State v. Fridy
| Decision Date | 20 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 65A01-0509-CR-418.,65A01-0509-CR-418. |
| Citation | 842 N.E.2d 835 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Quentin FRIDY, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Quentin Fridy was charged with possession of marijuana1 as a Class D felony. Fridy filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals.2
We reverse and remand.
On August 17, 2004, Officer Dan Hoehn, of the Evansville Police Department Narcotics Unit, responded to a complaint from a local hotel that the odor of marijuana was emanating from one of the rooms. At the scene, two subjects gave Officer Hoehn consent to search their room. During the search, Officer Hoehn found one-half-pound of marijuana.
The two subjects stated that they were holding the marijuana for Fridy, their supplier, "on a front," and volunteered to cooperate with the police and to obtain additional marijuana from Fridy. Tr., 5-17-05, at 9.3 The police provided no incentive for the subjects (hereinafter, "informants") to cooperate. Id. at 4-5.
In the presence of the police, the informants placed a phone call to arrange a meeting with Fridy. State's Ex. 1 at 2. Prior to the meeting, the police searched the informants and their vehicle. An Evansville Police Detective followed the informants to Fridy's residence and kept in constant visual contact. One of the informants entered the residence and returned to the vehicle with Fridy. Thereafter, Fridy entered the back seat, the informants entered the front seat, and the three drove away. Detective Townsend, another Evansville Police Detective, followed the vehicle and executed a traffic stop. During the stop, Detective Townsend saw Fridy place something under the driver's seat. Police obtained the driver's consent to search the vehicle and found a green, leafy substance weighing approximately five ounces under the driver's seat. The substance field-tested positive for marijuana.
During the investigation, the police learned from Fridy's landlord that Fridy rented the residence where the informants picked him up. The police further learned that the landlord saw Fridy leave with the two informants, which confirmed the officers' observations.
Officer Hoehn filed with the trial court an affidavit of probable cause in which he described the events leading up to the arrest. Based on this affidavit the trial court issued a warrant on August 17, 2004, to search Fridy's residence for marijuana, methamphetamine, and items associated with the dealing of controlled substances. State's Ex. 1 at 1. The search of Fridy's residence revealed more than 160 grams of marijuana and a loaded pistol.4 Appellant's App. at 9.
On September 7, 2004, the State charged Fridy with Class D felony possession of marijuana. On March 9, 2005, Fridy filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search arguing that the search violated Fridy's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Fridy argued that there was no probable cause to search his residence because the warrant was based primarily on the hearsay statements of the two unnamed informants.
On April 29, 2005, prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, Fridy filed a motion to compel disclosure of the informants' names and addresses. The motion stated "[t]hat the Affidavit supporting the Search Warrant sets out hearsay statements of confidential informant's [sic] and claims that the confidential informants' statements are reliable because they were made against penal interest." Appellant's App. at 24. In his motion, Fridy argued that the reliability of the informants' hearsay statements could not be confirmed without knowing their identities and in what way their statements were against their penal interests. After a hearing, the trial court granted Fridy's motion to compel disclosure of the names and addresses of the confidential informants, which the State refused to do. Two weeks later, on July 12, 2005, the State filed a Request for Ruling on Motion to Suppress without the disclosure of confidential informants. The trial court held a hearing and, on July 19, 2005, granted Fridy's motion to suppress the evidence found in his residence. Appellant's App. at 31. Because the suppression of the evidence effectively precludes the State's further prosecution of Fridy, the State now appeals.
Initially, we note that Fridy failed to file an appellee's brief. Under such circumstances, a less stringent standard of review applies, and the State need only establish prima facie error, which is error at first sight or on the face of it. State v. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind.Ct. App.2005); Parker v. State, 822 N.E.2d 285, 286 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). This rule is not intended to benefit the appellant, but rather to relieve this Court of the burden of developing arguments on behalf of the appellee. See Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d at 558; Parker, 822 N.E.2d at 286.
The State claims that the suppression of all evidence was an inappropriately broad remedy for the State's failure to disclose the identity of the informants. In essence, the State argues that if the trial court had omitted all evidence that was solely attributable to the informants' statements, sufficient evidence of probable cause still existed to grant the search warrant. As such, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Fridy's motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. We agree.
The trial court's ruling provided:
The Defendant, having requested disclosure of identity of confidential informants, and the Court, having granted said motion, and the State of Indiana, having requested ruling on the Motion to Suppress without the disclosure of confidential informants, the Court now takes the Motion to Suppress out from under advisement and grants said Motion to Suppress.
Appellant's App. at 31. Generally, we review a trial court's decision to grant a motion to suppress as a matter of sufficiency. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d at 557-58; State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 93 (Ind.Ct. App.2000), trans. denied. When conducting such a review, we will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d at 558. Here, the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show that the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law. State v. Estep, 753 N.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). This court will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court. Id. at 25.
The trial court's stated reason for granting Fridy's motion to suppress was the State's noncompliance with the trial court's order requiring it to reveal the informants' identities. As such, we address both the question of whether there was probable cause to support the warrant and whether the trial court erred in granting Fridy's motion to suppress as a sanction for the State's noncompliance.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require a search warrant to be supported by probable cause. State v. Mason, 829 N.E.2d 1010, 1015-16 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). We accord significant deference to a trial court's probable cause determination, but we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. Id. at 1016; Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). On review, we determine whether the trial court had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause to support the search warrant existed. Query v. State, 745 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind.2001).
"[U]ncorroborated hearsay from a source whose credibility is itself unknown, standing alone, cannot support a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant." Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind. 1997) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). IC 35-33-5-2(b) provides that when an affidavit is based on hearsay, the affidavit must either contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay or contain information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay. See Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 100 (Ind.1997). Either is sufficient under the statute.
Declarations against penal interest can furnish sufficient basis for establishing the credibility of an informant within the meaning of IC 35-33-5-2(b)(1). Houser, 678 N.E.2d at 100 (); Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The probable cause affidavit in this case provided:
The statements of the two individuals from the hotel room are reliable because they are based on personal knowledge and made against their penal interests. Information obtained from them regarding the residence, its occupant and the presence of marijuana were confirmed through the controlled delivery, statements by the landlord, and observations of law enforcement. The two individuals are known to EPD by name, Date of Birth and other identifiers.
State's Ex. 1 at 3 (emphasis added).
Focusing only on the italicized language, Fridy's motion to compel the disclosure of the informants' identities argued that in order for the defense to determine whether the hearsay declarants are credible, the State must show how their statements are against their penal interests. Fridy, however, failed to consider that this information was only necessary if...
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