State v. Frazier, 86,741.
Decision Date | 15 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 86,741.,86,741. |
Citation | 42 P.3d 188,30 Kan. App.2d 398 |
Parties | STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. TROY D. FRAZIER, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Kristen Chowning, assistant appellate defender, and Randall L. Hodgkinson, deputy appellate defender, for appellant.
Julia D. Allen, assistant county attorney, F. William Cullins, county attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ELLIOTT, P.J., GREEN, J., and PADDOCK, S.J.
Troy D. Frazier appeals his conviction of and sentence for possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. On appeal, Frazier argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of possession; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a) is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence. We affirm Frazier's conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
On March 22, 2000, Theresa Foster picked up Frazier from a friend's residence and the two went to the Coffeyville, Kansas, Wal-Mart to purchase presents for Foster's daughter's birthday. After shopping, the couple went to the Schwinn Motel, where Foster had stayed the night before. Foster and Frazier then drove to Parsons, Kansas, to attend her daughter's birthday party.
After Foster and Frazier left the motel, police officers executed a search warrant for Foster's motel room as part of a narcotics investigation. When the officers arrived at the motel room, they knocked on the door, but no one answered. The officers then set up a surveillance of the room and waited for the occupants to return.
After the party, Frazier, Foster, Foster's two children, and Penny Collins went to the Coffeyville Wal-Mart. Collins and Foster's daughter went into the store, purchased some items, and put the items into the trunk of the car. The group then returned to the motel.
An officer surveilling the motel room observed Frazier retrieve two Wal-Mart bags from the trunk of the vehicle and carry the bags towards the motel room. Frazier approached the motel room with a key in his hand and was attempting to unlock the door when the officer took him into custody. The bags that Frazier was carrying contained 5 cans of starter fluid, 14 boxes of cold or allergy pills, and 4 lithium batteries. The officer deduced that the items in the bags were to be used to manufacture methamphetamine based on the combination and amount of the items.
Frazier was charged with several drug offenses, but all of the charges except one count of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine were dismissed before the case was submitted to the jury. A jury convicted Frazier of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. He was sentenced to the standard term of 150 months' imprisonment based on his criminal history score of H and a drug severity level 1 felony.
Frazier's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of possession. Frazier concedes that he failed to request an instruction on the definition of possession. Accordingly, our standard of review is as follows:
State v. Evans, 270 Kan. 585, 588, 17 P.3d 340 (2001).
Frazier argues that the instruction on the definition of possession was necessary because he was in constructive possession of the bags containing the methamphetamine precursors. A defendant is in constructive possession of illegal items if the items are found on premises where the defendant is in nonexclusive possession, rather than on the defendant's person. See State v. Hazley, 28 Kan. App. 2d 664, 672, 19 P.3d 800 (2001).
Here, however, Frazier did not constructively possess the items in the two Wal-Mart bags because the items were found in his actual possession. As such, this is not a case where the State asked the jury to conclude that Frazier was guilty simply because he was present at a location where illegal items were discovered. Instead, Frazier had actual possession of the items in the Wal-Mart bags because he was carrying the bags. "Possession" under the law involves "[h]aving control over a ... thing with knowledge of and the intent to have such control." PIK Crim.3d 53.00 (2000 Supp.). The omission of that definition in this case was not clearly erroneous.
Nevertheless, Frazier contends that without an instruction on the definition of possession, the jury could have concluded that he was guilty solely because he was carrying the bags to the motel room without knowing what the bags contained. This argument is without merit because the jury was instructed that to convict Frazier of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, the State was required to prove that Frazier "knowingly possessed ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to use the product as a precursor to any illegal substance." Because the trial court instructed the jury that an element of the offense was an intent to use the items for an illegal purpose, the jury was implicitly required to find that Frazier knew what the bags contained. As a result, we find that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the definition of possession was not clearly erroneous.
Next, Frazier contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jasper, 269 Kan. 649, 655, 8 P.3d 708 (2000).
Frazier was convicted of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in violation of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a). The statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to possess ephedrine, pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers with intent to use the product as a precursor to any illegal substance." K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a).
Frazier contends that the State failed to prove he possessed a substance prohibited by K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a). He argues that the legislature's reference to "ephedrine" and "pseudoephedrine" in that subsection of the statute indicates an intent to address pure ephedrine. According to Frazier, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not prove that he possessed pure ephedrine. Instead, Frazier concedes that, at most, the evidence established that he possessed a drug product containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.
To support his argument, Frazier notes that subsections (b) and (c) of the statute prohibit certain types of marketing of "any drug product containing ephedrine." See K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(b) and (c). Frazier claims that a plain reading of the statute indicates that when the legislature intended to address a drug product containing ephedrine, it called it just that and by failing to use that language in subsection (a), the legislature intended to address only pure ephedrine.
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law; therefore, this court's standard of review is unlimited. State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 43, 966 P.2d 671 (1998).
In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
Frazier's argument that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a) addresses only pure ephedrine is without merit. Interpreting the statute to prohibit possession of only pure ephedrine would be to include language that is not readily found in the statute. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a) is a general statute that addresses not only pure ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, but also drug products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent of the statute to prohibit the use of otherwise legal drugs containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in the manufacture of illegal substances. As a result, this court finds that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 65-7006(a) is not limited to the possession of pure ephedrine.
We further find that the evidence is sufficient to support Frazier's conviction. A forensic chemist with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation testified that the pills recovered from Frazier contained ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. After review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have found Frazier guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the evidence is sufficient to support...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Patton
...65-7006(a) and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) in State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 106 P.3d 1129 (2005) (adopting reasoning of State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App.2d 398, 42 P.3d 188 [2002])—catapulted Ortiz into the common-law equivalent of superstardom. See State v. Phinney, 280 Kan. 394, 122 P.3d 356 (2005......
-
State v. Schoonover
...In discussing the overlap between ephedrine and possession of drug paraphernalia, the panel noted the holding of State v. Frazier, 30 Kan.App.2d 398, 405, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002), that possession of ephedrine and possession of drug paraphernalia are identical offenses ......
-
State v. Harp
...This construction was recently employed in Swisher, where the defendant raised an identical offense argument in light of State v. Frazier, 30 Kan.App.2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002) (possession of ephedrine, a severity level 1 drug felony, and possession of drug paraph......
-
Laymon v. State
...more promising because, at the time Laymon's brief was filed in his direct appeal, an analogous line of cases under State v. Frazier, 30 Kan.App.2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002), was developing; and the McAdam line of argument had been rejected by only one Court of Appe......
-
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
...7 (Oct. 2004). [136] 227 Kan. at 142. See also K.S.A. 65-4159(b) (Furse 2002). [137] K.S.A. 65-4161(a) (2002). [138] State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App. 2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002), relying on State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229, 768 P.2d 268 (1989). In Nunn, the state con......
-
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
...7 (Oct. 2004). [136] 227 Kan. at 142. See also K.S.A. 65-4159(b) (Furse 2002). [137] K.S.A. 65-4161(a) (2002). [138] State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App.2d 398, 42 P.3d 188, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002), relying on State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229, 768 P.2d 268 (1989). In Nunn, the state conc......
-
Methamphetamine - a Recipe for Disaster
...to a conviction for possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine has been an issue perplexing our appellate courts. In State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App. 2d 398, 42 P.3d 188 (2002), the defendant was convicted of the severity level 1 offense of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in violat......