State v. Frickey

• Decision Date: 07 November 2014
• Docket Number: 110,566.
• Citation: 337 P.3d 73 (Table)
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Chad Anthony FRICKEY, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

337 P.3d 73 (Table)

STATE of Kansas, Appellee
v.
Chad Anthony FRICKEY, Appellant.

110,566.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Nov. 7, 2014.
Review Denied July 22, 2015.

Kevin Shepherd, of Topeka, for appellant.

Andrew Bauch, assistant district attorney, Joel Cochran, legal intern, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, C.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Chad Anthony Frickey appeals his conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Frickey claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to arrest him. Specifically, Frickey argues that the district court erred in considering the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and a preliminary breath test (PBT) in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest him for DUI. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.

In the early morning hours of January 6, 2013, Douglas County Sheriff's Deputy Bryon Revell was traveling westbound on North 1600 Road/County Road 442 in Douglas County when he observed an eastbound Nissan Sentra that appeared to be exceeding the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Revell activated his radar, which indicated that the car was traveling 71 miles per hour. Revell stopped the car, identified Frickey as the driver, and informed him of the reason for the stop. When speaking with Frickey, Revell noticed a moderate odor of alcohol and saw that Frickey's eyes were bloodshot. When asked if he had consumed any alcohol, Frickey admitted to having “a couple” of drinks.

Revell then had Frickey exit the car so he could administer field sobriety tests. After observing clues of intoxication during an initial HGN test, Revell had Frickey get back into the Nissan while he repositioned his patrol car in order to administer additional field sobriety tests. Revell then administered the HGN test a second time, and Frickey displayed four out of a possible six clues of intoxication. Frickey also displayed three out of a possible eight clues of intoxication during the walk-and-turn test and two out of a possible four clues of intoxication during the one-leg-stand test. Frickey did not display any clues of intoxication during the alphabet test or the counting test.

After administering the field sobriety tests, Revell requested that Frickey submit to a PBT. Frickey agreed to take the test and registered a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .101—which is above the legal limit. Revell then placed Frickey under arrest and transported him to the Douglas County Jail. There, Frickey took a breath-alcohol test on an Intoxilyzer 8000 machine, which revealed a BAC of .098.

The State charged Frickey with DUI, speeding, and failure to provide notice of change of address. Prior to trial, Frickey moved to suppress all evidence observed and collected during and following the investigative detention and arrest, arguing a lack of probable cause for his arrest.

At the suppression hearing, Revell testified about the events leading up to Frickey's arrest. Defense counsel objected to Revell's testimony regarding the results of the HGN test, asserting that HGN evidence is admissible only if it is qualified by a scientific expert. Defense counsel also objected to the admission of the PBT results because Revell did not properly observe the recommended 15–minute waiting period.

After considering the evidence presented at the suppression hearing—including the results of the HGN test and the PBT—the district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Officer Revell had probable cause to arrest Frickey based on a totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the district court found the following factors supported a finding of probable cause: (1) Frickey was speeding more than 10 miles per hour over the posted speed limit; (2) he had bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol; (3) he admitted to consuming alcohol; (4) he exhibited clues of impairment during the walk-and-tum test, the one-leg-stand test, and the HGN test; and (5) his PBT results.

Frickey waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. At trial, Frickey preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Based on the stipulated evidence, the district court found Frickey guilty as charged. Frickey timely appealed his convictions.

On appeal, Frickey contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Revell lacked probable cause to arrest him. Specifically, Frickey argues that the district court erred in considering the results of the HGN test and the PBT in determining whether Revell had probable cause to arrest him for DUI. Without the HGN and PBT results, Frickey asserts that the remaining evidence does not rise to the level of probable cause. The State argues that the district court did not err in considering the results of the HGN test and the PBT in determining whether Revell had probable cause to arrest Frickey for DUI. In the alternative, the State argues that even without the HGN or PBT results, Revell still had probable cause to arrest Frickey for DUI.

Where, as here, the material facts as to a district court's decision on a motion to suppress are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 485, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). The State bears the burden of proof for a suppression motion. State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 985, 218 P.3d 801 (2009).

In order for a warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arrest must be supported by probable cause. Sloop v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. 13, 20, 290 P.3d 555 (2012). Probable cause is defined as “ ‘the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed the crime.’ “ 296 Kan. at 20. In attempting to...