get out of here for awhile." Officer Cowart was also told by Defendant that he had bombed the Chattanooga synagogue and the house of an Israeli lobbyist in the Washington, D.C., area. During the direct examination of Officer Cowart by Defendant's counsel, not only were some of the general conditions at Marion brought out, but defense counsel also specifically inquired about Defendant's stabbing incident asking whether they had discussed an alleged attempt by Defendant's attackers to assault him sexually. At this point in the examination, Defendant reacted, denying that any such attempt had been made. The terse exchange between Defendant and his counsel is preserved on the record; defense counsel withdrew the question when Defendant adamantly denied it. The Defendant himself did not testify on his own behalf.
The following day, July 12, 1984, closing arguments were made, first by the State, which emphasized Defendant's political and religious beliefs as his motive and the corroboration of the confession, asking the jury to find it credible. Next, Defendant's counsel reminded the jury that Defendant was not on trial for his beliefs and that Defendant deserved a fair trial only for the crimes charged. The defense continued its strategy of attempting to show that Defendant confessed to the bombing as a part of his scheme to obtain a transfer from Marion. During a brief jury-out conference following the closing argument of one of Defendant's attorneys, the trial court stated to Defendant's counsel that it had "come to [his] attention that [Defendant] would like to make a closing...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
State v. Stephenson
...upon his failure to testify in the regular manner. The State too has an interest in a fair trial. Id. at 371; see also State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn.1986) (agreeing with Burkhart that a defendant has no absolute right to make an unsworn statement to the We agree that the rationale......
-
Metcalf v. State, 90-KA-1227
...774 P.2d 698 (1989); Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.1987); State v. Lehman, 137 Wis.2d 65, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987); State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn.1986); Reed v. State, 491 N.E.2d 182 (Ind.1986); State v. Cooley, 468 N.W.2d 833 (Iowa App.1991); Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d ......
-
State v. McCary
...to confer. A defendant has no constitutional right, of course, to act as co-counsel when he is represented by counsel. State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn.1986). Before a trial court may allow a defendant to participate in a dual representation, there must be a determination that the de......
-
State v. Copeland, No. E2002-01123-CCA-R3-DD (TN 8/22/2005)
...appellate court should not redetermine in retrospect and on a cold record how the case should have been better tried. State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Tenn. 1986). Finally, the defendant has submitted supplemental authorities in support of his argument, including the recent decision ......