State v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 01 September 1982
• Docket Number: 95,Nos. 94,96,s. 94
• Citation: 298 Md. 422,470 A.2d 1269
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Antoine D. FRAZIER (94) Thomas Edward Weems & Lamont Patton (95) Garry Shaw a/k/a Gary L. Shaw (96) Mark Richardson (124). & 124
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 422

298 Md. 422

470 A.2d 1269

STATE of Maryland v. Antoine D. FRAZIER (94) Thomas Edward Weems & Lamont Patton

(95) Garry Shaw a/k/a Gary L. Shaw (96) Mark

Richardson (124).

Nos. 94, 95, 96 & 124 Sept. Term, 1982.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 7, 1984.

Carmina Szunyog, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., William A. Swisher, State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Sandra L. Kemick, Haven Kodeck and Richard G. Scherr, Asst. State's Attys., Baltimore, for Baltimore City, on the brief), for appellant.

Gary W. Christopher, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

These four criminal cases, involving five defendants, were dismissed prior to trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore ¹ on the ground that they were not tried within 180 days as required by Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 591, and Maryland Rule 746. The State took appeals in all four cases, raising similar issues concerning the operation of § 591 and Rule 746. Because of the importance of the questions presented, this Court issued writs of certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, and we directed that the cases be heard together. We shall reverse.

I.

Before setting out the facts of each case, it would be useful to review the requirements of § 591 and Rule 746 as interpreted by this Court in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368 (1979), and Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982), AND TO REVIEW THE ASSIGNMENT SYStem for criminal cases in the circuit Court for Baltimore City.

A.

Art. 27, § 591, was enacted by Ch. 212 of the Acts of 1971, and Rule 746 was promulgated in 1977 to implement § 591. The statute and the rule, applicable to criminal cases in the circuit courts, require that a trial date be set which shall not be later than 180 days after the appearance of counsel or the arraignment of the defendant, whichever shall first occur. Under § 591 and Rule 746, a postponement of the trial date must be made or approved by the administrative judge or a judge designated by him and only for good cause shown. ² Soon after § 591 was enacted, but prior to the adoption of Rule 746, it was held in Young v. State, 15 Md.App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, summarily aff'd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972), that the requirements of § 591 were only "directory" and not mandatory. Seven years later, however, in State v. Hicks, supra, we overruled the Young case, held that the time period for trying a circuit court criminal case was mandatory, ³ and held that if the case was not tried within that period and there was no postponement of the trial date complying with § 591 and Rule 746, dismissal of the criminal charges is ordinarily the appropriate sanction. There were several reasons for overruling Young. First, it was pointed out in the Hicks opinion that § 591 represented a legislative policy to obtain the prompt disposition of criminal charges, manifesting the Legislature's recognition that excessive delay in trying criminal cases is detrimental to the criminal justice system, but that this policy had been "largely unheeded" in light of the Young decision. 285 Md. at 316-317, 334, 403 A.2d 356. Second, we stated in Hicks that the adoption of Rule 746 was intended to "put teeth" into the statutory requirements governing the assignment of criminal cases for trial. Id. at 318, 403 A.2d 356. Finally, we pointed out that the holding in Young was contrary to the language of § 591 and Rule 746, Id. at 334, 403 A.2d 356.

Section 591 and Rule 746 require setting "a date for the trial" or "a trial date" within 180 days from arraignment or the appearance of counsel. Section 591 states that "[t]he date established for the trial" shall not be postponed except for good cause and with the approval of the administrative judge, and Rule 746 requires that "a change of trial date" be granted by the county administrative judge or his designee and only for good cause. Under this language, it could be argued either (1) that the statute and rule apply only to the setting and postponement of the first trial date or (2) that the provisions apply to all scheduled trial dates in a case. In the Hicks opinion we indicated that every postponement of a circuit court criminal trial date was required to be granted by the administrative judge or his designee and only upon a showing of the requisite cause. 285 Md. at 316-318, 403 A.2d 356. See Guarnera v. State, 20 Md.App. 562, 572-573, 318 A.2d 243, cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974), cited and quoted with approval in Hicks. See also Bethea v. State, 26 Md.App. 398, 400-401, 338 A.2d 390 (1975). At the same time, we made it clear in Hicks that the purpose of § 591 and Rule 746 was to set a time limit for the trial of a criminal case, that the dismissal sanction was applicable when the case was not tried within that time limit and not postponed in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746, but that the dismissal sanction was inapplicable to violations of § 591 and Rule 746 which did not prevent the case from being tried within the prescribed time period. 285 Md. at 318, 320, 334, 335, 403 A.2d 356. Thus, when there are several orders by the administrative judge postponing a criminal trial, and one of those orders has the effect of postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline, it is the latter order with which a judge hearing a motion to dismiss is concerned. The critical order by the administrative judge, for purposes of the dismissal sanction, is the order having the effect of extending the trial date beyond 180 days.

This Court also stated in the Hicks opinion that § 591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications of the constitutional speedy trial right but stand "on a different legal footing." 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d 356. In addition, we emphasized that one circumstance where the dismissal sanction was inappropriate was "where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746." Id. at 335, 403 A.2d 356.

Finally, the Court held in Hicks (285 Md. at 336-338, 403 A.2d 356) that the overruling of Young v. State and the new rulings in the Hicks opinion should be given prospective effect under the principles set forth in cases such as Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1969-1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1741, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); and Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975). See also McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 419 A.2d 369 (1980). In reaching this conclusion, we pointed out that "the new interpretation announced does not relate to the fact-finding determination of whether a defendant did the act, but, like the exclusionary rule involved in Linkletter v. Walker, supra, is a prophylactic measure designed to insure compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials of criminal cases. It is the type of new ruling that is almost invariably not given retroactive effect." 285 Md. at 337, 403 A.2d 356.

Three years after Hicks, in Goins v. State, supra, this Court reiterated that dismissal was the appropriate sanction if a circuit court criminal case was not tried within the 180-day time period, and if there was no order by the administrative judge, based on good cause, postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline, and if the defendant did not seek or expressly consent to a trial date in violation of § 591 and Rule 746. Under such circumstances, dismissal would be the appropriate sanction even if the delay may have been for the defendant's benefit, or the defendant may have engaged in dilatory conduct, or the prosecution may have been free of fault. 293 Md. at 100, 106-109, 112, 442 A.2d 550. We repeated in Goins that § 591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications of constitutional speedy trial analysis. Id. at 109, 442 A.2d 550.

In the Goins opinion we reaffirmed that the State has the duty of bringing the defendant to trial, that the defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, and that, therefore, the defendant has no obligation to seek a postponement under § 591 and Rule 746. 293 Md. at 109-110, 442 A.2d 550. Goins also held that, under § 591 and Rule 746, the administrative judge may, for good cause, order a postponement of the trial date on his own motion. Id. at 110-111, 442 A.2d 550. ⁴ Lastly, we held in Goins that when an order of the administrative judge necessarily has the effect of postponing the trial date past the 180-day deadline, and the order is supported by good cause, such order complies with § 591 and Rule 746 regardless of whether the administrative judge was conscious of the 180-day deadline. Id. at 111-112, 442 A.2d 550.

B.

As a result of the Hicks decision, it was necessary that procedures be adopted in various subdivisions to assure that criminal cases be tried in conformity with § 591 and Rule 746. The subdivision with the greatest criminal caseload, and thus presenting a real need for an efficient assignment system, was Baltimore City. For example, in fiscal year 1983 there were 8,571 new criminal cases filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, consisting of 4,147 felony cases and 4,424 misdemeanor cases. The criminal assignment system which evolved in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is as follows. ⁵

Within a few weeks after the filing of every criminal case in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a mandatory arraignment is routinely held. ⁶ At the arraignment there is present someone from the criminal division of the Central Assignment Office ⁷ with the necessary data for the assignment of a trial date, and at that time a trial date is assigned for each case except those which are...