State v. Frater

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FULLERTON, J.
• Citation: State v. Frater, 147 P. 25, 84 Wash. 466 (Wash. 1915)
• Decision Date: 20 March 1915
• Docket Number: 12220.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. VANCE. v. FRATER et al.

147 P. 25

84 Wash. 466

STATE ex rel. VANCE. v. FRATER et al.

No. 12220.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 20, 1915

Department 2. Original application for peremptory writ of mandamus by the State, on the relation of William Vance, against A. W Frater and others. Application denied.

Vanderveer & Cummings, of Seattle, for relator.

John F Murphy and Robt. H. Evans, both of Seattle, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

This is an application made upon notice for a peremptory writ of mandamus directed to the defendants, as judges of the superior court of King county, commanding them to appoint an official court reporter. The defendants, through their counsel, have demurred to the application, and the cause is before us upon the question whether the facts stated therein justify the issuance of the writ. We find it unnecessary to set forth the facts recited in the petition as they suggest but a single question, namely, the applicability of the provisions of the act of March 19, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 386) to the county of King.

The act in question by its first section makes it the duty of 'each superior court judge in counties or judicial districts in the state of Washington having a population of over thirty thousand inhabitants to appoint a stenographer to be attached to the court holden by him.' The last section of the act provides that the 'act shall not apply to any county having a population of two hundred thousand, or over.' It is conceded by the relator, and the court knows judicially, that the county of King has a population in excess of 200,000, and that the act as written does not apply to that county.

It is the relator's contention that the classification made of the counties by the Legislature is not founded upon any just distinction between the separated classes, and is, in consequence, arbitrary and in violation of those clauses of the Constitution designed to secure the equal protection of the laws and to prevent class legislation. The inquiry suggested by the contention is narrowed, however, by our decision in State ex rel. Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 140 P. 540, where we held the act operative as to the counties to which it ostensibly applied. Discussing the nature of the section now in question, it was there suggested that it was a limitation upon the general classification made in the first section of the act, rather than an additional classification; and it was held, when so considered, not to affect the constitutionality of the act in so far as it was made operative, even though the limitation might be considered in violation of the Constitution, as in such a case the limitation alone would be rejected.

The present inquiry is, therefore: Should the limitation exempting from the operation of the act counties containing a population of 200,000 or more be rejected as violative of the Constitution. So treating it, we are not convinced that the limitation is invalid. To classify counties and...