State v. Frazier, 78-442-C

Decision Date27 October 1980
Docket NumberNo. 78-442-C,78-442-C
Citation421 A.2d 546
PartiesSTATE v. Richard Alan FRAZIER. A.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

At about 4 a. m. on December 8, 1977, in the town of Cumberland, Patrolman John Bruno (Bruno), while on routine motor patrol, spotted an "unfamiliar" automobile with two occupants traveling east on John Street. When Bruno noticed that the vehicle lacked a front license plate, he radioed police headquarters to tell his superiors that he was about to stop the car. After stopping the vehicle, Bruno asked the operator for his license and his car registration. The driver was the defendant, Richard Alan Frazier (Frazier). The other front-seat occupant was Frazier's friend, Lynn Gray (Gray).

Bruno's testimony indicated that as he approached the vehicle, he directed his flashlight beam into the back-seat area to assure himself that no one was hiding behind the front seat. As he did so, Bruno observed "an AM/FM tape player, a camera, a case of beer, and * * * a knife * * * " in plain view on the back seat. The knife was described in the indictment as "a carving knife." Frazier appeared "nervous" and repeatedly asked Bruno why he was being stopped, but he did produce a valid license and registration. Thereupon, Bruno asked Frazier to step out of the car, and as he complied, the patrolman noticed a steak knife protruding from Frazier's back pocket. At this point, a sergeant arrived on the scene, and the occupants were separated and asked to recount the details of their recent activities. Their answers about where they had been and where they were going were mutually inconsistent. After conferring about the conflicting stories and the items seen on the rear seat, Bruno and the sergeant decided to transport Frazier and Gray to the Cumberland police headquarters "for further investigation." The automobile remained, with an officer standing guard, where it had been stopped.

When the duo arrived at headquarters, they were separated, searched, and the contents of their pockets seized. At approximately 4:30 a. m., Bruno telephoned the neighboring communities of Lincoln and Central Falls in order to ascertain whether the articles seen on the back seat might have been implicated in any recent "breaks or incidents." When Bruno called the Central Falls police, he talked to Officer Roland H. Fournier (Fournier).

Earlier, Fournier had been on patrol when, at approximately 3:45 a. m., he received a radio directive to proceed to 34 Watson Street and to investigate a report about a man screaming. When Fournier arrived at the multitenement dwelling located at the designated address, he was told by the first-floor tenant that "there was a man upstairs bound and gagged on the floor." When Fournier and a fellow officer entered the second-floor tenement, they found the tenant, Angelo Rodrigues (Rodrigues), a Colombian immigrant, bound, gagged, and blindfolded.

Rodrigues was freed from his bounds and assisted in composing himself. After an inspection of the premises, the officers became aware, through their use of a minimum of English and an abundance of sign language, that Rodrigues had been robbed. Included in the stolen goods were a camera, a tape recorder, a case of beer, and some cash. Fournier's colleague took Rodrigues to the Pawtucket Memorial Hospital for treatment, and Fournier returned to headquarters where for a short period he assumed the duties of the desk officer.

When Bruno called the Central Falls police, he spoke to Fournier. As soon as Bruno mentioned that one of the suspects had in his possession a "Colombian peso," Fournier asked about the presence of a case of beer, a camera, and a recorder. Within minutes after receiving an affirmative response, Fournier was on his way to Cumberland to bring the "two suspects back to our city for investigation."

Approximately six month later, in early June 1978, Frazier was on trial before a Superior Court jury on a two-count indictment charging him with the crimes of robbery, a violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-39-1, and assault with a dangerous weapon, to wit, "a carving knife," in a dwelling house with intent to rob, a violation of § 11-5-4. At the trial, Rodrigues told the jury that he had been beaten and robbed by two men whom he had met earlier in the evening of December 7 in a Central Falls bar and whom he had invited to come to his tenement for a sip of Colombian "firewater." Rodrigues insisted that Frazier had confronted him with a carving knife and demanded his cash, and that Frazier then took the knife, cut Rodrigues's pants pocket, and removed his wallet. In his testimony, Frazier conceded that he and Gray had met Rodrigues in the bar and had accepted Rodrigues's invitation for an early-morning potation. Frazier supplied the transportation. He denied any connection with the robbery episode but admitted helping Gray to tie up and blindfold Rodrigues. He explained the presence of the steak knife by telling the jury that after Gray had threatened Rodrigues with the steak knife, he relieved Gray of the knife, put it in his pocket, left the tenement, and returned to his car. According to Frazier, Gray bore the sole responsibility for the back-seat array of goods.

After the trial justice's instructions, the jury returned to the courtroom twice, one to ask the trial justice how one would prove the requisite intent to rob and later for a reading of that portion of Rodrigues's testimony relating to Frazier's cutting of his pants. The trial justice, in denying the motion for a new trial, made it clear that a crucial portion of the prosecution's case consisted of the testimony given by the commanding officer of Cumberland's night patrol. The officer testified that when Frazier arrived at headquarters, one of the items taken from his person was a fountain pen. Earlier in the trial Rodrigues had identified the fountain pen as his. 1

Although Frazier raises a multitude of issues, the decisive issue relates to the trial justice's denial of Frazier's motion to suppress the evidence initially seized by the Cumberland police and subsequently received by the Central Falls officers. The trial justice rested his denial of the motion to suppress on (1) Frazier's lack of standing, (2) a lawful arrest by the Cumberland police, and (3) language found in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 12-7-1, which in its relevant part states that a police officer "may detain a criminal suspect for investigatory purposes for a period up to two hours."

In ruling on the standing issue, the trial justice relied on our holding in State v. Jardine, 110 R.I. 491, 493, 293 A.2d 901, 902 (1972), where we recognized that a proponent of a motion to suppress evidence has the requisite standing if he had an interest in the "object seized" or in the "place searched." 2 The trial justice observed that even though Frazier produced a valid license and registration, there was no evidence indicating to whom the car belonged or if he had the owner's permission to use the vehicle. The trial justice apparently overlooked Officer Bruno's affirmative response when he was asked if Frazier complied with his request that he produce "his license and registration." This evidence unquestionably indicates that Frazier was the owner of the vehicle and thus had standing to seek suppression of the tangible evidence presented at the trial by the prosecution.

The trial justice, in finding that the search could be...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Wilkes v. Young
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • July 12, 1994
    ...412 So.2d 984, 986 (La.1982); People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 445 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99-100, 429 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1981); State v. Frazier, 421 A.2d 546, 550 (R.I.1980); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 684, 689 (La.1978). See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Sec. 3.2(e), at 594-96 (2d ......
  • People v. Tottenhoff, 84SA311
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1984
    ...U.S. 878, 103 S.Ct. 173, 74 L.Ed.2d 142 (1982); People v. Reynolds, 94 Ill.2d 160, 68 Ill.Dec. 122, 445 N.E.2d 766 (1983); State v. Frazier, 421 A.2d 546 (R.I.1980). Because an arrest based on probable cause is a reasonable constitutional intrusion, a full search of the person arrested is p......
  • People v. McCoy
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • March 14, 1994
    ...prove that probable cause exists to support an arrest without a warrant. State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 684, 689 (La.1978); State v. Frazier, 421 A.2d 546, 550 (R.I.1980); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.2(e) at 596-97 (2d ed. 1987). As the Supreme Court of Illinois put it,......
  • State v. Burns, 79-520-C
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1981
    ...cause must exist at the time an arrest is made; probable cause cannot be grounded upon information subsequently gained. State v. Frazier, R.I., 421 A.2d 546, 550 (1980); State v. Firth, R.I., 418 A.2d 827, 829 (1980). Finally, we note that the probable-cause standard for determining the leg......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT