State v. Frost

• Decision Date: 16 December 1926
• Citation: 135 A. 446,105 Conn. 326
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. FROST.

135 A. 446

105 Conn. 326

STATE v. FROST.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 16, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John W. Banks, Judge.

Charles Frost was convicted of statutory arson on trial to the court and he appeals. No error.

Ordinarily when a witness is asked to identify the assailant or other person who is subject of his testimony the witness's act of pointing out the accused is of little testimonial force.

Homer S. Cummings, of Stamford, Clifford B. Wilson, of Bridgeport and Raymond E. Hackett, of Stamford, for appellant.

William H. Comley, State's Atty., and E. Earle Garlick, Asst State's Atty., both of Bridgeport, for the State.

WHEELER, C.J.

In his first three assignments of error the accused assigns as error the conclusion reached by the court, in paragraph 65 of the finding, that " Friedman, Isaacson, Baker, and Cohen set fire to and burned said factory building of A. Phillips & Co., Inc., with the knowledge of the defendant Frost and at his request and instigation and pursuant to their employment by Frost to burn said building," because not supported by the facts found. His fourth assignment is that this conclusion was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. His fifth and sixth assignments are that the evidence did not establish the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt and did not exclude every reasonable presumption and hypothesis of innocence. His tenth assignment is the error of the court in denying his motion to set aside the judgment. All of these assignments were intended to raise the one question:

" Whether, on all the evidence, the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged."

The procedure of trying criminal causes to the court at the election of the accused is of comparatively recent origin in this state, and the record in this case was prepared upon the analogy of the procedure in a civil case tried to the court. That the profession may no longer be in doubt about the proper procedure on appeal from the judgment in a criminal case tried to the court, we state the procedure.

The statute (Public Acts of 1921, c. 267, § 2), giving the accused his election to be tried by the court, was not intended to take from him any substantial right theretofore existing in behalf of one accused of crime. The court is, by this statute, substituted for the jury and fulfills, in the trial of a criminal cause without a jury, the duties of both court and jury. Fulfilling the function of the jury, the court determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and is governed in that decision by the same principles as would have governed the jury in passing upon that question. Fulfilling the function of the court, it determines, as in all cases, all interlocutory rulings made prior to or during the trial, and in its final decision applies the law to the facts found proved. Thus every question which could be legitimately made on appeal in the case tried to the jury can be made on appeal in the case tried to the court.

There is one difference in the case tried to the court which, of necessity, gives the accused an additional right. In the criminal case tried to the jury, the court makes up its finding on appeal by incorporating the facts offered in evidence and claimed to have been proved by either party; upon this record, on appeal, the instructions to the jury are tested. In the criminal case tried to the court, it makes a finding of the facts upon which its conclusions are reached. Its finding should contain the subordinate facts found and then the conclusions reached from those subordinate facts. The method thus far conforms with that of the civil case tried to the court. It is entirely practical to carry out this method in the case tried to the court. In that tried to the jury, there is no practical method of having the jury make a specific and detailed finding of the facts. In special cases a finding by the jury of certain specific facts may be had by way of a special verdict, or by way of answers to interrogatories. If there were a practical method of having the jury make in every case a finding of facts, that would be the best and the fairest practice. There is every reason for the adoption of this method, in the case tried to the court, and no reasonable objection to it, so far as we can conceive. The appeal may then bring up every interlocutory ruling and all errors predicated upon the conclusions reached by the court, and, if the facts found in material matters would support assignments of error for their correction or for addition thereto, these may be assigned as error on the appeal as in the present practice in civil cases tried to the court.

It is essential that the conclusions reached by the court should be stated in the finding. If these be conclusions of fact based upon the subordinate facts, these should be stated. If these be conclusions of law reached by the court of its own motion, or in passing upon claims of law made by either party, these should be stated. A conclusion in the finding that the accused had been proved guilty, as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, could only be tested on appeal by determining whether the subordinate facts fairly supported this conclusion. We approve of this method in State v. Henderson, 102 Conn. 658, 659, 129 A. 724.

If an accused, in a case tried to the jury, desires to raise the question whether upon the evidence he could be found proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, his only method of having that question determined on appeal would be by making his motion to set the verdict aside as against the evidence and assigning the denial of that motion as one of the grounds of his appeal. The legislative provision according to the accused the right to be tried by the court did not, in terms or by implication, deprive the accused of his right of appeal upon the ground that upon the evidence he could not be found proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, nor deprive him of any other right of appeal.

We must assume that every substantial right of appeal applicable in the case tried to the jury is applicable to that tried to the court, and that the procedure must conform as nearly as may be in the case tried to the court with that in the case tried to the jury. The judgment in the case tried to the court is the equivalent of the verdict in the case tried to the jury; the court taking the place of the jury, pro tanto. By analogy, to make the practice uniform in each of these methods of trial, after judgment the accused would be required to file his motion to set aside the judgment upon this ground, and, upon denial of his motion, take his appeal. This would require the trial court to again pass upon the ground necessarily involved in its judgment and delay the appeal pending the argument and disposition of the motion. In the interest of a simpler and speedier procedure, we think the making of this motion should be dispensed with and that the accused should only be required to assign this reason of appeal among his assignments of error, when the appeal is taken.

If this is the only reason of appeal, he must take his appeal within 10 days from the rendition of judgment, the practice in this case conforming as near as may be with that provided by General Statutes, § 5841, for setting aside a verdict. The procedure for securing the presentation of the evidence upon the record and the method of taxing costs against the accused, should he not prevail upon his appeal, shall be that now provided in the case of appeals from the denial of motions to set verdicts aside.

Reason 5 of the accused's assignment of errors sufficiently assigns this reason of appeal; it is properly before us under the practice we have outlined because made one of the many reasons of appeal at the time the appeal was taken. Upon this assignment we determine, upon the entire evidence, whether the trial court erred in holding upon the evidence that the accused had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Paragraph 65 is treated by the trial court as the finding of a subordinate fact; it is, in reality, a conclusion from the subordinate facts and properly treated as such by counsel for the accused in their brief. Testing the conclusion by the subordinate facts found, it is very clear that they do fully support this conclusion. In many particulars, counsel for the accused claim the facts are found without evidence, but since, if the corrections claimed were made, the ultimate question would still be " whether on all the evidence the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged," and that question must be determined under the fifth assignment of error, the counsel very properly do not attempt to point out the material corrections of the finding on which they rely, but confine their argument upon this point to a consideration of the evidence. We shall pursue the same course, for by it the rights of the accused will be fully protected. The procedure we outline will aid in rendering this new method of trying criminal causes by subjecting the decisions of our trial court to review in this court upon every question which could be reviewed in a case tried to the jury. The efficiency and serviceability of this method of trial has been fully approved in this jurisdiction, save only that it is thought to impose in capital cases too heavy a responsibility upon a single judge. It has likewise long been tried and approved in Maryland.

We dispose, first, of the principal ground of appeal--that the evidence does not establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel for the accused claimed that the accused was entitled to an acquittal because the state's case rested upon the uncorroborated testimony...