State v. Fremont

Decision Date02 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-1443.,06-1443.
Citation749 N.W.2d 234
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Guy Edward FREMONT, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey H. Greve, County Attorney, for appellee.

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we consider whether the search and seizure provisions of the United States and Iowa Constitutions require the suppression of evidence obtained where a search warrant was approved by a magistrate who, at the time of the execution of the warrant, simultaneously represented a party in a family law proceeding adverse to one of the warrant's named parties. We hold under the facts of this case that the magistrate was not "neutral and detached" as required by the Fourth Amendment and that the doctrine of harmless error does not apply. As a result, the motion to suppress should have been granted. The conviction of the defendant, therefore, is vacated and the case remanded to the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In August 2005, Mike and Amy Wilson contacted Worth County Deputy Sheriff Dan Fank regarding their granddaughter. The Wilsons told Fank that when they visited their granddaughter, the baby's clothing smelled of marijuana. Additionally, Amy told Fank that when the baby's mother, Destiny Fremont, visited the Casey's store where Amy worked, she exhibited bloodshot eyes and acted "goofy." When confronted about being stoned, Amy reported that Destiny merely looked away and giggled. Fank told the Wilsons that they should contact the Department of Human Services and report any further incidents to law enforcement.

The following month, Amy contacted another Worth County deputy sheriff, Jan Langenbau. Amy advised that after she and her husband picked up the child, they opened the baby's blanket and found a leafy substance they believed to be marijuana. Langenbau collected the substance. Tests later confirmed that it was indeed marijuana.

In January 2006, T.C. Simon contacted Fank. Simon was at the time dating Lacy Nelson, Destiny's sister, and had recently lived with Nelson, Destiny and their parents. Simon admitted that he had smoked marijuana at the residence. Simon additionally told Fank that the Fremonts periodically purchased marijuana, that everyone in the home smoked it, and that they possibly also used methamphetamines. Simon expressed concern about the small children who resided at the home.

Two weeks after receiving the report from Simon, Fank and Northwood Police Officer Jesse Luther removed a bag of garbage from the sidewalk in front of the Fremont residence. In the garbage, the officers discovered an envelope addressed to the defendant Guy Fremont, Destiny's father, numerous stems and seeds, and a used package of ZigZag rolling papers. The stems later tested positive as marijuana.

On January 19, 2006, Fank presented an application for a search warrant to Douglas Krull, a part-time magistrate. The application included an affidavit by Fank, a report by Langenbau, and photos of the items recovered from the garbage bag. Among other persons, Destiny Fremont was listed on the search warrant as residing in the home.

Krull immediately recognized Destiny's name. Destiny and Bryce Schnulle were the unmarried parents of the Wilsons' granddaughter. Krull, in his capacity as a private attorney, had previously filed a paternity, custody, and child support action on behalf of Schnulle against Destiny. Two months prior to the warrant application, Schnulle through Krull, sought temporary child support. The court denied the motion, and ordered Schnulle to pay temporary support. The matter was still pending at the time the warrant was issued.

Krull decided to sign the warrant even though he was aware of his representation adverse to Destiny. Krull reasoned that the evidence was overwhelming, physical in nature, and did not require him to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. The search warrant was executed on the same day Krull signed the warrant.

The search produced substantial evidence against the adults living in the home. Upon entering, Fank immediately recognized the overwhelming smell of burnt marijuana. Searches conducted on the adults present produced additional marijuana and rolling papers. When Fank pulled Guy aside and asked if there was additional contraband in the house, Guy directed officers to two trays of marijuana in an upper cabinet in the kitchen. In addition, marijuana was seized from an upstairs bedroom and methamphetamine and marijuana paraphernalia were discovered, including pipes with residue in the room next to where small children were playing. Guy also admitted he sold marijuana, but only to make a life for his family.

In light of the evidence, the State charged Guy with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and child endangerment.

Guy filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search, asserting that Krull was not a neutral and detached magistrate as required by Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court held that because probable cause was so clearly established, no constitutional infirmity was present. Guy was later convicted of all charges. The defendant appealed.

II. Standard of Review.

Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 2005). In an action involving a structural challenge to the validity of a warrant, the burden of proof rests with the defendant. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 672 (1978).

III. Discussion on Merits.

A. Background of Requirement of a "Neutral and Detached" Magistrate in Search and Seizure Context. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const., amend. IV.

The Iowa Constitution has a search and seizure provision with nearly identical language. Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. These two constitutional provisions are generally "deemed to be identical in scope, import, and purpose." State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa 1982). No party has suggested that the Iowa constitutional provision should be interpreted differently than its federal counterpart on the contested issues in this appeal and, as a result, we interpret the Iowa Constitution similarly to its federal counterpart. In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n. 1 (Iowa 2000) (refusing to deviate from federal analysis in considering state constitutional claim because appellant "ha[d] suggested no deficiency in the federal principles . . . nor ha[d] he offered an alternative test or guideline").

The second clause of the Fourth Amendment, known as the Warrants Clause, is silent on the question of who may issue a valid warrant. As a result, while the language suggests an intent to limit the power of police to engage in searches and seizures that are unreasonable or not based on probable cause and to limit the scope of warrants authorizing intrusions into private lives, there can be no resort to a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment to provide guidance on the question of who may issue a valid warrant. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Chi. L.Rev. 47, 47 (1974).

The drafting history of the Fourth Amendment is also of little help. While James Madison's original draft of the Warrants Clause was directed solely at the substantive requirements for a valid warrant, the draft was changed by Congress to include the Reasonableness Clause. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 197, 208-09 (1993). There is simply nothing of relevance on the question of magistrate qualifications that can be teased from this drafting history.

In light of the language and limited legislative history, it is not surprising that authorities have resorted to vague generalities in characterizing the commands of the Fourth Amendment. Leading Fourth Amendment scholars declare that the Fourth Amendment embodies "a spiritual concept" in the value of privacy and a "value judgment" about privacy and security in a free and open society. See Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation 47 (1966); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.Rev. 349, 403 (1974). These declarations, however, provide little specific guidance on how Fourth Amendment values should be implemented in the real world.

B. United States Supreme Court Approach to Neutrality and Detachment of Magistrates Under the Fourth Amendment.

1. "Neutral and detached" magistrate. Left with the broad language of the Fourth Amendment and the unilluminating historical context, the burden of translating the generalized constitutional commands of the Fourth Amendment into a workable body of law has fallen on the United States Supreme Court. The first clear pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must be issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate surfaced in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). In Johnson, Justice Robert Jackson emphasized that the inferences drawn from evidence to determine whether probable cause existed to engage in a search must be made by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 14, 68 S.Ct. at 369, 92...

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